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THE CONTEMPLATED ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE: 1890–1901 *

ON March 17, 1890, the young Kaiser dismissed Bismarck from the chancellorship of the empire. He announced that though the pilot had changed, the course was to be the same. German historians, however, have rightly applied to the years following 1890 the term *der neue Kurs;* for the new pilots in part perhaps did not understand the old course, in part did not choose to follow it. The new chancellor, General von Caprivi, played no decisive part in foreign affairs, nor did Prince Hohenlohe, who succeeded him in 1894. The new foreign secretary, Freiherr von Marschall, who succeeded Her-

* This article is based primarily upon the documents of the German foreign office, published under the title of *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette,* to which all references merely by volume and number refer. As a supplementary source the writers have tried to make the fullest use of Eckardstein, *Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten* (Leipzig, 1919-1920), to which references are made under the author's name only. Lastly, they are indebted to Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1924) for suggestions and help of many kinds, and they have occasionally even quoted his words. All the documents in *Die grosse Politik* bearing upon direct negotiations for alliance or entente between Germany and England the writers have gone through and summarized; i. e. the documents dealing with Salisbury's proposal of 1895, with Chamberlain's proposal of 1898 and with the last negotiations of 1901, as well as with the developments growing out of the Jameson Raid and the Kruger telegram in the winter of 1895-1896. It was these episodes that were originally meant to be the topic of this article, but it proved impossible to isolate them from the events of the years from 1890 on. For other episodes, accordingly, the writers have followed Brandenburg's guidance. All his references to the German archives were verified in *Die grosse Politik,* and are here made by number of volume and document in that collection, as he himself gives them in the second (1925) edition of his book.

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bert Bismarck, was a political novice, whom the diplomats in Berlin dubbed *ministre étranger aux affaires.*[1] He was by no means wholly incompetent nor incapable of a policy, but in practice his policy was generally to follow the advice of the head of the political division of the foreign office, Baron von Holstein. So likewise did his successor, Count von Bülow, who replaced him in 1897, and still continued, even after succeeding Prince Hohenlohe in the chancellorship in 1900, to follow Holstein's lead, until the latter's retirement in 1906.

For fifteen years, therefore, the dominating influence in German foreign policy was this man, who never appeared in the open, who bore no responsibility for that policy or its results before either Kaiser or people. "Such a policy from the back office was unworthy of a great state".[2] Moreover, Holstein was a man little fitted for this extraordinary position: intelligent and experienced in his office, keenly intellectual, but a rationalizer and a theorist, too subtle to accept the simplest solution of any problem that came before him; in particular, little acquainted with or interested in economic problems; finally, by nature so abnormally distrustful of other men that he shunned unnecessary contact with them, and could never free himself in his office from personal dislikes and suspicions of his colleagues.[3]

It was, to be sure, only because of his subordinate position that Holstein survived the house-cleaning in the foreign office. The Kaiser would have no adherent of Bismarck left in any prominent position, nor did he consider trained and experienced subordinates necessary, or even desirable, so long as he was to be at the helm. Doubtless the Kaiser never ceased to believe that he was directing foreign policy, and his advisers found it easiest to let him think so. But it was not so. He interfered often enough, and by his whims and indiscretions frequently embarrassed them to an inconvenient degree, but just as often he yielded to their counsels, indeed almost always in questions

[1] Eckardstein, I, p. 131. [2] Brandenburg, p. 20.

[3] Concerning Holstein see Brandenburg, p. 20 *et passim;* Eckardstein, I, pp. 12 *et seq. et passim.*

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of prime importance, and no one of the really serious blunders of German diplomacy can be laid solely to his account. In spite of the custom of sending him important documents from the foreign office, which he would return adorned with marginal notes and appendices, it is sometimes doubtful how well he was kept informed of developments. Foreign governments, to be sure, did not trust him, but neither did they respect nor fear nor even greatly regard him: their official attitude towards Germany was not conditioned by what he did or said (talking was always his *mêtier* anyway). On the contrary, his ill-considered words continually affected public opinion in foreign countries, naturally most of all in England, and almost always unfavorably for Germany, sometimes in truth disastrously. If he was an important influence in and upon German foreign policy, as he must be allowed to have been, it is accordingly for this reason and this reason only. He was one of those unhappy beings specifically endowed with the gift of invariably saying at the crucial moment something so very bad that no good words before or after, nor even the fact that his acts generally belied his ill-chosen words, could ever undo the damage.[4] And so it came about that Holstein continued to pull the wires behind the scenes, where he had been since 1880.[5]

Within a few weeks of Bismarck's dismissal Germany declined to renew the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 with Russia,

[4] Concerning the Kaiser in relation to foreign policy see Brandenburg, pp. 17 *et seq.*; Eckardstein, I, p. 106 *et passim*.

[5] Eckardstein claims (I, p. 120) that there can be no doubt that he was involved in the intrigues against his old chief both before and after his dismissal, which may perhaps account for some of the bitterness of the surviving diplomats of Bismarck's school against him, as well as for his own particular dislike and suspicion of many of them. For example, Münster, the ambassador at Paris, wrote to Eckardstein in 1898: "How Holstein can permit himself, from a mere personal grudge, to leave me here at this important post completely unoriented, he will have to settle with his own conscience, if he has such a thing" (Eckardstein, I, p. 297). Similarly von Stumm, the ambassador at Madrid, said to him in 1891: "This big, dangerous fool Holstein . . . will get the German Empire into great troubles some day"; and in the same year Münster remarked to him: "I really don't know which he [Holstein] hates more, the French or me" (Eckardstein, I, pp. 143 and 142). Hatzfeldt and Eckardstein at London were among the few exceptions; with them Holstein even maintained a vigorous private correspondence.

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which he had already arranged with Russia to renew.[6] Whether the arguments against renewal, which Holstein did most to press, were sound or not, in any event this decision *per se* rescinded Bismarck's policy of maintaining Germany's position by a complicated system of alliances. *Propter hoc* perhaps not wholly, but certainly *post hoc* and that very soon, followed the Franco-Russian negotiations which culminated in the conclusion of a military convention early in 1894. The slight *rapprochement* with Russia around the time of the accession of Nicholas II and later the romantic correspondence of those passionate friends Willy and Nicky could make little difference after that. Russia was irreparably lost to Germany as a possible ally so long as Russia adhered to the new alliance with France.

The alternative was inevitable and very plain: England must be won, else Germany would be isolated in the Triple Alliance. Indeed, on the very day after Bismarck's dismissal the Kaiser made a speech at a dinner in Berlin at which the Prince of Wales was a guest: in the brotherhood of Waterloo England with her fleet, Germany with her army, must preserve the peace of the world.[7] And within three months the Heligoland agreement had been made with England. Upon Russian policy these acts could have only one effect. The German blunder lay in failing to perceive that this policy of cooperation with England must be adhered to before all else and in spite of all obstacles. Not that there was anything new in this policy, but that now it was the only policy: henceforth there could be no alternative whatsoever.[8]

[6] Brandenburg, pp. 20 *et seq.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[8] Bismarck had contemplated this very deal for Heligoland, though without paying too high a price, and in particular without alienating Russia. Far more than that, he had not only desired friendly cooperation with England, as in the Mediterranean agreement of 1887 between Austria and Italy and England, he had even hinted at an alliance in his letter to Salisbury in 1887. Salisbury had answered evasively (IV, 930 and 936), not only because England at that time felt no need of alliance, but because he suspected that Bismarck's letter, following closely upon a secret inquiry from Alexander III as to England's attitude in case of war between Russia and Germany, was prompted only by fear of Russia (Eckardstein, II, p. 154). Yet in 1889 Bismarck was still contemplating an alliance with England directed against France, although

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It was scarcely for lack of encouragement from England that Germany failed. For although it was not until later that England herself reached the point of suggesting an alliance, yet, throughout all these years from 1886 on, the necessity of as close cooperation as possible with Germany was plain to English statesmen. Lord Grey mentions the constant friction with Russia and France, the need of diplomatic support in Egypt which could be had only from the Triple Alliance, and finally "a belief that the power of the Triple Alliance made for stability and therefore for peace in Europe, that France and Russia, though militarily the weaker, were the restless powers, while the Triple Alliance was on the whole contented".[9] So England's chief motive in the deal involving Heligoland was to conciliate the good will of Germany.[10] So also England brought to bear her great influence in Rome to induce Italy to renew the Triple Alliance in 1891, although the Italian foreign minister was inclined to France;[11] therewith also the adherence of England to a North African agreement similar to the Mediterranean agreement of 1887 was contemplated.[12] The final explanation of what did happen lies, of course, in the fact that Germany after 1890 rapidly ceased to be contented. The policy of colonial expansion, reluctantly accepted by, or rather forced upon, Bismarck, with the later corollary of naval expan-

he fully realized the difficulties in the way (Brandenburg, p. 20), and there can be no doubt that he constantly looked to this as the culmination of his whole policy. Münster wrote to Eckardstein in 1898: "I know for certain that Bismarck always wanted an alliance with England. Since, however, he could not have it, he was occasionally much wrought up against England, as was natural to his choleric temperament" (Eckardstein, I, p. 296). In an analysis of this letter to Salisbury and the answer to it, Holstein told Eckardstein in 1901: "These two letters give the key to our policy since 1887" (Eckardstein, II, pp. 281 *et seq.*) Bülow also at the same time expressed a like opinion (XVII, 4992). That is, by her attitude at that time England pointed Germany towards the Russian door, which had already led to the Reinsurance Treaty. But by her own act in 1890 Germany closed that door. She had then to realize that thereby it was also locked, and that she must try and keep trying the key in the English door.

[9] Grey, *Twenty-five Years,* vol. I, p. 7.

[10] Lee, *Edward VII,* vol. I, pp. 662 *et seq.*

[11] Brandenburg, p. 30

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 30.

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sion, captivated the Kaiser, gradually generated for the first time a definite anti-English feeling in influential circles in the German government, more and more misled even the responsible directors of German foreign policy, and so furnished occasion for repeated friction with England which did not so much estrange England as alienate Germany from England, with the result that German statesmen misunderstood their own position and lost the ability to perceive England's position aright, clear of their own prepossessions and prejudices.

In May, 1892, Lord Rosebery, then foreign secretary in Gladstone's last cabinet, told the German ambassador, Count Hatzfeldt, that he preferred cooperation with Germany to colonial concessions in favor of France, and in July, alarmed by the prospect of war with France, he even suggested the possibility of England's joining the Triple Alliance. He was interested, to be sure, in egging on Italy against France, a danger of which Germany warned Italy to beware. Hatzfeldt advised asking if England were really ready to join the Triple Alliance, in which case Italy would back her to the limit, but France yielded the disputed point and Rosebery lost interest.[13] From this Marschall drew the conclusion that no power of the Triple Alliance could afford to support England without a definite understanding in advance; that England was only looking for somebody to pull the chestnuts out of the fire.[14] Two years later, in 1894, Rosebery led Marschall to another inference of still more fateful import to German policy. Rosebery was anxious to assure England of support by the Triple Alliance against the French fleet in the Mediterranean in the event of war with Russia. Germany was bound to refuse, for fear of Russia, and refused also to promise diplomatic pressure upon France, as being futile without a threat of war. Thereupon Rosebery threatened to come to an understanding with Russia and France.[15] Marschall was not impressed, and, when Rosebery did nothing to follow up his threat, concluded that the threat was mere bluff.[16] Possibly it was then, but it was not

[13] VIII, 1746, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1835.
[14] VIII, 1754, 1757.
[15] VIII, 2054.
[16] VIII, 2055.

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when it was repeated in 1898 and 1901. Meanwhile the silly legend of *la perfide Albion* and the "chestnut policy" of England, as Holstein never wearied of calling it, became *idées fixes* in the German foreign office.

It will be plain later how large a part fear of Russia continued to play in determining Germany's attitude toward England. But unquestionably the chief source of distrust of England lay in Germany's colonial ambitions. In particular, the growing irritation at finding the British Empire always in the way everywhere in the world was undoubtedly responsible for the bad diplomatic manners on Germany's part that repeatedly offended the English government; it was always colonial questions that gave occasion for these outbursts. Such friction began as early as January, 1893, when Germany suddenly threatened to withdraw diplomatic support in Egypt unless England ceased, as the Germans put it,[17] to support France against Germany in Asia Minor, or, as Grey puts it,[18] to compete for railroad concessions. In Grey's words, "There was no choice for us but to give way", although "we could not fairly have refused to consider an arrangement. . . . But it left a sense of discomfort and a bad taste behind; . . . the method adopted by Germany was not that of a friend; . . . it was open to Germany to repeat the squeeze".[19] From an agreement of November, 1893, with England in regard to Kamerun the Germans got the impression again that England was in general unfriendly to Germany's colonial ambitions (doubtless true enough *per se*), an impression which was reinforced when England refused to attempt to influence the United States to join her in relinquishing Samoa entirely to Germany,[20] and indelibly impressed upon their minds when in May, 1894, England concluded a treaty with Belgium in regard to certain African territorial questions which plainly ran counter to the provisions of the Congo Act of 1885. Germany joined France in protest against this viola-

[17] VIII, 1816; XIV, 3965 to 3974. The incident is not mentioned by Brandenburg.

[18] *Twenty-five Years*, vol. I, pp. 9 *et seq.*

[19] Germany did; e. g. see pp. 34-35, *infra*.

[20] Brandenburg, p. 32.

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tion of a previous agreement.[21] Grey demurely remarks: "This German protest was well-founded; there was such an agreement and it had been overlooked".[22] He ignores the fact that Rosebery did his best to make capital out of the situation, and that it was actually in the course of the ensuing dispute that he made his bid for support from the Triple Alliance and his threat to turn to France and Russia.

Unmistakably during the year 1894 relations between Germany and England became somewhat strained. In November, Rosebery, now prime minister, complained to Hatzfeldt of Germany's cooperation with England's enemies. Hatzfeldt answered plainly that so long as England opposed Germany in colonial questions and declined to guarantee the status quo in Europe for Germany's benefit, no more favors from Germany were to be expected.[23] Indeed, such warnings to England had begun as early as September, 1893.[24] Hatzfeldt, moreover, warned the government at home that a swing of England towards Russia and France was far from impossible. Even in the press of London it was being mentioned, and echoed in Paris, and answered in a new vein of hostility by the German press. Surely Hatzfeldt was not bluffing, yet he made no more impression upon Marschall than had Rosebery. Nevertheless, in a memorandum summing up his opinions on Anglo-German relations at the end of 1894, Marschall will leave the door open to an alliance, in the hope of a change of government in England favorable to Germany.[25]

A new motive, however, begins to appear in German foreign policy, in which lurked a great and, as it proved, fatal danger; i. e. the idea of utilizing Germany's favorable position between the Dual Alliance and England, not, in Bismarck's way, to preserve peace—if we may call the status quo peace—but for Germany's own particular advantage, and that not merely in holding what she had but in getting more.[26] Brandenburg, speaking as a German, has this to say: "The danger of this policy lay

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 33 *et seq.* [22] *Twenty-five Years*, vol. I, p. 21.
[23] IX, 2161. [24] VIII, 2018. [25] IX, 2162.
[26] *Cf.* a memorandum of the Kaiser's views, July 31, 1895, IX, 2318.

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in the fact that the orientation of general policy was based upon momentary gains in remote parts of the world; if we always inclined to the party that made the best bid, we were sure finally to get a reputation for unreliability".[27] The leading exponent of this policy was Holstein. His also was the new *modus operandi* which we shall meet again; i. e. temporary cooperation with England's enemies, as with France in the African dispute of 1894, for the ulterior purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon England to adopt an attitude in general more conciliatory to Germany's colonial ambitions. It was a policy not likely to be successful with England for very long, and very likely meanwhile to offend the temporary partner, as indeed it did offend France in this first case.[28]

In the spring of 1895 Germany joined Russia and France in depriving Japan of the fruits of victory in the war with China.[29] This was the first momentous blunder that the German statesmen of *der neue Kurs* made. Russia was helped in the Far East, with as little hope as ever of any lasting *rapprochement* so long as the Franco-Russian alliance lasted; Japan's enmity was gained; England, contrary to Germany's expectations, held aloof. The only profit to Germany was the acquisition of Kiao-chow, a pitiful reward (even against this it was from Russia that the strongest protests came, not from England), while at the same time the other European powers also added to their holdings in China, Russia herself taking the biggest plum in Port Arthur.[30] The idea of the Germans was that Russia, kept busy in the Far East, would cease to be a European danger, especially to Austria, in the Near East;[31] indeed, the Czar said as much to the Kaiser the year after.[32] In that case France could offer Russia no inducement to support her in any attempt to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The Kaiser seems also to have

[27] Brandenburg, p. 43.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 36; Mévil, *De la paix de Francfort à la conférence d'Algésiras* (Paris, 1909), pp. 6 *et seq.*

[29] Brandenburg discusses this episode in detail, pp. 44 *et seq.*

[30] Brandenburg, pp. 83 *et seq.*

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 56 *et seq.*

[32] XI, 2868.

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infected his advisers with his "Yellow Peril" mania.[33] The German policy assumed that the Czar would maintain his friendly attitude towards Germany and that he would continue to direct Russian foreign policy, most of all that Russia would be continuously successful in the Far East. "We had staked everything on one card that we did not even hold in our hand", is Brandenburg's comment. "The lines laid down at that time were followed until the downfall of Russia in East Asia in 1905 overthrew the whole structure. For this reason it is that the events of this spring were of such great import. Here already the knots of destiny were tied."[34] And these were the statesmen who were afraid to take a chance on England! Whether the policy originated with the Kaiser or with Holstein via Marschall, they were all agreed on it and they ignored Hatzfeldt's warnings to beware of Russia. Henceforth fear of Russia was a motive stronger than ever in German foreign policy, for Russia with a free hand in the Far East was the foe of Germany's one possible ally, while Russia in Europe remained the ally of Germany's one enemy.

The attempt of Salisbury, who had succeeded Rosebery as prime minister in June, to come to a definite agreement with Germany against the time of the eventual collapse of Turkey, marks the first definite step of the English government towards a closer general understanding not only with Germany but with the whole Triple Alliance. Salisbury's idea was that of Nicholas I before the Crimean War: divide the spoils instead of quarreling over them.[35] In particular it would appease Italy, whose ambitions in Abyssinia seemed to Salisbury unwise, by giving her an outlet in the Balkans and North Africa. In general, by involving Austria directly and Germany indirectly, it opened a field for the closest sort of cooperation in the future between the Triple Alliance and England. Salisbury was willing to broach the question to no other power.

Hatzfeldt saw clearly the advantages of such an agreement in advance. It would strengthen the Triple Alliance within; it

[33] XI, 2858, 2861, 2862; Brandenburg, pp. 51 *et seq.*

[34] Brandenburg, p. 60.

[35] X, 2369 to 2372.

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would harmonize the Balkan policies of Austria and Russia (since Salisbury was willing to let Constantinople and the Dardanelles go to Russia and to compensate Austria with Saloniki); finally, it would tend to weaken the Dual Alliance by making France less important to Russia.[36] The Kaiser, too, came to see its advantageous possibilities,[37] although originally he was for nothing so "*echt englisch*."[38] But Holstein, though urging Hatzfeldt to press upon England the matter of support for Italy, would have nothing to do with the proposal[39] until Salisbury had grown cool over it, and the Italians had modified their claims in Abyssinia,[40] and the unfortunate incidents of the Kaiser's meeting with Salisbury during his visit to Cowes in early August had befogged the whole atmosphere.[41]

The considerations of the German foreign office are important because already here in 1895 they bring to light the fundamental prepossessions of German policy that were to block the succeeding English attempts to reach an understanding with Germany. Holstein could not believe that Salisbury's proposal was the frank attempt at an understanding that the German documents at least show it to have been. He interpreted it as an attempt on England's part to involve the continent in difficulties in which England should not participate but of which she should be the final arbiter; or else, he insisted, England was merely trying to divert attention from Egypt.[42] For Germany to make proposals in the matter, as Salisbury after a first rebuff suggested,[43] was to risk the danger of breaking "the bridge to Russia" and tying up her "free hand", which he was convinced was what England wanted anyway. A month's negotiations therewith came to nothing. Salisbury succeeded in making himself gloriously misunderstood. An extreme incredulity of anything English, the eternal necessity of penetrating English proposals for the hidden motive, the desire to get around this English subtlety with a keener German subtlety

[36] X, 2390, 2391, 2392.
[37] Note to X, 2391.
[38] X, 2380.
[39] X, 2379.
[40] X, 2381, 2382, 2385, 2386.
[41] X, 2384.
[42] X, 2373, 2374, 2377.
[43] X, 2375.

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(the product of Holstein's mind), an exaggerated concern for "the bridge to Russia" and the "free hand"—all these things led to futility. If Salisbury could not be understood, Chamberlain's straightforwardness later was sure to be baffling, the more so as he became more specific.

To return to the Kaiser's visit to Cowes: according to the official record[44] the momentous interview with Salisbury took place after dinner on August fifth. A second interview, requested by the Kaiser over the telephone for the afternoon of the next day, never took place. The Kaiser waited on his yacht *Hohenzollern* several hours, but Salisbury was detained in audience with the Queen, and returned to London the morning of the seventh without ever hearing of the invitation. On the eighth he wrote to Hatzfeldt expressing his regret for the misunderstanding.[45] There is in the documents at this time no allusion to any unpleasantness between the Kaiser and Salisbury, nor to any impoliteness on either side except Salisbury's failure to keep an appointment of which he was ignorant.[46]

[44] X, 2385. [45] X, 2386.

[46] Eckardstein mentions only one interview, on August eighth, on board the Hohenzollern, for which Salisbury kept the Kaiser waiting over an hour because of a breakdown in the engine of his boat. In consequence the Kaiser had got nervous and was inclined to be temperamental, so that when Salisbury came to suggest the desirability of putting an end to Abdul Hamid and his régime, the Kaiser came to the defense of his "friend" and the conversation became heated. Now this was certainly not the interview officially recorded in the German foreign office. Anyone, however, who reads Eckardstein's detailed story (I, pp. 211 *et seq.;* II, pp. 284 *et seq.*) will find it hard to agree offhand with the editors of *Die Grosse Politik* (note on X, 2385) that no such "second" interview ever took place. To Eckardstein it is not a second interview at all, but the interview that took place between the two men. Moreover, Sir Valentine Chirol (London *Times,* Sept. 11, 13, 1920) seems to agree with Eckardstein, and adds moreover a remark of Salisbury to his secretary, that in the future it would be desirable to have a third person present at interviews with the Kaiser, "since he seems to have the habit of putting his own words into the mouths of those that talk with him". (See also Eckardstein, III, pp. 11 *et seq.*) It is indeed extraordinary that the German documents contain no allusions to such an interview, but the *argumentum ex silentio,* especially in the case of official documents, can surely not be pressed too far. Even in the documents, Holstein's later allusion (XVII, 5019, June 14, 1901) to a fact "not generally known", that the Kaiser repudiated Salisbury's suggestion so strongly that the latter took offense and refused to meet him again, shows

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In any event, for some reason a profound distrust of Salisbury became henceforth a *Leitmotif* in the German foreign office. So far as concerns the Kaiser, it is impossible to show from the documents that it originated with this episode. Eckardstein says it did,[47] and elsewhere quotes from a private telegram of Holstein to him on March 20, 1901: "It was his [Salisbury's] fortune by his churlish conduct at Cowes in 1895 to bring the best friend that England had in Germany, the Kaiser, to a frame of mind that contributed to the sending of the Kruger telegram."[48] So far as the documents go, the Kaiser comments that, since it is not possible to drive the partition plan out of Salisbury's head, it will have to be reckoned with in the future, and may after all be worth while for the Triple Alliance;[49] and later he even remarks that Salisbury may be right after all in his idea of putting an end to Abdul Hamid's régime.[50] At any rate, there is no doubt that this feeling towards Salisbury did later come to possess the Kaiser's mind.[51] If it was not *propter hoc* it was at any rate *post hoc*, and it became later a matter of such grave consequence that it may be stressed here as well as elsewhere.[52]

either that there was a second interview, or else that the whole truth about the one interview is not to be found in the document recording it at the time. Certainly the mistake is not likely to be in Holstein's memory, for that is not his kind of mistake. That such a meeting could have fallen on the same date as Salisbury's note of apology is surely not impossible.

To be sure, the editors of *Die grosse Politik* severely impugn Eckardstein's accuracy upon many occasions, and even his veracity upon some. See particularly Thimme's article (referred to in footnote 62), p. 212 note and p. 240. But this is not a question of accuracy in detail, and if it is all merely false it is a very poor lie, because, like all Eckardstein's statements, it is extremely and even unnecessarily detailed. Eckardstein himself elsewhere suggests (in emphasizing the importance of Holstein's private correspondence, which was, he says, often inconsistent with his official despatches) that a document is not necessarily true because it is official (I, pp. 13 *et seq.*).

[47] Eckardstein, I, pp. 210 *et seq.*

[48] *Ibid.*, II, p. 282.

[49] Note to X, 2391.

[50] Note to X, 2416.

[51] *Cf. infra*, pp. 28, 37-38.

[52] See R. J. Sontag, "The Cowes Interview and the Kruger Telegram," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, June 1925, pp. 217 *et seq.* The writers can not agree with this article in every detail, but they would particularly call into question the statement on p. 228, "During the subsequent visits of the Kaiser, even at the opening of the Boer War, when Germany's good will was vital

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The same suspicion possessed, if it did not actually dominate, Holstein's mind; he indeed seems to have succeeded in distrusting Salisbury even more than he distrusted most men, particularly Englishmen. Eckardstein speaks of the unhappy effects of this feeling even on Hatzfeldt's later relations with Salisbury.[53] In January, 1896, Holstein remarks to Hatzfeldt that probably not even the Transvaal question but only time and a change of personnel in the government will bring England to see the necessity of a continental alliance.[54] Still more, he states in a later memorandum that he distrusts the English government and people even more than he distrusts Courcel (the envoy in London of Germany's sworn enemy!), and that in the reaction of the English to the Kruger telegram, as compared with their reception of President Cleveland's Venezuela message, he can discern nothing but a deep fear of Germany's commercial rivalry in the future and a determination on England's part at any cost to keep a free hand against Germany with an eye to the trouble that England considers inevitable in the future.[55] Finally, even in June, 1901, he can find nothing in Salisbury's past conduct to warrant hope that he truly and earnestly desires an alliance with Germany.[56] So far as con-

for England, Lord Salisbury refused to meet him." Certainly Salisbury did not meet him, but he urged him to come to England specifically that he might have a personal interview with him, which is hardly consistent with an unwillingness to meet him. (See XIV, 4077.)

Nor are the writers ready to agree with Sontag (p. 228, note 3) that "the general acceptance which Eckardstein's story has been accorded by serious historical scholars illustrates in a striking manner the lax critical standards which have been applied to sources dealing with the pre-war period". The memory of "the splenetic and untrustworthy Baron von Eckardstein" (p. 221) is, he says (p. 228), "not to be trusted when not supported by documents". What documents? Official documents? Eckardstein relied upon his diary and upon letters to guide his memory, which are surely documents. How can such questions be settled, if ever, until the contents of the English archives are known? (*Cf. supra,* footnote 46.)

[53] Eckardstein, II, pp. 14 *et seq.*

[54] XI, 2621. Just so in November 1894 Marschall had resolved to keep the door open to England in hope of a change of government. Well, the change came, from Rosebery to Salisbury, i. e. from liberal to conservative, just as the Germans hoped. What change would have satisfied them?

[55] XI, 2637. [56] XVII, 5019.

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cerns Salisbury's feelings we know little, but this much we shall perceive, that henceforth he becomes increasingly sceptical of the possibility of reaching an understanding with Germany, increasingly reluctant to participate in negotiations, still more to initiate them.[57]

Meanwhile, all through 1895, trouble between England and Germany had been brewing over the South African Republic. In February the English ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, accused Germany of "coquetting" with the Transvaal. Marschall denied the charge, and declared that Germany's sole policy in regard to South Africa was the maintenance of the status quo, according to the treaty of 1884, which provided for the economic independence of the Republic, although its political foreign relations were under some sort of English supervision.[58] In a farewell call upon Marschall in October, before turning over his post to the new ambassador Sir Frank Lascelles, Sir Edward Malet renewed his charge. He referred to Germany's encouragement of the Boers to an anti-English attitude as "the one dark spot" in Anglo-German relations, which if continued "might lead to serious consequences".[59] The Kaiser, who was instantly informed, in an interview the same day with Col. Swaine, the British military attaché, chose to regard the remarks of Malet as "a virtual ultimatum". "So for the sake of a few square miles full of niggers and palm trees England has threatened with war her only real friend, the German Kaiser, nephew of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland."[60] Hatzfeldt telegraphed immediately that Salisbury was "surprised and sorry", but the Kaiser would be satisfied with nothing less than a formal disavowal and assurance by Salisbury that Malet had spoken without instructions. To this Salisbury agreed, whereupon the Kaiser consented to regard the "virtual ultimatum" as "a piece of insolence".[61] The episode is of interest as the first of a series of such temperamental outbreaks against England on the Kaiser's part.

[57] *Cf. infra*, pp. 48-49.

[58] XI, 2577.

[59] XI, 2578.

[60] XI, 2579.

[61] XI, 2580 to 2584.

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When, however, the trouble was actually brought to a head by the Jameson Raid in the last days of December, the steps that Germany took were by no means due wholly, if indeed chiefly, to concern over the treaty of 1884, or even to concern for the protection of German lives and property in the Transvaal, the two avowed—and *per se* quite genuine—motives of German policy. It must be particularly insisted upon that beyond the declared policy of maintaining the status quo Germany seems really to have had no South African policy whatsoever.[62] No more had the project of a landing corps from the German cruiser *Seeadler* at Delagoa Bay to protect German citizens and property in Pretoria been planned in advance;[63] it was not until December 31 that President Kruger[64] and the Portuguese government[65] were asked for permission. Dangerous in particular this act of Germany certainly was, for had not Portugal flatly refused permission on January 3, 1896, and, when the German request was renewed, refused again on the eighth except in case further events should imperil German lives and property,[66] public opinion in England would have made war inevitable—or so at least Eckardstein says that Salisbury told him in 1899.[67] Even President Kruger showed better

[62] A warning from the consul at Pretoria on Dec. 24 that trouble of some sort was impending was promptly communicated by Marschall to the English ambassador, with a restatement of Germany's insistence upon the status quo (XI, 2585, 2586). Of the eleven despatches to the consul at Pretoria preserved in the archives of the foreign office for 1895, only two are political at all, and those two subsequent to the raid. (See in Thimme, "Die Krüger-Depesche: Genesis und historische Bedeutung", *Europäische Gespräche,* Mai-Juni 1924, pp. 201 *et seq.,* p. 203.) One, of Dec. 30, is the first statement of German policy to Pretoria, and that coupled with a warning to President Kruger that to keep Germany's good will he must avoid all provocation of England (XI, 2587). The consul at Lourenço Marques (Delagoa Bay) had even been reproved on Dec. 18 for having advised the Boer agent Dr. Leyds in November to go to Berlin "in order to inform himself authentically of the attitude of the German government" (Thimme, p. 204).

[63] As Sir Valentine Chirol suggested in the London *Times* of Jan. 8, 1896; see Thimme, p. 204, note.

[64] XI, 2591.

[65] Even then only for fifty men from only the one cruiser; Eckardstein is therefore wrong in speaking of a larger force (I, p. 275).

[66] Note on XI, 2591.

[67] Eckardstein, I, pp. 275 *et seq.*

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sense than Marschall in following Marschall's own advice, for he advised delay "in order not to complicate the situation", and so gave time for the German foreign office to learn of the utter failure of the raid, which obviated that difficulty for good.[68]

Following receipt of the news of the beginning of the march of Dr. Jameson's freebooters, Marschall in the name of the Kaiser on December 31 instructed Hatzfeldt to inquire officially whether the English government approved of the violation by the Chartered Company of the borders of the Transvaal; if so, he was to ask for his passports; if not, to ask what steps the English government intended to take to right this wrong.[69] The next day Hatzfeldt replied that Salisbury did not approve and had ordered Jameson to retire at once; that in his opinion the government would enforce the order, as the whole incident was very unwelcome to Salisbury.[70] On January 2, on the theory that the English government would allow its orders to be disobeyed, Hatzfeldt was instructed to state officially that Germany was "not disposed to accept any alteration whatever in the international status of the South African Republic as guaranteed by treaty". When he telegraphed from London that the raiders had been defeated by the Boers and forced to surrender, Marschall then telegraphed back to him to withhold the official communication, which Hatzfeldt was able to get back at the Foreign Office the next morning, luckily still unopened.[71] The next day Marschall instructed Hatzfeldt to tell Salisbury how glad he was to be relieved by the course of events in the Transvaal from a painful commission which had consisted in the communication of an official note to him—this by way of scaring Salisbury.[72] The crisis was now passed. The same day, January 3, Marschall instructed the consul at Pretoria that, while Germany would support a conference of the powers on the international status of the Transvaal, she would take no initiative,[73] and, from January 5 on, all instructions to him coun-

[68] XI, 2601.
[69] XI, 2590.
[70] XI, 2596, 2597.
[71] XI, 2600 to 2606.
[72] XI, 2607.
[73] XI, 2609.

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seled President Kruger to moderation, counsels which ultimately prevailed.[74] Furthermore, on January 7 Hohenlohe warns the Kaiser to beware of the Boer agent Dr. Leyds, who merely desires to make a tool of Germany, regardless of the consequences to Germany.[75]

The most important declaration that Germany made was not, of course, in the form of an official despatch from the foreign office and was not addressed to England at all, i. e. the notorious telegram of January 3 from the Kaiser to President Kruger.[76] As to how this telegram came to be sent and what it signified, Thimme, one of the editors of *Die Grosse Politik*, after exhaustive investigation and collation of all the available—and often contradictory—evidence, reaches the following conclusions.[77] The Kaiser came to a conference at the foreign office that morning with proposals that would inevitably at the very least and best have completely isolated Germany. He was argued out of these ideas by Hohenlohe and Marschall and the naval representatives who constituted the council. But something had to be done. The telegram was then drafted by Kayser, head of the colonial division of the foreign office, and submitted to the council by Marschall. The phraseology was sharpened by inserting the allusion to independence, by Marschall but certainly not of his own volition, since he clearly knew better.[78] To appease the Kaiser, and indeed to satisfy

[74] XI, 2615, 2616, 2617.

[75] XI, 2618. Sontag's statement (p. 244, article cited in footnote 52, *supra*), "In the correspondence of the Wilhelmstrasse with the Boer agents assurances of support gave way to counsels of moderation", seems misleading. Neither the documents in *Die Grosse Politik* nor Thimme's study (*supra*, footnote 62), to which Sontag refers, reveal anything that could fairly be called "assurances of support" without careful qualification.

[76] XI, 2610. The following is a translation. "I offer you my heartiest congratulations that without appealing for the help of friendly powers you and your people have been successful, by your own might against the armed host which burst into your land in breach of peace, in restoring peace and maintaining the independence of your land against attacks from without."

[77] Article cited in footnote 62, *supra*. See also Lee, *Edward VII*, pp. 721 *et seq.*

[78] For once, Thimme thinks, Holstein seems to have had nothing, or at any rate comparatively little, to do with the decision of the chancellor and the foreign secretary. *Cf.* however Eckardstein, I, p. 277.

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German public opinion, perhaps nothing less would have done at the time.[79] And in fact the telegram was not only enormously popular for some time in Germany, but at first throughout Europe as well—everywhere but in England.

Therefore the telegram, while it was a "diplomatic impromptu", was an act of government none the less. Its purpose can hardly be better expressed than in the words of Sir Valentine Chirol, then Berlin correspondent of the London *Times*.[80] "The purpose of the telegram was clearly two-fold. It was a bid for popularity at home, which in the present internal situation was eminently desirable, and it was a warning to England that she could only find salvation in closer contact with Germany and her allies". Years later Sir Valentine Chirol reiterated:[81] "The object seems to have been not so much war with England as the use of a threat to force England to come to terms with the Triple Alliance, for that indeed was the one object of German policy throughout all these years"[82]

In fact, Holstein's idea of acting upon occasion in concert with some one of England's enemies had ripened into the brilliant idea of a sort of temporary alliance of all the continental

[79] The Kaiser was in fact greatly excited, as best appears from his letter to the Czar of January 2 (Goetz, *Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren*, p. 301): "The Transvaal Republic has been attacked in a most foul way, as it seems not without England's knowledge. I have used very severe language in London and have opened communications with Paris for common defense of our endangered interests. [This was untrue, of course.] . . . I hope that all will come right, but come what may I will never allow Britain to stamp out the Transvaal".

The Russian answer was very polite and non-committal (XI, 2621, 2622). Particularly diverting is the Czar's telegram (XI, 2623): "My very best thanks for your kind letter. Quite agree with all you say." Most diverting of all is the Kaiser's letter to Queen Victoria on January 8, in which he claims that his telegram to President Kruger was meant to maintain peace and to express his indignation at the outrage done to the Queen. (Lee, *Edward VII*, pp. 725 *et seq.*, prints the letter, together with the letter to the Czar.)

[80] *Times*, Jan. 6, 1896.

[81] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1924.

[82] Of course nothing could have been further from the German government's thoughts than war. In his private diary on January second, when the news came of the failure of the raid, Marschall wrote "Thank God" (Thimme, p. 211).

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powers for certain fixed objects only.[83] Each should gain some specific concession by consent of the others without consulting England, which was to be scared especially through Italy. Marschall at the same time darkly intimated the same possibility to Sir Frank Lascelles,[84] and Hohenlohe commented to the same effect to Münster, the ambassador at Paris.[85] Of course nothing came of it. Russia would just then have been glad enough to see the Transvaal question become *casus belli* between Germany and England.[86] Austria was alarmed at the very thought of alienating England, not to say joining any combination against her.[87] For Italy on January 11 Crispi actually offered his "good offices in the conflict between England and Germany"[88] In any event the whole idea was completely frustrated by France. When the French ambassador learned on January 1 from Marschall that Egypt would be excluded from the scope of the proposed understanding, he made it clear that France was not interested, since that alone proved that Marschall was not really in earnest.[89] It soon became clear to Germany, if it was not already, that for France all other questions were subordinate to the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, France was so little interested in the proposal that it was used in Paris as a pretense for considering the possibility of an Anglo-French understanding against Germany,[90] if in fact Courcel, the ambassador at London, did not actually communicate it to Salisbury.[91] Not that the Germans would have minded that; Marschall remarks on January 3 that nothing would suit him better than for Italy to warn England.[92] For indeed Germany was not in desperate earnest, if in earnest at all. Holstein wrote to Hatzfeldt on January 10 that, while Germany could make it worth while for France and Russia to support her against England, yet a disaster to England would be a

[83] Memorandum of Dec. 30, 1895, XI, 2640.

[84] XI, 2589.

[85] XI, 2641.

[86] XI, 2624, 2628.

[87] XI, 2645, 2688, 2678; XII, 2927.

[88] XI, 2634.

[89] XI, 2739, 2744 and Brandenburg, p. 71; see also Mévil (footnote 28), pp. 8 *et seq.*

[90] XI, 2650, 2651, 2657.

[91] Brandenburg, p. 73.

[92] XI, 2644.

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danger to Germany: "better a little diplomatic victory for Germany and a little political lesson for England".[93] Probably Holstein was wrong in his estimate of Germany's means of conciliating France. At any rate, Marschall had caught on by January 19, when he said that England was plainly correct in basing her policy [*sic*] on a belief that the continental powers were "too busy with their own family quarrels to keep an eye on what England is up to in the rest of the world".[94]

This, then, was Germany's method of working for an alliance with England. For although Holstein was very careful to avoid making any use of this particular South African difficulty in his flirtation with other powers,[95] none the less this was the mentality of the German foreign office from which the communications to England and the telegram to President Kruger proceeded. The Kruger telegram was therefore by no means inconsistent with this policy of Germany: if its allusions to friendly powers and to independence and its silence as to England's own official disavowal of the acts of the raiders irritated England, that is what it was intended to do. Foolish as well as somewhat dangerous that policy surely was. For what in the world could Germany have done to back up the smallest of her threats? Furthermore, it was fundamentally unwise, and its consequences were disastrous. It did not alienate the English government. If its motive was understood by the correspondent of the *Times*, we may be sure that it was no less clearly understood by the government, and this it is that doubtless explains Salisbury's friendly attitude throughout and the fact that the government "kept its head."[96] It seems, however, not to have occurred to the Germans that the very means they took to attain their ends might make those ends more difficult if not impossible to attain. As Hatzfeldt pointed out, Salisbury had at any rate been forced to contemplate the possibility of an anti-English policy on Germany's part—a policy which, however the subtle Germans meant it, the simple English would be compelled finally to regard as hostile, and so to contemplate

[93] XI, 2649.
[94] XI, 2651.
[95] XI, 2629.
[96] XI, 2636.

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the contingency of being driven to act with Russia and France (a warning which in this case made the same impression upon the German foreign office that it always made). For upon English public opinion the effect of the Kruger telegram was wholly bad.[97] Nor did the government do anything to correct and enlighten that opinion, as Hatzfeldt remarks,[98] and even Salisbury himself continued to be fond of "biting allusions to the Kruger telegram".[99] According to Eckardstein, the conduct of Hohenlohe and Marschall drove Hatzfeldt to "wring his hands in despair" over their "incomprehensible folly"[100]—a charge from which Thimme is at pains to defend them.[100a] Within the walls of the German foreign office the defense may hold; once outside those walls, most of all in London, the seat of the government with which Germany desired an alliance, certainly not much else remains but folly.[101]

After all this it may seem surprising that the Kaiser on December 20, 1895, should have broached to Colonel Swaine the possibility of a definite alliance of England and Germany, together with a warning that otherwise England might in time find the continental powers arrayed solidly against her.[102] No acknowledgment came from London, however, nor was Mar-

[97] See Brandenburg, p. 72: "Nothing affected public opinion in England so unfavorably for the Kaiser and German policy as the Kruger telegram. In after years it was held up to the German statesmen as an unfriendly act". *Cf.* Grey, *Twenty-five Years,* vol. I, p. 36: "Though the dramatic demonstration of the German emperor's telegram may not have initiated . . . suspicion, the recollection of the telegram strengthened it in later and more dangerous years".

[98] XI, 2636. Hatzfeldt speaks also of many anonymous letters of threat and abuse addressed to him.

[99] Brandenburg, p. 98.

[100] Eckardstein, I, p. 278. Eckardstein also remarks that Münster's favorite term for the foreign office was *das Zentralrindvieh,* "the headquarters blockheads".

[100a] For Thimme's view see his article cited in footnote 62, *supra,* pp. 234 *et seq.*

[101] The writers can not agree with Sontag's statement (p. 245) that "the events of January 1896 had at least shown the danger of the bludgeoning policy by which the Wilhelmstrasse had sought to force home these ideas". Would that they had! See p. 34 *infra* in regard to German methods in 1899 and pp. 37-38 *infra* in regard to 1900.

[102] X, 2572.

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schall in favor of so simple an arrangement, fearing that Germany would commit herself to too much in undertaking to defend England's Indian empire against Russia.[103] But all was not well within the Triple Alliance. Austria and Italy both blamed the estrangement between Germany and England for England's refusal in February, 1896, to renew the Mediterranean agreement of 1887, and Italy, already uneasy at England's refusal to support her ambitions in Abyssinia, was still further alarmed by her disaster there on March 1.[104] The Kaiser then returned to his suggestion on March 4 in an interview with Lascelles, in which he tried to scare him with dreadful pictures of the danger to England and the Triple Alliance alike from Russia and France.[105] Salisbury replied that he was anxious to restore "our former friendly and intimate relations", but that England could enter upon no alliance binding her to any *casus belli*, because of public opinion and because it was unnecessary for her. He would continue to incline towards the Triple Alliance, which had always hitherto satisfied the Kaiser, although now after the Kruger telegram he could be surprised at nothing.[106]

Again in December, 1896, Hatzfeldt declared Germany's readiness at any time to enter into a formal alliance, but Salisbury answered again that, even were it consistent with England's interest, it remained inconsistent with English tradition.[107] Finally, in November, 1897, Bülow, the new foreign secretary attributing Russia's protests against the occupation of Kiaochow to a disposition to take advantage of the estrangement between Germany and England, instructed Hatzfeldt to ascertain if at least a slight and gradual *rapprochement* were not possible, "which in any event we have never lost from view".[108] Hatzfeldt found Salisbury not interested in his suggestion that Germany might support England in Hawaii against the United States in return for concessions in Samoa, though he seemed willing enough to listen to other suggestions on colonial ques-

[103] X, 2569.
[104] Brandenburg, pp. 75-76.
[105] XI, 2771, 2772
[106] XI, 2639, 2779.
[107] XII, 2629.
[108] XIV, 3698, 3702.

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tions. When, however, Hatzfeldt spoke of the desirability of all such specific understandings as tending to improve general relations, Salisbury indulged in another allusion to the Kruger telegram. Hatzfeldt warned the government at home to beware of Russia and to expect nothing of England at present, nor—once again—to be surprised even at an understanding between England and the Dual Alliance.[109]

Once again, however, Hatzfeldt was mistaken; the wolf had not really come yet. The next thing that did come from England was a suggestion for an alliance. The Germans might well be surprised. We have seen them hinting, suggesting, even offering, an alliance. We have seen them trying to scare England, even by devious methods to coerce England into an alliance. Now we shall see what they did when an alliance was offered to them. Meanwhile, through the war between Greece and Turkey over Crete in 1897, we can get a further glimpse into the peculiar mentality of the German statesmen before whom this proposal of England is about to be laid.

In regard to the war, the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance acted together to secure localization of the conflict, to blockade Crete, to bring pressure to bear upon Greece to accept the Turkish terms after her defeat. English feeling, on the contrary, was strongly pro-Greek, though under the circumstances England could do nothing for Greece. Marschall was delighted at the realization in this instance of his dream of a continental block holding England in check, though he realized now as well as before that the idea had no lasting validity.[110] Why the policy of the English government should have puzzled any observer at all familiar with the attitude of England towards Turkey during the recent Armenian troubles, why it should have puzzled that government in particular to which Salisbury had broached his plan for a partition of spheres of interest in the Turkish realm, seems hard to understand. Yet even Hatzfeldt, who of all Germans should have known better—and generally did know better—seems to have suspected that English policy was in fact still aiming at a rapid collapse of Turkey,

[109] XIII, 3420; XIV, 3708, 3709. [110] XII, 3427, Feb. 1, 1897.

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such as would precipitate a continental war in which England would step in at the end to seize what share of the prizes she chose.[111] "Perhaps even he [Hatzfeldt] went too far in his suspicions. English policy is more likely to proceed point by point than to work out such far-reaching artificial plans, whose execution still remains uncertain."[112] Still further, this was the very man to whom Salisbury had said, when Hatzfeldt spoke of the uneasiness which the uncertain and on the face of it unintelligible English policy in the Armenian question had occasioned on the Continent, that he was quite aware that he was given credit for *arrières-pensées* abroad, because, he thought, of the fact that English parliamentary government was not well understood outside England; and that indeed, if he were asked why he had not done this or that at such and such a time, he could only answer, "*Parce que je n'avais pas envie de perdre ma majorité.*"[113] This was Hatzfeldt, the wise, moderate, discreet, experienced Hatzfeldt, in London. What then could Bülow with his love of finesse and Holstein alone in his private office in Berlin be expected to think?

The first definite proposal of alliance from England, the second important attempt to achieve a closer understanding with Germany, the negotiations of 1898, have to do with a new name, Joseph Chamberlain.[114] The way was opened for Chamberlain by a conversation of Balfour with Hatzfeldt, the general tenor of which was that there was no essential conflict between German and English interests.[115] Even this preliminary conversation, however, brought up again as one of the chief difficulties in the way of any agreement the old question of reciprocation of imperial interests. Chamberlain himself in a con-

[111] XII, 2931.

[112] Brandenburg, p. 82. Just so Grey remarks, in a more general sense: "If all secrets were known it would probably be found that British foreign ministers have been guided by what seems to them to be the immediate interest of their country, without making elaborate calculations for the future." (*Twenty-five Years*, I, p. 6).

[113] XI, 2639, March 15, 1896.

[114] Oddly enough Lord Grey in his recent memoirs has nothing whatever to say of these 1898 negotiations. What is the explanation?

[115] XIV, 3778, 3779, 3780.

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fidential conversation with Hatzfeldt on March 29 brought the whole question quickly to a head.[116] England needed an alliance to insure peace: Russia in China, France in West Africa, had acquired an influence the increase of which England could no longer tolerate. The identity of English and German commercial interests should lead to an agreement on major issues that would solve all minor ones. If England had an alliance with Germany she could back Germany in China without fear of French or Russian complications. Since she had to choose an ally, her choice would be Germany; she might even for the sake of German support adhere to the Triple Alliance. Moreover, she was forced to make her decision soon. What were the German ideas concerning the terms of such an agreement?

The Germans could not bring themselves to the point of thinking of terms: such directness was not conventional.[117] Suppose, they argued, they did make an alliance; it would be perfectly easy for the English to cast it aside by a simple change of government in the moment of Germany's need. What could England want now of an alliance with Germany anyway? Germany would never suffer the position of England as a great power to be weakened. It was rather to England's interest to have Germany neutral on the Continent, in case of trouble with Russia and consequently France, since Germany could keep France quiet. Besides, without an alliance England could placate Russia with concessions in the Far East, which would diminish the possibility of Russian assistance to France against England or Germany. Against France alone England had nothing at all to fear. Let England give heed to this continental situation before Russia should lose her mood to be conciliated.

Chamberlain could see no point in these preoccupations.[118] He found no precedent in English history to warrant any fear that England, if bound by an alliance, would leave Germany in the lurch at the critical moment. In fact, he approved of parliamentary ratification of any agreement, which did not seem to him at all doubtful. As to Russia, what England was inter-

[116] XIV, 3782. [117] XIV, 3783. [118] XIV, 3784.

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ested in was to keep her from further aggression in China, to keep the rest of China open to England and, if Germany was interested, to Germany too. England could decide upon no Russian policy for the future until this question of an alliance was closed. She was willing to risk war against Russia in the Far East with Germany as her ally on the Continent. Could not the Germans answer definitely?

They could not; they could offer no assurances.[119] The time was not ripe. Eventually an alliance was possible. In the meantime English public opinion would have to become less hostile to Germany and more definitely favorable to a continental alliance. When in the course of time England realized that Russia and France were too closely united to be parted, and at that moment when both threatened England and Germany in the Far East by a joint advance, then would be time enough to "play the treaty game with Parliament". To risk a war with Russia now, in case the proposed alliance should be rejected by Parliament (as the Germans rightly felt to be far more likely than Chamberlain would admit), even to risk incurring Russia's positive ill-will, was unthinkable. Eventually England would have to come to Germany. Meanwhile let there be no minor friction, but let "the cooling balm of English concessions" to Germany's imperial ambitions be applied to "a sore anti-English public opinion in Germany". Balfour took this message quietly: Chamberlain did like to go forward a little precipitately.[120] As to that he agreed with Hatzfeldt, who considered Chamberlain in general a "naïve beginner" in foreign politics.[121] Bülow was inclined to agree: Chamberlain's proposals were "too fantastic and perhaps cunning too". The Kaiser also contrasted "the practical nature of Balfour's proceeding" with "these theoretical vague fantasies" of Chamberlain.[122]

[119] XIV, 3785.

[120] XIV, 3786.

[121] XIV, 3789.

[122] XIV, 3790. The Kaiser was in essential agreement with the foreign office on the whole question. He would keep England friendly and hopeful as a protection against Russia and in order to be in a position to receive colonial favors.

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To prepare Hatzfeldt for another conference with Chamberlain on April 25, the German foreign office did nothing more than elaborate their old themes and set a price upon German neutrality on the Continent.[123] This did nothing to clarify an atmosphere which, however, Chamberlain immediately proceeded to make clearer than ever.[124] He brushed aside Germany's attempt to intrude Austrian and Italian questions: any mollifying effect upon German public opinion achieved by a conciliatory English attitude in these matters might be secured through an alliance with Germany. Minor concessions in colonial questions were pointless unless a general agreement, i. e. an alliance, were possible. Germany must understand again that England was interested in opposing and preventing Russia's advance in North China, which was leading directly to war. She could not do it alone. If Germany would not help (and here a new note is struck), other means must be found to avoid the appearance of yielding before Russia. If an alliance with Germany was impossible, an understanding with Russia or with France was not, and England would if necessary even be willing to try both. Germany might expect colonial concessions under a general alliance; if she rejected this proposal, she might expect nothing more from him. In particular, he would like to have something definite to say to Salisbury when he returned from the Riviera about the first of May.

To deal with such a person was impossible: more naïveté, more fantasy, more theory! "I think I'll wait till Salisbury comes home", Hatzfeldt informed the foreign office, "and talk it all over with him".[125] "Yes, do", encouraged Bülow, "and be sure to emphasize the danger to Anglo-German relations of 'a rough handling of specific minor questions as they shall arise'".[126] Back then to the consideration of minor difficulties. In the same document Bülow repeats the old arguments why Germany could not go ahead. Germany would welcome an English attempt to come to terms with France, for when Eng-

[123] XIV, 3792. [124] XIV, 3791, 3793.

[125] XIV, 3793. This projected interview seems never to have taken place.

[126] XIV, 3794.

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land got through she would have a clearer idea of the general situation; i. e. she would appreciate the fact that Germany was her only possible ally so much the more that she could then possibly estimate the real value of such friendship in terms of diplomatic legal tender.[127]

What then could the English do? Chamberlain had said about all he could say. Yet in his Birmingham speech on May 13 he made the first public admission that England needed any ally,[128] a speech that should have taken most of the sting out of Salisbury's remark to Hatzfeldt, in the course of some minor discussion, "You ask too much for your friendship".[129] The Germans, however, were not to forget that remark. Salisbury's abruptness and his concern over the recently consummated Austro-Russian agreement in regard to their Balkan interests brought to the front again their distrust of him. In spite of their knowledge that, though the cabinet was not unanimous, yet besides Chamberlain and Balfour also the Duke of Devonshire, Sir William Harcourt and Lord Rosebery were sympathetic to an alliance;[130] in spite of the fact that they had every reason to believe that Salisbury, though he was neither enthusiastic nor hopeful, yet knew all about Chamberlain's speech before it was made;[131] still they could not believe that Salisbury was not as much as ever disinclined to any continental alliance or to any serious overtures to Germany.[132] His proposal of 1895 they had of course decided to discount. They chose, that is, to see the situation in the light of their interpretation of things past, in utter disregard of any new facts that might be brought to their attention.

"You ask too much for your friendship" may well be considered the termination of England's first attempt to come to an understanding with Germany. By May 20 Hatzfeldt was

[127] The Kaiser, on the contrary, while he regarded an Anglo-Russian entente as impossible, did not so regard an Anglo-French entente (notes on XIV, 3793)

[128] XIV, 3795. Chamberlain said: "If the fate of the Chinese empire is not to be decided without England, we ought not to dismiss the idea of an alliance with those powers whose interests are at one with ours".

[129] Note to XIV, 3795.

[130] XIV, 3788.

[131] XIV, 3797.

[132] XIV, 3796.

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again suggesting to the English "a compliant attitude in minor questions", while Salisbury revealed his mood by observing that that was all very well, provided one side did not always give and the other always get, and by maintaining an "obstinate silence" in answer to Hatzfeldt's personal suggestion that England might let Germany share in all her future colonial gains.[133] By June 2, Salisbury had reached again the old point, where he thought it better not to make definite treaties of alliance until the specific need should arise for which they were to provide.[134] Chamberlain, while he still stuck to his idea, was quite disappointed at his failure to date and made no more overtures for the time being.[135] The Germans comforted themselves with the hope of an ultimate agreement and with the wisdom of continuing for a while to stand between England and Russia.[136]

It was now for the Kaiser to give a dramatic conclusion to the affair, to derive some practical result from Chamberlain's "fantastic and theoretical" talk. If, he reasoned, England could be trusted, an alliance with her would be for the future an advantage so exceptional that the only possible condition for rejecting it would be a strong alliance with Russia.[137] The reasoning was worthy to be taken seriously by his advisers.[138] The method that he used to apply it was deplorable. To find out what Russia would offer in this situation, upon his own initiative he wrote on May 30 a private letter to the Czar.[139] He relates truthfully the course of the negotiations with England up to a certain point. Then he continues: "After Easter the request was urgently renewed, but by my commands cooly [*sic*] and dilatorily answered. Now, however, the request has been

[133] XIV, 3798.

[134] XIV, 3800.

[135] XIV, 3801.

[136] XIV, 3802.

[137] XIV, 3799. His alternative interpretation of the English proposals as inspired by a concern over the new German navy bill is a realistic suggestion which only the English archives can verify or disprove. No evidence for this theory comes to light at the time. Later the English became more painfully aware of the propaganda of the "big navy" party in Germany (e. g. see footnote 224, *infra*), but there is still no evidence that this had anything to do even with the last English proposal of alliance in 1901.

[138] See also footnote 127, *supra*. The Kaiser had his moments too.

[139] Goetz, *Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren*, pp. 309 *et seq.*

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renewed for the third time in such an unmistakable manner, putting a certain short term to my definite answer, and accompanied by such enormous offers showing a wide and great future opening before my country, that I think it my duty to Germany to reflect before I answer. I am informed that the alliance is to be with the Triple Alliance and with the addition of Japan and America, with whom pourparlers have already been opened. . . . As my old and trusted friend I beg you to tell me what you can offer me and will do if I refuse. Before I take my final decision and send my answer in this difficult position, I must be able to see clearly, and clear and open without any back-thoughts must your proposal be. . . . May God help you to find the right solution and decision! It is for the next generation."

The Czar's answer included the following passage:[140] "Three months ago, in the midst of our negotiations with China, England handed us over a memorandum containing many tempting proposals trying to induce us to come to a full agreement upon all the points in which our interest collided with her's [*sic*]. These proposals were of such a new character that I must say we were quite amazed, and yet their very nature seemed suspicious to us, never before had England made such offers to Russia. That showed us clearly that England needed our friendship at that time, to be able to check our development in a marked way in the Far East. Without thinking twice over it their proposals were refused. Two weeks later Port Arthur was ours. . . . It is very difficult, if not quite impossible, for me to answer your question whether it is useful or not for Germany to accept these often repeated english [*sic*] proposals, as I have not the slightest knowledge of their value. You must of course decide what is best and most necessary for your country. Germany and Russia have lived in peace since old times, as good neighbors, and God grant they may continue so, in close and loyal friendship. Our countries have luckily no political frictions, and nowhere do our interests come into collision. . . . You know my ideas and convictions and you can

[140] XIV, 3803.

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therefore rely fully on my country's peaceful and quiet attitude."

The amount of truth in the Czar's reply can not be ascertained without the evidence of the English archives. Certainly the Kaiser did not get what he hoped for from his dear cousin. Bülow thought that the Czar's letter could not have been written without containing some grain of truth. Probably not: there is nothing implausible in the idea that England had suggested to Russia some specific or even general settlement of one or even all of their various points of difference. Surely, however, there was no reason to suppose that the grain of truth was any bigger or the amount of lying any smaller in the Czar's reply than in the Kaiser's letter, which offered Bülow a rough standard whereby to estimate the unknown quantities. Does it not from this distance look most like the traditional meeting of Greeks? At any rate, Bülow could discern nothing but certain proof of the deviousness of English ways in this willingness to compromise with Russia at the expense of other powers, and a final corroboration of the wisdom of Germany's course of action.[141] Everything is hereafter to be suspected except specific and concrete agreements on particular questions, until England should choose to make a definite proposal, and that officially. Here was encouragement for insisting, in all discussion of those precious minor matters, that a friendly German attitude towards English colonial expansion had its price like everything else: "live and let live" should be the motto for England.[142] "Thus the purpose of the Russians, to increase the mistrust of the German statesmen against England, was splendidly achieved. They might well rub their hands in Petersburg."[143]

During the following weeks the first of several minor questions was taken up, the conclusion of a treaty providing for the partition of the Portuguese colonies in case Portugal defaulted on a new Anglo-German loan.[144] During these negotiations the

[141] XIV, 3804. [142] XIV, 3805. [143] Brandenburg, p. 97.

[144] Grey's statement (*Twenty-five Years*, vol. I, p. 44) that "the agreement was made very reluctantly so far as Lord Salisbury was concerned and only in deference to German insistence" is misleading. It is true that after their inception under his own auspices Salisbury turned the negotiations over to Balfour, and perhaps himself lost interest as time wore on.

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question of an alliance came up again, when in July the Germans proposed "a simultaneous settlement of all current colonial questions".[145] But they set too high a price for the English to consider unless at the same time a general alliance should be concluded.[146] In August, Lascelles at Berlin told the Kaiser that Chamberlain had recently suggested to him a defensive alliance between England and Germany for mutual assistance if either party were attacked by two enemies. The Kaiser replied that this would be a wholly acceptable basis for further negotiations.[147] The British foreign office did nothing to follow up this most promising lead.[148] We can not yet guess the answer to that riddle. It is true that in this same interview with Lascelles the Kaiser became so excited about the matter of the Portuguese colonies as to say that if Germany's last proposals were not accepted the further presence of a German ambassador at London would be superfluous. But what of that? "In London they seem not to have taken his outbreaks of temperament, with which they were already too familiar, in a very tragic manner."[149] Was it because the English must by this time have known of the Kaiser's disingenuous—if no worse—communication to the Czar (the Russians would have taken good care of that)?[150] Even in that case it was not because Chamberlain had given up hope, for in his Wakefield speech in December we find him again suggesting his alliance to British public opinion.[151] At any rate, it probably would have made no difference, with Bülow dangerously holding up before the Kaiser the dazzling role of *arbiter mundi* and Holstein casting up the dangers of a war with Russia and France in which Germany would carry the whole load.[152]

The "naïve beginner in foreign politics" had been as unsuccessful in 1898 as his "churlish" chief in 1895. He had

[145] XIV, 3830.

[146] Brandenburg, pp. 98-99.

[147] XIV, 3865.

[148] Nor does Eckardstein even mention it; see I, pp. 292 *et seq.*

[149] Brandenburg, p. 100.

[150] "Later statements of Chamberlain tend to bear out this conjecture". Brandenburg, p. 104.

[151] XIV, 3892; Brandenburg, p. 103.

[152] XIV, 3867, 3868.

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spoken in plain words and he had warned the Germans that if necessary he would turn to France and Russia. All this had no effect: it was only Rosebery's bluff once again. The Czar's letter, far from suggesting the possibility of some degree of sincerity in Chamberlain's warning, only made clearer the unscrupulousness of the English. Even the compliance of Delcassé in the Fashoda crisis of September, even the fact that Russia counseled the French to moderation, merely disappointed the German foreign office and disgusted the Kaiser; it gave them no inkling of the real possibilities of the future.[153] The supreme fallacy of German policy had been formulated: England would ultimately have to come to Germany. Until England realized this, Germany need not be eager, but rather should get what she could from immediate colonial bargaining —until England should accept her destiny. The *bête noire* of parliamentary rejection of an alliance, while a very sound preoccupation, hardly merited the consideration it received. The same unshakable suspicion of English motives that had become so prevalent since 1895, the implacable devotion to "the bridge to Russia", the fear of risking trouble with Russia, a cool friend, and France, a sworn enemy (although in case of a continental war Germany could hardly in any event remain neutral)—these were the considerations that determined German action.

From March to December, 1899, Anglo-German relations turned on the Samoan difficulties, in which it seemed to Germany that England was acting with the United States against her. The problem was finally solved to their mutual satisfaction by England's withdrawal from Samoa for compensation elsewhere. But the course of the negotiations and in particular the methods employed by the Germans produced a highly unfavorable impression on the English government. At one point in the negotiations Holstein transmitted to Salisbury

[153] The Kaiser prepared a telegram to the Czar criticizing Muravieff, the Russian foreign minister (XIV, 3913), which Bülow insisted upon emending (XIV, 3916). The Kaiser, not to be foiled by his own advisers, got it all into a private letter to the Czar (Goetz, *Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren*, pp. 63 *et seq.*).

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through an unofficial channel a sort of threat to break off diplomatic relations, to which even Hatzfeldt attributed English compliance.[154] In fact, Salisbury revealed his real feeling in a remark to the Duke of Devonshire:[155] "I am waiting every day for the ultimatum from Berlin that they threatened me with on account of Samoa. Unfortunately so far it has not shown up" ("unfortunately" because it would have been easier for him to ignore Germany, and quite possible also, as he knew, if the Germans did not). After all, Hatzfeldt was a German diplomat, but even so he should have known better. For had not Salisbury in the midst of the trouble over the Jameson Raid requested him "as a friend" to say nothing that would have to be construed as a threat, since that would "make everything impossible"?[156] Of course the English were moved by all sorts of considerations, fundamentally by a healthy sense of their own interest, and since they did wish to get along with Germany, therefore they were bound to be influenced by German threats. The Germans could not see that England was convinced not by their arguments and their methods but in spite of them. Furthermore, the Kaiser became so incensed at Salisbury that he actually wrote to Queen Victoria to complain of the premier's anti-German policy.[157] The Queen reproved William sharply and warmly defended Salisbury, enclosing in her letter a statement by Salisbury, in which he professed ignorance as to what the Kaiser was talking about and by his analysis of the facts made it difficult for the Kaiser to be certain himself.[158] Eckardstein tells us that Salisbury often said to him, "Your Kaiser seems wholly to forget that I am no minister of the King of Prussia but the prime minister of England".[159] Finally, the Kaiser, who was piqued at not being invited to England for the Queen's birthday in May, threatened not to come for the Cowes regatta in August, to which he had been invited.[157] Not only the Queen but Salisbury through Hatzfeldt urged him to come, the latter that he might have a

[154] XIV, 4063 to 4068.
[155] Eckardstein, II, p. 15.
[156] XI, 2597.
[157] XIV, 4074.
[158] XIV, 4076.
[159] Eckardstein, I, p. 214.

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personal interview with him.[160] But he still declined to come unless a settlement of the Samoan difficulty could be reached.[161] It was reached and he did come, although not until November. As a matter of fact, this was perhaps the one visit he ever made that the English government had particular reason to desire, in view of the imminence of the Boer War, especially since, as things turned out, he was accompanied by Bülow.[162] The Kaiser was in fact anxious enough to come, but ready to make what capital he could out of the English desire to have him come just then, when Anglophobia was so prevalent in Germany, for the sake of the effect on the public opinion of Europe.[163]

The Kaiser with Bülow made his visit at the end of November and met with the warmest sort of greeting. It was an opportunity for Chamberlain to broach his plan again. In two interviews with the Kaiser he suggested an alliance providing *inter alia* for the inclusion of the United States. The Kaiser returned the old answer: it was best to continue on the beaten path of agreement on isolated questions. In an interview with Bülow, Chamberlain argued along similar lines; Russia must be checked in Asia; France was on the decline; Germany was England's natural ally.[164] Bülow encouraged him to try his idea again on English public opinion, though in fact he contemplated no change in his own policy.[165] Salisbury remained

[160] XIV, 4077.

[161] XIV, 4108.

[162] Eckardstein, II, p. 79.

[163] *Ibid.*, II, p. 47. Eckardstein tells how the Kaiser had asked Hatzfeldt in the summer to hint for a special invitation for a visit in state. The Prince of Wales told Eckardstein, "He may come so far as I am concerned, only he is to take care to make no more bombastic speeches, which public opinion in England would under no circumstances tolerate". The Prince was alluding to a speech on board a German cruiser at Cowes in 1895, which gave occasion for the articles in the *News*, like those in the *Standard* so offensive to the Kaiser that he was still sore over them when he wrote to Queen Victoria on Jan. 8, 1896. (See Eckardstein I, p. 270; also see footnote 79, *supra*.)

[164] XV, 4398.

[165] Bülow's revised opinion of Chamberlain is well worth noting: "a frank, prudent, scrupulous but practical business man". He also thought that English sentiment was less hostile to Germany than German to England. (Brandenburg, p. 117.) Unhappily he made no later use of these ideas.

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skeptical,[166] but Chamberlain, hopeful as ever, followed up Bülow's suggestion in his speech at Leicester on November 29. He was disappointed to meet a cool reception in the English press and a genuinely hostile one in the German, but surprised and offended at Bülow's speech in the Reichstag on December 11, which was actually friendly to the Dual Alliance rather than to England. Bülow let it be understood that this was only internal politics for a strong navy, but Chamberlain justly felt that he had been betrayed.[167] Even Hatzfeldt suggested the advantage of leading Chamberlain on to commit himself, in prospect of colonial concessions.[166] "Did we not", says Brandenburg, "herein pursue a policy like that policy which we were always ascribing as a reproach to England? . . . We always wanted to be too clever." [168]

Upon this bad situation followed trouble in January, 1900, over three German steamers captured by the English on the suspicion of carrying contraband to the Boers. The English dared make no defense of their conduct, especially when search revealed no contraband.[169] The government furthermore promised not to repeat the offense. But Salisbury had occasion again to be offended by the threatening tone of the German communications.[170] At one time the Kaiser was considering sending a personal representative to London to obtain assurances from the English government within forty-eight hours that no such offense should recur.[171] The English government

[166] XV, 4401.

[167] Brandenburg, p. 117. Four years later Chamberlain said to Eckardstein: "Once already Count Bülow has reproved me in the Reichstag. By now I have enough of such dealing, and there can no longer be any talk of an understanding between Germany and England" (Eckardstein, II, p. 377).

[168] Brandenburg, p. 117.

[169] Eckardstein claims that the whole thing was a plot of the Boer agent, Dr. Leyds (II, p. 147); there is no evidence in the documents for this idea.

[170] XV, 4458. *Cf.* Eckardstein, II, pp. 144 *et seq.*, where he quotes a remark made to him several years later by Edward VII to the effect that, while the motto of English diplomacy was "*suaviter in modo fortiter in re*" in Berlin they seemed "to have inscribed upon their shield the reverse, '*fortiter in modo, suaviter in re*'".

[171] Eckardstein, II, pp. 146 *et seq.*

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learned of this plan through the same unofficial channel that Holstein had used to transmit his threat of an ultimatum during the Samoan negotiations.[172] "I can not possibly", Salisbury said to Eckardstein, "allow a policy to be dictated to me from Berlin with the watch in the hand".[173] A little later he declared once more that English policy was against alliances or interference on the Continent, though not against cooperation with continental powers in England's own interest.[174]

The situation was not improved by the Kaiser's rejection of a Russian proposal for a coalition against England in January, 1900,[175] nor by the German refusal of a later proposal from the Czar in the name of Russia and France for an offer of mediation in the Boer War.[176] These Russian proposals were immediately represented in London as having been initiated by the Kaiser.[177] The misrepresentation was plausible, not only because of the Kaiser's personality, but because of the bargaining policy which had by now become chronic in the German foreign office. Moreover, the very form in which Bülow couched his refusal—a statement that Germany could enter upon no such novel departure unless assured of the status quo on the Continent by a definite agreement with France—lent itself to just such misrepresentation. Bülow denied the charge absolutely, alleging that his impossible stipulation amounted only to a polite refusal, and calling attention to Germany's very different conduct when in the spring of 1895 she did in fact wish to cooperate with Russia and France.[178] Nor in fact was the charge believed by the English government nor by the Prince of Wales, with whom the Kaiser was carrying on a considerable correspondence. The desire of Russia and France further to alienate England and Germany was well enough known in London. Probably also the English government knew of a similar suggestion made by Russia in April, 1899,[179]

[172] Eckardstein, II, pp. 150 *et seq.*

[173] *Ibid.*, II, p. 155.

[174] XV, 4471.

[175] XV, 4465.

[176] XV, 4472, 4473, 4474.

[177] See Eckardstein, II, pp. 167 *et seq.*, for the means which Russia seems to have taken to distort the facts.

[178] XV, 4495, 4496, 4497.

[179] XIII, 3537; XIV, 4960; XV, 4206.

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which the Kaiser and Bülow had rejected as impracticable and of doubtful value anyway.[180]

The serious part of all this at the time was that it robbed the Kaiser's friendly words, such as his assurance to the Prince of Wales that Germany desired no weakening of England, and even his friendly acts, such as his reference of the Boer appeal for intervention on March 10 to London and his refusal to receive the Boer deputation, of the full effect they should have had in England, although the government was delighted and

[180] This version of what happened is based upon the documents of the German foreign office, upon Eckardstein's very circumstantial account, and upon Brandenburg. Lee, however, believes that the Kaiser was guilty, on the authority of documents from the old Russian embassy at London, which he cities in detail (*Edward VII*, pp. 749, 761 *et seq.*). Doubtless these documents are authentic, but to the writers it seems unsafe to accept them as true without corroboration from some wholly independent source. Are they not rather more of such things as the memorandum given to the Prince of Wales at Copenhagen by a high personage at the Danish court, purporting to come from the ministry at St. Petersburg, which the Prince showed to Eckardstein in March 1900 (see footnote 177, *supra*)? In fact, Eckardstein tells how he warned the English government in advance that the Russians would do just what they did. We know that the Kaiser could lie, we know that he was erratic and wholly unreliable, if not occasionally treacherous. The Prince of Wales knew of all his wild talk, which reached London in forms probably exaggerated, he knew of the still wilder—the insane—talk of the military clique surrounding him at court (e. g. see Eckardstein, II, pp. 170 *et seq.*). Doubtless he realized that much at least of the Kaiser's talk was intended to keep Russia and France estranged from England, a *Leitmotif* of German policy, and most of the rest temperamental outbreaks. He knew of the Queen's warning the Czar to pay as little heed to the Kaiser's slanders of England as she paid to his slanders of Russia (Lee, p. 741, note). He had himself been the unhappy recipient of the Kaiser's letters, and had been deeply offended, particularly by his comparison of the Boer War to a football match. (Lee discusses the correspondence, pp. 755 *et seq.*, and prints the Kaiser's effusions in full in Appendix A.) But he did know the Kaiser, had known him since he was a little boy, and perhaps nobody in his day knew better all that was going on in Europe than he. In spite of everything he did not believe that the Kaiser was guilty of such perfidy, not to say madness. Does not Edward VII in 1900 remain to this day a better judge than even his admirable biographer in 1925?

The question is discussed in the *Deutsche Revue*, Juli-Sept. 1908, pp. 257 *et seq.*, "Deutsche Intrigen gegen England während des Burenkriegs, von einem Wissenden." The article is in answer to one in the *National Review*, July 1908, by André Mévil (the German calls him Melvil), who returns the charge the next year in his book (cited in footnote 28, *supra*, pp. 45 *et seq.*). Neither seems to the writers to have much independent value.

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profoundly relieved (especially by his declining to see the Boers). In spite of everything, however, Chamberlain declared that regardless of all obstacles he would not so long as he lived let go of his pet idea. Meanwhile all misunderstandings must be avoided; much more difficult matters had been settled with France in a far quieter and more polite manner.[181] But Salisbury remained as skeptical as ever; in June he suggested that Germany was in reality only after colonial concessions anyway, and would in case of war stand rather with her continental neighbors than with England.[182] Yet Germany passed by a suggestion from England for an agreement over Morocco,[183] and the Yang-tse agreement in the autumn of 1900, designed to check Russia in North China, was of no real advantage to either party and did nothing to change the situation.[184] "And yet", says Brandenburg, "the feeling remained with the more far-seeing men on both sides of the Channel that they really belonged together".[185] One wonders. Who was the German Chamberlain?

If after all that had gone before the English renewed their attempt yet once more to come to terms with Germany, it would almost seem as though the moment so confidently awaited by the Germans had come, the great moment when the English government should realize that England really needed Germany as an ally. If the Germans so disastrously failed to recognize the moment when it arrived, that was due to their conviction that England had no choice. Consequently, so long as English statesmen persisted in talking of alternatives, the time could not yet be quite ripe; merely to prefer an alliance with Germany was not enough.

The next and last opportunity for agreement was offered by the Kaiser's visit to England in January, 1901, when his impulsive haste in rushing to the bedside of the dying Queen actually for a little while endeared him to the whole English

[181] Brandenburg, p. 123. [182] XVII, 4977.

[183] Brandenburg, pp. 123 *et seq.*

[184] *Ibid.*, 126 *et seq.*; Eckardstein, II, pp. 202 *et seq.*

[185] Brandenburg, p. 130.

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people.[186] Meanwhile Salisbury had turned over the foreign office to Lord Lansdowne, retaining the premiership; Chamberlain was colonial secretary as before. In Germany the fact that Bülow had succeeded Prince Hohenlohe as chancellor made no difference: Holstein remained as ever in his back office. At first the Kaiser in England thought that he did discern the expected moment, for on January 20, after being informed by Eckardstein of the new approach of the Duke of Devonshire and Chamberlain,[187] he telegraphed to Bülow: "So it seems they are coming to the point we have been waiting for". Then he added: "God give me the right thoughts and words . . . so that what we say may turn out for the good of both peoples".[188] But Holstein could not see, and what he could not see remained officially invisible.[189] If therefore, when the Kaiser came to talk to Lansdowne, he had nothing to say that was to the point, it was because his advisers had with considerable difficulty argued him out of his perfectly sound notion that Germany was running some risk of falling between two stools.[190]

In his talk with Lansdowne[191] the Kaiser observed that the trouble with English diplomacy was that, unlike continental diplomacy, it was single-track, "just like an English lord with a salmon on his hook". The old phrase "England and the Continent" would no longer hold; it would have to be Eng-

[186] XVII, 4986; *cf.* Eckardstein, II, p. 255.

[187] It will be noted that during these last negotiations Eckardstein as first secretary generally acted for Hatzfeldt, who was in poor health at all times and often quite incapacitated.

[188] XVII, 4982.

[189] Glaring light is shed upon this man's peculiar mentality, as well as upon his tremendous influence, by Eckardstein's account of what happened on January 18, after his earlier private interview with the Duke of Devonshire and Chamberlain at the Duke's castle (II, pp. 235 *et seq.*). For fear of Holstein, upon Hatzfeldt's advice he left out of his official telegram to Bülow (XVII, 4979) all mention of the Duke of Devonshire, also letting their meeting appear to have been incidental, not—as it was—prearranged. Hatzfeldt, in an accompanying private telegram to Holstein (XVII, 4980), stressed the idea of Chamberlain's opposition to Salisbury within the cabinet and the approaching departure of the premier for the Riviera.

[190] Brandenburg, p. 134.

[191] XVII, 4987.

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land with the Continent, or England with Russia and the United States, two non-European powers. And in the Continent he meant to include France, which he regarded as a necessary element in Europe, to be won back from Russia to Europe by Edward VII. But that was not all. Lansdowne chanced to speak of the balance of power's being in England's hands. The Kaiser corrected him: now the balance of power was with the German army. To be still more accurate he exclaimed: "I am the balance of power", for "I make German foreign policy". But he wished England and Germany to stand together against the Slavs; the Latins were done with their days of domination.

There was a party in the cabinet, and in the general public that favored an entente with Russia. There was even talk about purchasing the friendship of Russia by withdrawing from North China and Persia.[192] But there was also uneasiness about Russia, which Lansdowne himself felt.[193] Russia and the United States seemed to be drawing together. Relations with the United States were "not altogether pleasant". The peremptory rejection of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty by the Senate convinced those Englishmen "who looked behind the scenes" that nothing could be expected of the United States in case of certain eventualities. The United States was supporting Russian policy in North China, the Kaiser informed Lansdowne. The Russians were also placing orders for munitions in the United States, because the sources of Gallic gold were beginning to dry up.

To the German foreign office this talk about possible Russian friendship seemed the same old bluff, a means of securing better terms from Germany.[194] There were, to be sure, reasons for their suspecting this—among many reasons new and old for not believing it. Chamberlain had indeed expressed himself informally and personally to Eckardstein as favoring an entente with Russia if—but only if—an agreement with Germany and the Triple Alliance failed.[195] But the Germans were sure it

[192] XVII, 4979, 4980.
[193] XVII, 4987.
[194] XVII, 4983.
[195] XVII, 4979.

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would not fail.[196] Officially Chamberlain favored a secret arrangement with Germany concerning Morocco, which he intended to take up with Lansdowne as soon as the septuagenarian prime minister got out of England on his way to the Riviera. Through this arrangement he hoped to effect some sort of general agreement with Germany and the Triple Alliance—eventually.[197] Edward VII told the Kaiser that neither he himself nor Lansdowne favored Russia or France, although Salisbury favored France.[198] To Bülow and Holstein the uselessness, the sacrifices, even the destructiveness perhaps, which an agreement with the Dual Alliance seemed to entail for England, appeared to be eternally prohibitive of any such thing: it would postpone, but also make more inevitable, England's future struggle for existence.[199] Germany must bide her time; no English statesman must have occasion to say again, "You ask too much for your friendship". Germany's own relations with Russia were not, and must not become, so precarious as to force her into English hands. The only satisfactory basis for an Anglo-German entente was a general crystallization in England of a feeling of "the almost sure danger of war"—danger to England.[200]

Throughout February, attention in both London and Berlin was concentrated on the problem of Russia in China and the future rôle of Japan.[201] By March, however, the English interest in the possible alliance had revived. The English statesmen seemed to be at the crossroads in general, and with reference to their Chinese policy in particular. England had secured Germany's cooperation in a joint protest at Peking against special concessions to Russia.[202] But she seemed to want more.[203] There was a possibility of a Russo-Japanese war. Would there, Lansdowne asked Eckardstein on March 18, be any chance of a joint German-English action to localize such a conflict and to keep France quiet? There would be no chance at all, Eckardstein informed Holstein that he had replied, un-

196 XVII, 4981.
197 XVII, 4980.
198 XVII, 4986.
199 XVII, 4984, 4985.
200 XVII, 4981 to 4985.
201 Note to XVII, 4998.
202 XVII, 4993.
203 XVII, 4992 and note.

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less Germany had assurance from England of counter-support for her interests.[204] To the German foreign office that meant one thing: England's support of Germany in Europe against France and Russia, and moreover some "immediate direct advantages" (e. g. concessions in South Africa), to appease anti-English public opinion in Germany, which, in Holstein's judgment, had since 1898 become so much stronger that it would no longer as then be satisfied with a mere defensive alliance looking to the future.[205] Furthermore, Lansdowne said, England was considering a long-term defensive arrangement with Germany; if to Germany such an arrangement seemed possible, he would make specific proposals. Eckardstein replied that he could make no answer until he did make such proposals, which he would of course communicate to Berlin. As a matter of fact, however, he had previously told Lansdowne that in the event of such a general defensive alliance Germany would of course keep France neutral in a Russo-Japanese war, but this, he remarks, he did not dare admit to Holstein.[206]

In response to his request for immediate instructions, Bülow answered that of course the members of the Triple Alliance would have to agree.[207] The Triple Alliance would then seem to have been composed of Germany and Austria, for Bülow states that all Lansdowne would have to do would be to take up the matter with a more than willing foreign office at Vienna, which would communicate immediately with Berlin, and then they would all be ready to proceed with details without further delay. Let Italy be confronted with the *fait accompli;* the discretion of her government was not to be trusted.[208]

In the meantime Lansdowne had prepared a memorandum with Balfour, which had been shown to Salisbury, who by now had advanced far enough to "approve in principle of a strong defensive alliance". While Lansdowne did not show the memorandum to Hatzfeldt, he did on March 23 ask him personally the following questions.[209] First, did he think that the German

[204] XVII, 4994.
[205] XVII, 4989.
[206] Eckardstein, II, pp. 279 *et seq.*
[207] XVII, 4996.
[208] XVII, 5003.
[209] XVII, 4997.

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government would undertake such an alliance in spite of anti-English public sentiment in Germany? Second, if so, would his government prefer "an unconditional defensive alliance" or only an alliance for mutual help against attack by two or more enemies? Third, (it is the representative of Great Britain speaking to the representative of Germany) did he think Germany would prefer a secret or a parliamentary agreement? Finally, would Japan be considered eventually, so far as Asiatic problems were concerned?

Strange as it may seem, Hatzfeldt replied that he thought Germany would be favorable to an alliance if it were mutually advantageous. Public opinion, he thought—dissenting therein from Holstein—need hardly be considered: it was only the Kaiser and the Chancellor that really mattered. He believed his government would prefer an alliance providing for mutual defense against two or more enemies, and that they would also prefer a parliamentary agreement, although he did not feel that they would insist upon that point. Japan, too, he was sure would be welcome. But in fact this declaration was modified in two important respects by a despatch from the foreign office, solely for Hatzfeldt's personal guidance so long as Lansdowne remained "academic in theory and personal in attitude".[210] First, parliamentary ratification was a *sine qua non*. Second, an alliance of England not with Germany alone but with the Triple Alliance was infinitely preferable, although Hatzfeldt had urged that it was too early to suggest to Lansdowne any negotiations with Vienna. As to Japan, Bülow agreed; while she might see no immediate advantage in adhering to an Anglo-German defensive alliance, her adherence would be desirable, if only to keep her in good political company.

In view of all this it is hard to understand how Eckardstein could consider his next interview with Lansdowne promising, as it seems he did, inasmuch as Lansdowne, knowing of course nothing of Hatzfeldt's last instructions from Berlin, remarked that the treaty had better be kept secret for the time being, and that he could consider no dealings with the Austro-Hungarian

[210] XVII, 4998.

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monarchy.[211] If the Germans were prepared to insist upon these two points, then, unless the English gave way, plainly the case was quite hopeless just when it began to look most hopeful. Apparently Eckardstein did not believe that his government would insist to the last upon the inclusion of Austria, which seemed to be the point upon which Lansdowne was most positive. He was himself so opposed to the idea, which he regarded as "a whim of Holstein", that, disregarding his instructions, he never—"needless to say", he remarks—so much as mentioned it in his conversations with Lansdowne, believing that he would never agree, and fearing thereby to provoke in his mind a suspicion that Germany was not in earnest.[212] All that he did at this time was to inform the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, who informed the foreign minister, Goluchowski, who was of course delighted at the prospect.

As to parliamentary ratification, the Germans had been quite right to consider it doubtful in 1898. Their fatal mistake was to consider a written agreement formally ratified to be necessary either in 1898 or in 1901. It was a mistake not merely because the event has proved them wrong, but because, if it be not invariably a mistake to distrust those with whom you are dealing, it is certainly always dangerous to try to deal with those whom you distrust. Bülow did not share Holstein's phobia of Salisbury, yet he could say no more than "He is blamed for what are general English faults".[213] And all the while the answer to the riddle of English policy was that the English meant what they said, and were saying quite enough of what they meant to furnish ground for an understanding. If only the Germans could have taken to heart Chamberlain's words in his ill-fated Leicester speech of 1899! "To me it seems to matter little whether you have an alliance which is committed to paper . . . or an understanding in the minds of the statesmen of the respective countries. An understanding is perhaps better than an alliance, which may stereotype arrange-

[211] Eckardstein, II, pp. 287 *et seq.*

[212] *Ibid.*, II, p. 286.

[213] XVII, 4989.

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ments which can not be regarded as permanent in view of the changing circumstances of the day."[214]

At this point the question of the alliance was eclipsed by the Kaiser's irritation over the long-unsettled matter of the Boxer indemnity,[215] which had gradually risen to such a pitch that about the first of April Colonial Director Stübel was sent on a special mission to London. What might have proved a calamity turned out most happily.[216] Stübel made an excellent impression on the English government, and moreover advised his own government to accede to the English demands in regard to the indemnity, also to conclude an alliance with England with all possible speed.[217] Meanwhile Russia had been forced to yield in face of the joint English-German-Japanese *démarche* at Peking. This first definite, though slight, anti-Russian move on Germany's part might have been expected to make the Germans more suspicious of their reliance on Russia and so perforce less free to indulge in suspicions of England, but it had no such effect.[218]

No more had another attempt by Russia and France—alarmed lest this latest Anglo-German agreement over the Chinese indemnity be an omen of a further *rapprochement*—to to take advantage of the megalomania of the Kaiser by again inspiring distrust of him and of Germany in London, and this time even in Vienna. Hatzfeldt believed these intrigues to have had only slight and temporary effect in London. "God grant!" wrote the Kaiser: "I don't understand the English. Such a lack of character is absolutely awful."[219] Whereupon he had three talks with Lascelles.[220] He informed him that his

[214] Grey, *Twenty-five Years,* I, pp. 41 *et seq.* Did Russia and France, one wonders, consciously profit by Germany's mistake when their turn came? Certainly the Germans never dreamed with how much less the implacable Dual Alliance could be satisfied than what England was ready to offer them.

[215] A trifle at such a time, one would think; *cf. infra,* p. 54.

[216] Hatzfeldt was so distressed, according to Eckardstein (II, p. 290), that he referred to the foreign office as "the great fools' paradise in Berlin".

[217] Eckardstein, II, pp. 289 *et seq.* and 323.

[218] XVII, 4990, 4992.

[219] XVII, 4999.

[220] XVII, 5000.

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personal and official conduct since the beginning of the Boer War offered no justification for such "unintelligent and incomprehensible suspicions" by such "unmitigated noodles" as certain English ministers. This outburst was inspired directly by Hatzfeldt's report that he had learned confidentially that in March Balfour had asked a leading London financier if he did not consider the Kaiser capable of suddenly flopping over to Russia.[221] The Kaiser made a marginal note on the document: "Hell and damnation! to think me capable of such a thing!"[222] This, from the man who had transmitted Chamberlain's offer of 1898 in distorted form to the Czar!

The Kaiser reported Lascelles to have been much impressed. So was Edward VII—to whom at the same time the Kaiser wrote a private letter—impressed, especially by the phrase "unmitigated noodles". When Eckardstein suggested to him that it were best taken as a joke, he agreed, with the remark that he had experienced such jokes before and that many others would doubtless follow.[223] Then he went on, more ominously, to say that the English could not follow the Kaiser's capers, and that among some of his ministers, most of all with Salisbury, there existed the greatest distrust of the Kaiser and of Bülow: "I myself have constantly labored to banish this suspicion, but everything has an end at last".[224] Indeed, henceforth it be-

[221] The informant was Alfred Rothschild, who, no doubt, thought thereby to to help matters along, for he was very keen for the alliance; see Eckardstein, II, p. 150.

[222] XVII, 4999.

[223] Lee gives an account of the origin of the strained relations between uncle and nephew and of the various more or less crucial episodes that punctuated their intercourse (*Edward VII*, pp. 646 *et seq.*, 656 *et seq.*, 666 *et seq.*, 734 *et seq.*). See also Eckardstein, II, pp. 29 *et seq.*

[224] Eckardstein, II, p. 298. The King also alluded to the Flottenverein and its press, which were doing nothing to pour oil on troubled waters. Similarly, Eckardstein (II, p. 161) quotes Hatzfeldt as having said and written repeatedly that the Kaiser's continual hysterical jumping about and the naval policy of Tirpitz between them would bring Germany to ruin. Elsewhere (I, p. 295) he tells how he first got the impression in 1898 that "with Wilhelm II the latest comer is always right". Later (II, p. 300) he quotes from a letter of Alfred Rothschild to him in June 1901: "Your government does not seem any longer to know what it wants". For Bülow had shown himself none too steady either—for example, in the matter of Chamberlain's Leicester speech.

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comes more and more patent that the Kaiser has at last done his work. It was not merely that the English distrusted him (probably no more than well-informed Germans did [225]). Rather they despaired of him and his goverment. If the Germans had to stand him, they did not.

The growing paucity of the Kaiser's marginalia on official papers from the foreign office indicates that as the negotiations proceeded he was not even kept fully—at least not officially—informed. On the eve of Edward VII's visit in August he was carefully coached by Bülow as to what had gone before as well as what he might say and might not.[226] Certainly, however, his statement to Eckardstein in February, 1902, that he had known nothing at all must be a not wholly uncharacteristic lapse of memory on his part; Eckardstein could hardly have erred so gravely in his account of the conversation. The next day Bülow, he says, after calming the Kaiser as best he could, told him that "it would perhaps have been better if I had not told him so much, for nothing sensible ever comes from that" [227]

To return to April. Throughout the month Lansdowne kept studying the history of the whole question of an Anglo-German alliance.[228] He was concerned over rumors of independent French action contemplated in South China and Morocco.[229]

[225] According to Haller's study of Prince Eulenburg-Hertefeld (see *The Living Age*, Nov. 8, 1924, pp. 325 *et seq.*), the effect of the Kaiser's rash tongue even in Germany made "many people, including men in high positions" willing "to start proceedings" to declare the Kaiser incompetent, "to deprive him of the direction of affairs", or even to compel him to abdicate. And this was before 1899. Eulenburg and Bülow had a difficult time "protecting the monarch against himself". Although he had genially promised Eulenburg (on Aug. 20, 1897) that "after this" he would "keep his mouth shut and use it only for eating, drinking and smoking", he more and more forgot his promise. For such a man it was of course an impossible pledge to keep.

[226] XVII, 5022, 5023 and notes.

[227] Eckardstein, II, pp. 383 *et seq.* Earlier (II, p. 301) he refers to a personal letter written to him in 1901 by the Duchess of Devonshire, according to which Sir Frank Lascelles had told the Duke that Bülow had asked him to say nothing of the negotiations to the Kaiser. From this the Duchess inferred that Bülow could not have been in earnest about the alliance.

[228] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 328-341 *passim.*

[229] XVII, 5003.

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But Holstein decided for Bülow that no more special agreements with England for joint action should be considered, for fear of lessening England's need of a general agreement with Germany.[230] The German foreign office was also concerned even more than before that Austria should participate prominently in the negotiations, to offset the attempt of Russia and France to inspire mistrust of Germany at Vienna.[231] By the middle of May, Salisbury, who was back in London, while according to Lansdowne still in principle favorable to an agreement with Germany, was disturbed as he contemplated the responsibilities England would be asked to assume towards the Triple Alliance.[232] How, asked Lansdowne on May 15,[233] would England be expected to act in case of a breach between Austria and Germany after Franz Josef's death? How in case Italy were attacked by France and Spain over some Mediterranean question? These eventualities must be definitely provided for. Some members of the cabinet were also concerned over the likelihood that German ambition in Asia Minor would some day lead to a collision with Russia, in which case Germany alone would be about all England cared to take on. Furthermore, Lansdowne said, public opinion in England regarded an alliance with a kindred and progressive people like Germany and with a deteriorating, partly Slavic state like Austria in entirely different lights.[233a]

Lansdowne ended this interview of May 15 by suggesting that they get something in writing, something "confidential and academic", as the only possible next step forward. It was never taken, that step; it was suggested only once again. This proposal, therefore, can almost be regarded as the high light of the negotiations. What followed was pathetic anti-climax.

The reason nothing came of it all was that England and Germany had reached an *impasse* over the question whether the alliance should be between the British Empire and Germany alone, or between the British Empire and the Triple

[230] Eckardstein, II, p. 343.

[231] XVII, 5001.

[232] XVII, 5004.

[233] XVII, 5005, 5006.

[233a] Race did not seem to make such a difference when it came to a Japanese alliance. But then, Japan was not deteriorating, and Japan was far away.

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Alliance. In other words, was Austria to be included or not? For plainly neither cared a straw about Italy in this matter, though both were sure of Italy's satisfaction with any agreement between them. To Germany an alliance of the British Empire with the Triple Alliance seemed the only fair bargain.[234] Since Germany had committed herself to Austria, she could not gain by an alliance which did not allow for that fact. If she thought that Austria was in danger of collapse after Franz Josef's death, she would not be satisfied with the Triple Alliance and would not delay reaching an understanding with Russia. Besides, the Reichstag and German public opinion would tolerate no exclusion of Austria, and the recent anti-German propaganda at Vienna was a further practical reason for including her. There was no danger of a clash with Russia: Germany's Asiatic interests were purely commercial, and the Bagdad railroad was to be an international affair. As soon as Germany withdrew from China, there would be no chance for collision with Russia anywhere; rather would the way be opened for a better understanding with Russia. Again, an alliance between Germany alone and the British Empire would "leave the back door open": in case of an attack on Austria by two enemies, Germany was bound to go to the assistance of her ally, but England would not be bound to assist Germany. Agreement on such a basis was not possible; to promise security to the British Empire and support of England's Chinese policy in return for only that, was not worth while. Any treaty must stipulate that an attack on any member of the Triple Alliance by two or more enemies constituted an attack on Germany.

Hatzfeldt was therefore instructed, contrary to his own judgment,[235] to go into no details and to put nothing in writing, until England agreed to this principle,[236] although Lansdowne repeated his suggestion of May 15.[237] Germany could hardly begin, Holstein noted,[238] by communicating the terms of the Triple

[234] XVII, 5007, 5010.
[235] XVII, 5008.
[236] XVII, 5009, 5011.
[237] XVII, 5010.
[238] XVII, 5012.

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Alliance to England, as Lansdowne had suggested.[239] A written memorandum for Lansdowne would mean that Germany would have made the first formal move, which was exactly what Germany did not want. It would be different if Lansdowne wrote (he was out of town at the moment) for information on some specific point, so that the formal initiative would be taken by England. Holstein was, however, suspicious of anything at all in writing. Lansdowne needed no written memorandum anyway: the question was, did England agree in principle to an alliance with the Triple Alliance or not? When that principle was admitted, they could proceed to details, written or unwritten.[240]

So, when after five months of preparation they seemed to be agreed to begin, they could not agree on a beginning. There are no communications in regard to the alliance between London and Berlin in *Die Grosse Politik* from June 1 until July 29, save one on June 15. And then, just when Hatzfeldt and Edward VII had managed to get well started (the King admitted that Salisbury was extraordinarily suspicious, ascribing this trait in part to advanced age), the Queen unfortunately entered the room and put an end to all political discussion.[241]

Count Wolff-Metternich, who was slated to succeed Hatzfeldt as ambassador,[242] suggested that for Germany the choice of ally was no longer between England and Russia but between England and nothing. Of this fact, he pointed out, the English were quite aware.[243] Both Rosebery and Chamberlain before Lansdowne had plainly admitted their growing dissatisfaction with the policy of "splendid isolation",[244] and as plainly their preference for an alliance with Germany, though certainly the adherence of England to the Dual Alliance would be most welcome to France. The advantage of an English alliance for Germany herself seemed to him dubious, although it would

239 Eckardstein, II, pp. 287 *et seq.*

240 XVII, 5014, 5015.

241 XVII, 5020.

242 Eckardstein was not trusted at Berlin because of his close English affiliations socially and by marriage and his open English sympathies.

243 XVII, 5018, June 1, 1901.

244 See also Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, I, pp. 9 *et seq.*

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undoubtedly strengthen the Triple Alliance as a whole. England's navy would be needed only in the improbable event of a war with the United States and there was slight chance that her traditional colonial and commercial policy would be altered by an alliance, while Germany would be incurring Russia's active hostility by backing England in the Far East.

Holstein went even further: he now regarded an alliance between England and Germany alone as positively dangerous to Germany.[245] Not only was the Triple Alliance the only fair partner for the whole British Empire, but only such an alliance would be a genuine security for European peace. Holstein still could not see what Hatzfeldt had repeatedly called to his attention, what Metternich now saw, what Chamberlain particularly had so plainly and so often said, that English statesmen were themselves aware that "splendid isolation" would no longer serve. He still saw in England's official procedure only the old "chestnut policy" of Salisbury. But he was not in the least uneasy, even though Germany could no longer "threaten England with other alliances". Time and the course of world events would inevitably bring them together; meanwhile Germany felt herself strong enongh to need to seek no further alliance, and free of any danger in her foreign relations. Bülow did admit that in an alliance with England there would be for Germany one advantage, aside from stabilizing the future peace of Europe (which seemed to him secure enough for Germany under the status quo), an advantage "direct and not to be underestimated".[246] If Germany was to continue her commercial and industrial development, she must have access to the world's greatest potential market, i. e. China. In China Germany could not go it alone, whereas with England she would have a common policy, directed politically against Russia and commercially against the United States. Herr Ballin (of the Hamburg-American Line) was very keen on this point, he adds; naturally, for it was plain enough that Germany was to continue her economic development. Bülow himself was all for a big navy, colonies, imperial expansion. Why then could

[245] XVII, 5019, June 14, 1901, memorandum of Holstein.

[246] XVII, 5018, note.

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he not proceed to follow his own inference through? Why could these German statesmen never free themselves from the horns of a dilemma? As it was, he merely communicated with Lascelles on June 17 along the lines of Holstein's memorandum.

The whole question was finally settled then and there, that is to say, although *finis* was not quite yet written. Even if after agreeing to begin they could have agreed how to begin, which they could not, can we have any confidence that they would ever have got very far, knowing what we know of the men responsible for German policy? "If", said Chamberlain to Alfred Rothschild in June, "they are too short-sighted to see that a whole new world constellation depends on this question, then there is no helping them."[247] When in August Germany declined once more to enter upon any understanding for joint action with reference to the danger of French aggression in Morocco,[248] which the English had so long especially desired and so often suggested,[249] he did finally give up, in the belief that Germany was only after colonial concessions and, if she had ever been in earnest about an alliance, was so no longer. The next month Bülow suggested to Metternich that his London career would open most auspiciously if he could secure a final settlement of the claims—so dear to the Kaiser's heart—for compensation for losses to German citizens in South Africa.[250] Eckardstein has some biting comment on that school of statesmanship,[251] although it is perhaps less severe, because less judicial in manner and method, than Brandenburg's judgment on the whole policy of Marschall, Bülow, Holstein, the Kaiser, all alike, in regard to "minor questions": "Germany was like a little shopkeeper who before the conclusion of a big deal feels bound to ask his customer for a little deposit".[252]

Nothing else mattered—the visit of Edward VII to Germany in August after the death of his sister, the empress dowager, as little as anything else.[253] For the last six months of the year

[247] Eckardstein, II, p. 300.

[248] XVII, 5021 and note.

[249] See particularly p. 43, *supra*.

[250] XVII, 5025.

[251] Eckardstein, II, p. 289.

[252] Brandenburg, p. 150.

[253] XVII, 5022, 5023 and notes.

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there are only half a dozen documents of any kind at all in the German archives bearing on this question. Hatzfeldt died in November, he who had tried so long and so hard but so unsuccessfully to bring England and Germany together. Metternich reported on December 28, 1901, in the last document of the series,[254] that Lansdowne had informed him that the negotiations had come to nothing only because of the state of public opinion in England and the certainty of trouble in Parliament over an alliance with the Triple Alliance, which seemed to the English government "for the present too big a fence to ride at". This was truer than Metternich's reply, that failure at a time when England was embarrassed by the Boer War was scarcely to be regretted by Germany; this, he explains, to convince Lansdowne that Germany had not been over-anxious and to suggest that England might come to regret the loss of an opportunity that might not recur.

So *finis* was finally written. For the present each must go his own way, though each professed to wish to act in full accord with the other whenever possible. There can be no doubt that Metternich was quite as much in earnest on this point as Lansdowne, for Bülow had already noted that nothing whatever must impair Germany's friendly relations with England, if only because he had the impression that Russia's desire to remain on good terms with Germany, which was a matter of the greatest concern to German diplomacy, largely depended upon a belief in the existence of such relations between Germany and England.[255] But if the diplomats of the German foreign office felt some tinge of uneasiness or regret in their own hearts, there is no sign of it in these documents.

They were so sure of the future. Yet it was not long until their confidence began to betray them. In February 1902, Eckardstein relates how Edward VII, after speaking of the recently concluded Anglo-Japanese alliance, said to him: "Unfortunately I can not look with the same confidence into the future, so far as concerns Anglo-German relations. Although the Kaiser is writing me long letters in which he assures me of his

[254] XVII, 5030.

[255] XVII, 5024, note.

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friendship, I am unfortunately no longer able to bank much on them.[256] . . . More than ever at present we are being pressed by France to come to terms with her in all colonial questions, and perhaps it will in the end really be the best for us to reach an understanding, for England wishes nothing except to have peace and to live on friendly terms with all other nations. . . . In any arrangement that we might in the future make with other countries, needless to say it would in any event be our principle to avoid offence to Germany."[257] Later, Eckardstein goes on to say, he learned from the Japanese ambassador that although Edward VII had in the spring of 1901 favored the adherence of Germany to the new alliance, which Eckardstein had hoped for from the first,[258] he later actually opposed the desire of the Japanese to include Germany.

If what has been written above is at all clear it will hardly be necessary to reiterate by way of summary the considerations

[256] E. g. the letter of Dec. 30, 1901 (XVII, 5029). The earlier part deals with purely personal matters; the concluding paragraph follows.

. . . The vanishing year has been one of care and deep sorrow to us all, and the loss of two such eminent women, mothers and Queens as dear Grandmama (*sic*) and poor mother is a great blow, leaving for a long time a void which closes up very slowly! Thank God that I could be in time to see dear Grandmama once more and to be near you and aunts to help you in bearing the first effects of the awful blow! What a magnificent realm she had left you and what a fine position in the world! In fact the first world empire since the Roman Empire. May it always throw in its weight on the side of peace and justice. I gladly reciprocate all you say about the relations of our two countries and our personal ones; they are of the same blood and they have the same creed and they belong to the great Teutonic race, which Heaven has intrusted with the culture of the world; for—apart from the Eastern races—there is no other Race left for God to work his will in and upon the world except ours; that is I think grounds enough to keep peace and to foster mutual recognition and reciprocity in all that draws us together and to sink everything which could part us. The Press is awful on both sides, but here it has nothing to say, for I am the sole arbiter and master of German Foreign Policy and the government and country must follow me even if I have to face the musik (*sic*). May your government never forget this and never place me in the jeopardy to have to choose a course which could be a misfortune to both them and us.

With my sincere wishes for a happy new year and joyfully anticipating Georgie's visit here I remain ever

Your most affectionate nephew—

WILLIAM.

[257] Eckardstein II, pp. 378 *et seq.* [258] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 285.

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that determined German foreign policy throughout these years, nor to point out once more wherein that policy was mistaken. We see it now in the light of the disastrous results which it at least in large part precipitated. As to that there can scarcely be two opinions.[259] 1901 is certainly the critical year in the European system of alliances, since it indicated the future path of England. What follows appears as an inevitable and tragic sequel. While it is futile to speculate as to what would have happened if what did happen had not, yet the conclusion is almost irresistible that some sort of Anglo-German entente would have succeeded far better than the equilibrium of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente in preserving the peace of Europe. It is obvious too, that even had such an agreement been concluded, it would have required the most enlightened statesmanship on both sides to keep it a reality, a statesmanship which, to judge from these negotiations, was little likely to be forthcoming. But at any rate there was in such a possible connection surely more hope and less danger. What proved to be the last opportunity was frustrated by a German diplomacy which even for 1901 must pass as somewhat petty, and very shortsighted.[260] Germany did not reject an alliance with England; she lost it. The German statesmen indeed acted as they did only because they were so sure of getting it. Their mistake was not so much that they did not know what was best for Germany, as that they did not know how to get it, even when much of what they wanted was offered to them. Just that was the tragedy for Germany and for Europe.

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[259] *Ibid.*, (III, p. 24) quotes from Prof. J. Haller ("Die auswärtige Politik des Fürsten Bülow", in *Süddeutsche Monatschrift*, Jan. 1917): "The political situation from which the world war proceeded developed in the period of Bülow. The world war is the fruit of the policy of isolating Germany, and isolation was the answer to the foreign policy of Prince Bülow."

[260] It is these last tragic negotiations of 1901 that Mr. H. H. Asquith (*Genesis of the War*, p. 49) quaintly refers to as "desultory pourparlers between Eckardstein and Chamberlain".

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THE POLITICAL METHODS OF THE ANTI-CORN LAW LEAGUE[1]

THE growth of the modern political party, with its highly-developed methods, is a recent and a fundamental fact of English history. In this connection, the means used for the effective mobilization of the great electorate created in the nineteenth century have been somewhat neglected by the constitutional historian, but they possess a real interest. The very few conscious attempts by scholars[2] to understand and describe the organization and functioning of political parties do not attempt to elucidate phases earlier than the last third of the century, though the large increase of the electorate effected by the "great" Reform Bill of 1832[3] had much earlier opened the way for methods of electioneering which were decidedly new.

During the thirty years' peace after the Napoleonic wars, and later still, English political parties had little or no existence outside of Parliament itself—and often surprisingly little cohesion within the Houses. Notwithstanding this fact, or possibly because of it, some of the most significant among the legislative reforms of the second quarter of the century were achieved less as a result of enlightenment and conviction within Parliament than as a consequence of external pressure. Three great associations were more or less directly responsible for the securing of Catholic Emancipation, for the abolition of slavery, and for free trade in grain. Parties, in fact, from the death of

[1] In the preparation of this paper I have been under very particular obligations to Mr. Conyers Read.

[2] A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England* (N. Y., 1921), Part II; Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (London, 1902), vol. I; Franqueville, *Le Gouvernement et le Parlement Britanniques* (Paris, 1887), II, especially ch. xxviii.

[3] The number of voters in England and Wales was increased from 435,000 to 652,000, or 49%. C. Seymour, *Electoral Reform in England and Wales* (New Haven, 1915), p. 533.

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Canning to that of Palmerston, were not performing that part of their function which consists in focusing and clarifying the opinion of the electorate on the main questions of public policy, and for a time a not inconsiderable portion of their present task devolved on associations organized for special purposes and laying no claim to the title of parties. The point at which an association ceases to be merely a private organization and becomes a quasi-public part of the national constitution is a question for which criteria could be found but which need not detain us here; yet it is clear that any society which seeks to persuade the legislature to follow a particular policy in a particular instance faces certain of the problems of organization and method which are met by real parties. The solutions devised may be worth our understanding.

Of the three great propaganda groups already mentioned, the Anti-Corn Law League attained the highest point of power and the most conspicuous success. As a rule, in our histories the League is described as a "peripatetic university", a great educational institution, the main work of which was to inculcate in the people the economic principles of *laisser faire*.[1] This indeed it was; but the Anti-Corn Law League became at the same time a force directly political, and aimed not only at the creation of a general public opinion favorable to its ends, but, in view of the slowness and uncertainty of such effort, initiated measures which looked to the procurement of a positive majority in Parliament. The electoral policy of the League shows that Joseph Chamberlain's feat of 1868 was not the first at-

[1] This is certainly the sole impression which would be obtained by a reader of such standard works as those of Spencer Walpole, *History of England* (London, 1905), vols. IV, V, chs. xvii-xix; Traill and Mann, *Social England* (N. Y. and London, 1897), vol. VI, pp. 225-26; J. A. R. Marriott, *England Since Waterloo* (N. Y. and London, 1913); and *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, ch. i; while even the best informed writers such as May, *Constitutional History of England, 1760-1860* (ed. Holland, London, 1912), vol. II, pp. 118-20; Lord Morley, *Life of Cobden* (London, 1881), vol. I; Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, p. 131; and Low and Sanders, *Political History of England, 1837-1901* (London, 1907), p. 53, give very little emphasis to other League methods than those of simple "propaganda". Harriet Martineau, *History of England during the Thirty Years' Peace* (London, 1850), vol. II, p. 615, forms an almost solitary exception.

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tempt at effective organization of the electorate. The Reform Bill of 1867, which increased the voting lists of England and Wales by 88 per cent,[1] gives the chief clue to the development of modern party organizations; but the act of 1832, which added only 217,000 electors, meant a proportional increase which also opened new fields to the inventive politician.

The depression following the commercial difficulties of 1837 seems to have been the immediate cause for the launching of the anti-corn law movement. Free trade was not a novel idea in Lancashire, and belief in its need is said to have contributed a good deal to the desire for parliamentary reform before 1832,[2] while the extreme radicals had long been preaching it. But before 1838 there had never been any connected agitation against the protective system. In the autumn of that year a Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association was formed, and with this stimulus the manufacturers of the North and the Midlands rapidly coalesced in similar societies in each important town. From the beginning the Manchester Association definitely took the lead and was almost at once urging the establishment of a central board to secure unity of action of all local associations.[3] The actual formation of the League was a result of the recommendation of a large body of delegates from local associations who met in London early in 1839 in the vain hope of exercising pressure on Parliament. Before dispersal this group made over the official headship of the movement to the Manchester society, which had just appointed for itself an executive committee that with few changes remained the active head of the entire movement throughout its life.[4] The League, in fact, was a league of local organizations, not at all of individuals; yet its central committee was the vital nucleus which determined all important matters of policy.

[1] Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 533; *cf.* Lowell, *Government of England,* vol. I, p. 208.

[2] A. Prentice, *History of the Anti-Corn Law League* (London, 1853), vol. I, p. 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 101.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 124-125.

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A conditioning factor of the whole agitation against protection lay in the constant adequacy of its funds. No manufacturer in the country employing over five hundred hands had failed, it was claimed, to contribute to the coffers of the League.[1] A very important cause of the enormous scale and success of the League's labors was the fact that a large proportion of the holders of liquid wealth in the kingdom were united in approving its aim. In 1840 the money commanded by the League amounted to about £8000; but later the pace was greatly accelerated, so that in 1844 and 1845 over £110,000 was expended,[2] while in a month's time at the end of December, 1845, and the first half of January, 1846, £150,000 was subscribed toward a fresh "quarter of a million fund"—of which only twenty per cent was finally called for.[3] These sums are cited merely to show that apparently there was no particular limit to the size of the organization that could be supported. The rapid financial expansion of the League, as a rough measure of total activity, may be interestingly compared with the increased power and scope of O'Connell's agitation in the 1820's after the imposition of "Catholic rent".[4] All money resources were absolutely centralized in the Council and the financial committee at Manchester, and no expenditures were made without their approval on the voucher.[5]

To understand the problem of the Anti-Corn Law League and the methods of its solution, the political complexion of the country should be borne in mind. About 1840 the active free-traders had no direct political power and appeared to consist of hardly more than "a mere handful of energetic men". In Parliament they were represented by the small and attenuated group of philosophical radicals, while on the other side was the vast majority of the members of both Houses, irrespective of parties. Responsible for and sustaining this majority were all

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 3631.

[2] Morley, *Cobden*, vol. I, p. 312; Prentice, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 413.

[3] Prentice, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 418, 442.

[4] Cobden wrote early in 1842: "I like the idea of an anti-Corn-Law *rent*." Morley, *Cobden*, vol. I, p. 229.

[5] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, pp. 213-14.

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the large landed proprietors of the kingdom, most of their tenant farmers, and the so-called "independent gentry", always socially conservative and devoted to the glorious British Constitution as established by their forefathers. The political parties, as such, both supported the principle of protection, though some of the Whigs were converts to *laisser faire*, and their leader, Lord John Russell, thought by 1841 that the time had come to make some move toward reform. It was on his proposal early in that year to reduce protection and to substitute a fixed duty for the sliding scale, that the Whig ministry, heir of the reform of 1832, finally fell.

The free traders of 1841 consisted, then, only of the larger manufacturers and a considerable number of intellectuals. It was a narrow basis on which to build a national movement, or so at least it seemed to Tory publicists like Croker, who denounced the League as an unconstitutional conspiracy.[1] The attitude of the working classes is additional proof of the limited social foundation of the anti-corn law agitation. At this period, when Chartism was absorbing most of the organizable energies of the English laborer, it was almost impossible for the lower classes, imbued as they were with theories of class war, to bring themselves to cooperate with a body representative mainly of employers. They did not, of course, support the protectionists; but for the most part they also held aloof from the League, though certain of the trade unions passed resolutions in favor of free trade.[2]

The problem of the League leaders was to create a public opinion which would ultimately dominate Parliament. From the beginning they resolved to keep out of Whig-Tory party politics, and to work for the one aim alone of securing the re-

[1] *Quarterly Review,* vol. LXXI, pp. 244-314 (December 1842); see also Jennings, *The Correspondence and Diaries of J. W. Croker* (London, 1884), vol. II, pp. 388, 390.

[2] Webb, *History of Trade Unionism* (London, 1911), p. 159. The relations of the Chartist and anti-corn law movements may be studied in three excellent books; Hovell, *The Chartist Movement* (Manchester, 1918); Dolléans, *Le Chartisme* (Paris, 1912-13, 2 vols.); West, *History of the Chartist Movement,* (Boston and New York, 1920). *Cf.* also Ashworth, *Recollections of Cobden and the League* (London and New York, [1876]), p. 24.

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peal of the legislation "protecting" agriculture. This was represented in its most favorable light, as a question of cheap food, to all classes of the community. A newspaper, *The Anti-Corn Law* (later *The Anti-Bread Tax*) *Circular* was started, and in 1843 a very ably edited weekly, *The League;* lecturers were hired and sent about to speak in public meetings; and the League published and circulated enormous quantities of pamphlet literature.[1] As the work progressed, it became clear that mere noise and publicity would not suffice to coerce Parliament or ministries. The League activities came more and more to focus on the task of obtaining voting power. The campaign of education was one means to this end, in its attempt to stir up the middle classes, to convert even some of the farmers, and to secure the aid of the workingmen, who in many boroughs were voters under the ancient rights left undisturbed in 1832. But more important was the actual attention to voters as such, which has been largely neglected in the current accounts of the period.

The adoption by the League of a non-partisan, or really a third-party, policy was formally made in 1840. "Dissociating ourselves from all political parties," said the resolution, "we hereby declare that we will use every exertion to obtain the return of those members to Parliament alone who will support a repeal of the Corn Laws." Prentice, reporting this, adds:

> The last resolution was not passed without deep deliberation. Many of the whigs in office, before the passing of the Reform Bill, had been opponents of the Corn Laws, and it was believed that they continued to be favorable to free trade. . . . There was a belief that in the struggle to destroy the landowners' monopoly the whigs would lend a friendly hand; and there was great unwillingness to embarrass an administration of which such hopes were entertained. It required, therefore, some firmness of resolution to declare that, in future, no distinction should be made between whig and tory candidates.[2]

[1] Compare an interesting summary of the activities of 1840 in Prentice, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 173-174.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 158.

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The policy thus announced was consistently though not slavishly held to throughout the life of the Anti-Corn Law League. As late as 1846, when the end was clearly in view, Cobden held strongly that the policy of isolation should be maintained.[1] Yet there was no lack of ordinary political sagacity. In the general election of 1841 when it was decided that Cobden should go to Parliament, the free-traders, not yet sure of their strength in Manchester, "too readily yielded to the wish of many influential persons that a member should be chosen who, while he was a thorough opponent of monopoly, would not be indifferent to the retention of the whigs in office"; and Cobden was put up for the surer if less impressive constituency of Stockport.[2] In the same year, at a by-election for Walsall, the League took its first plunge into politics on its own account. Rawson and Prentice, two members of the Executive Council, went to the borough and at once put the question of absolute repeal to the Whig candidate. He would not give a definite answer and before long withdrew from the contest. The League then offered its own candidate, who was, however, defeated. This move by the League, says Prentice, threw the whole ministerial press into the wildest hysterics and called down the unmeasured abuse of a host of Whig journals which, "professing to love free trade very much, loved whiggism much more."

The Anti-Corn League was thus fairly launched as an independent political force. And its activity and resources were always on the increase. Larger and larger subscriptions were raised, and were expended in getting up petitions to Parliament, holding public meetings, and sending out lecturers and literature. In 1840 Cobden noted the remarkable success of League lecturers in Ireland, which he expected to prove a

[1] Morley, *Cobden,* vol. I, p. 363.

[2] Prentice, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 227.

[3] *Ibid.,* vol. I, pp. 176-83. On the political policy of the League one should compare *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine,* n. s., vol. VII, p. 747 (1840); vol. VIII, pp. 67, 338 (1841); Ashworth, *Recollections of Cobden and the League,* p. 26; Garnett, *Life of W. J. Fox* (London, 1910), p. 259.

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trump card,[1] and in 1841 the League held a great conference of about two hundred ministers of all denominations at Manchester, at which "sternly uncompromising resolutions were passed by acclamation."[2]

In 1842 the Tories, recently come into office, passed a new corn law, which reduced protection not a little, though making no concession as to the principle. Sir Robert Peel denied that the prevailing depression and distress were due to the corn laws, but admitted that the sliding scale of 1828 was injurious to everyone concerned—and to the revenue. On the whole it was considered to the interest of the agriculturalists that the price of wheat should be between fifty-four and fifty-eight shillings, and the new scale was constructed with this in view, reducing the duties at different prices to about one-half. The free-traders, nevertheless, took any law short of repeal as their cue to protest, and made all the noise of opposition possible. Cobden denounced the bill from his newly-won seat in the House of Commons, and indignation was particularly manifest in the northern towns; in Stockport and Rochdale Peel's effigy was carried on gibbets through the streets and hurled with imprecations into the flames.[3]

Various and ingenious as were the League efforts, they made no considerable impression on the solid body of governing class opinion. If monopolists and bread-taxers were held up for public execration, so were the unconstitutional conspirators of Manchester, who sought to precipitate a bloody class war. The campaign tended to degenerate into a battle of words. The heads of the League, of whom Cobden and George Wilson appear to have been the most canny, saw that fresh lines must be laid, and after the legislation of 1842 they turned to activities designed to secure a majority at the next general election. As early as February of that year, Cobden wrote to Wilson advising a careful listing of all the boroughs of the realm, dividing them as "safe, tolerably safe, doubtful, desperate, hopeless."

[1] Garnett, *Life of Fox*, p. 260.

[2] H. Solly, *These Eighty Years* (London, 1893), vol. I, pp. 370-72; Prentice, vol. I, ch. xvi; *Quarterly Review*, vol. LXXI, pp. 255-56.

[3] Morley, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 221.

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The League's strength should then be concentrated on the "doubtfuls". Moreover, electoral committees should be formed in each borough to look after the registration.[1] Coincidently with this plan, a new education scheme was worked out for a thorough siege of every registered elector of the country by sending to each a packet of publications embracing the whole anti-corn law argument. The plan involved, said Cobden, an expense of £20,000,[2] part of which must go for procuring copies of the voting registers; but it was carried through. After May, 1843, systematic attention was given to the condition of the county voting registers, though public announcement of the plan was delayed until September, when Cobden expounded it to a great meeting at Covent Garden Theatre in London.[3] In the first place, he said, "we propose to provide a copy of every registration list for every borough and county in the United Kingdom. . . . We intend to bring these registers to a central office in London." We then propose, he continued, to correspond once a week with 300,000 of the 800,000 electors in the country, that being the number considered necessary to secure a majority, counting boroughs already safe, in the House of Commons.[4] Meetings were to be held in every borough, and any borough which did not have a free-trade candidate of its own would be supplied with one by the League. A few weeks later Cobden said that the future operations of the League would be strictly electoral.[5]

These "electoral" labors were threefold. The first aspect, the use of the mails to distribute literature, was necessarily new since the introduction of penny postage in 1839, and the more effective because unfamiliar. Only a little later came two other methods of attack, the creation of voting qualifications and the correction, from the League point of view, of the existing vot-

[1] Morley, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 228.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 250.

[3] Cobden, *Speeches* (ed. John Bright and J. E. T. Rogers, London, 1870), vol. I, pp. 72-74; *The League,* September 30, 1843.

[4] Cobden, *Speeches,* vol. I, p. 109.

[5] *The League,* October 21, 1843.

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ing lists. These two phases absorbed the main part of the anti-corn law activity from 1843 to 1846.

Attention to the voting registers for party purposes was nothing new with the Anti-Corn Law League. Its necessity, and the profits to be drawn from it, were due to the greatly increased complexity of the qualifications for voting introduced in the Reform Bill of 1832—qualifications of amazing variety and subtlety, definition of which often required expert interpretation in the law courts. The registers of voters included after each man's name a description of his qualification; so that in the periodic revisions of the lists undertaken in the courts of "revising barristers", it was possible for an alert party agent to object to the descriptions of voters of the other party, to amend or ignore those of his own, and thus materially to affect the party make-up of constituencies which were still by modern standards very small.[1] It appears that the Tories were the first to see the possibilities inherent in the situation. Less than three months after the king had signed the great Reform Bill, Lord Durham was expressing apprehension that the Tories had outflanked the Whigs by applying superior activity and pecuniary means to the task of getting their supporters on the registers,[2] while in 1834 Lord Lyndhurst told Greville that they had "several seats quite safe" in consequence of their work.[3] In 1837 Peel pursued the Tory advantage above ground with his advice to his party to "Register, register, register!" More privately he remarked: "That party is the strongest in point of fact which has the existing registration in its favor. It is a dormant instrument, but a most powerful one. . . . We shall soon have, I have no doubt, a regular systematic organization of it."[4]

[1] The revised registration act passed in 1843 did not materially change the existing situation. In one respect, in fact, it made the work of party agents easier. Seymour, *Electoral Reform in England and Wales*, p. 120.

[2] Durham to Grey, August 30, 1832. Reid, *Life of Durham* (London, 1906), vol. I, p. 311.

[3] *Greville Memoirs* (new ed., London, 1888), vol. III, p. 155. *Cf.*, also a Whig attack on the Carlton Club and the electoral activity of the Tories, *Edinburgh Review*, vol. LXII, pp. 167-84 (October 1835).

[4] C. S. Parker, *Peel* (London, 1899), vol. II, p. 368.

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It was the Anti-Corn Law League which fulfilled Peel's prediction, and the attacks on the League make it quite clear that its activities were novel only from their large-scale effectiveness in a method which had previously been confined to county or borough associations.[1] The system of the repealers was simple but comprehensive. In the first place it was essential to obtain accurate information of the attitude of the existing electors towards free trade, and as to whether they were still correctly listed on the registers. This knowledge was secured in three ways: in the course of the distribution of tracts, which was made by messenger as well as by post; by questionnaires;[2] and by a canvass. The latter was the main method of procedure. Agents were sent out to canvass the counties and to get information as to the political sentiments and qualifications of the electors. Then a conference was held at Manchester with thirty lawyers, and it was decided to object to all protectionists on the lists who were imperfectly described or whose qualifications might be attacked on technical grounds, and to set right the qualifications of free-traders who were in a similar situation.[3]

The superiority of the free-traders was due to nothing more than their greater activity and concentration of effort, which in many boroughs resulted in a net gain on the register quite sufficient to make the difference in case of an election. One extract may be taken as typical of the manner in which the thing went.

> Ashton-under-Lyne Borough Revision.—On Wednesday last C. N. Marshall, Esq., revising barrister, held his court for revising the borough list. . . . Mr. Henry Gartside, solicitor, appeared for the Free Traders; the Monopolists were not represented by any professional person. The Free Traders objected to 40 Monopolists, and succeeded in striking off 36. The Monopolists did not make any objections to the Free Traders.[4]

[1] *Parliamentary Papers,* 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, pp. 1-46; 3 *Hansard,* vol. LXXXIV, p. 516.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers,* 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 3386, 3100.

[3] *Ibid.,* § 3329.

[4] *The League,* October 4, 1843.

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In some cases, however, the "monopolists" also had a legal agent.

The wholesale character of the League activity made it inevitable that there should be abuses, which were mainly in the direction of the lodging of frivolous objections. In two parishes one man's name was signed to 710 notices of objection and he had got some one else to sign many of them for him. Many of the qualifications objected to included "a number of the most undoubted men of property; men whose qualifications were perfectly notorious".[1] In North Staffordshire out of a total registration of 10,050, there were between 1800 and 2000 objections signed by one man.[2] A person named Hickton, from the Southern Division of Chester, testified before the parliamentary committee of inquiry that he had objected to about two thousand names. A young man who said he came from Manchester from the office of the Anti-Corn Law League, brought him the notices of objection; Hickton and his two sons signed away as hard as they could without reading the notices or knowing the persons objected to; and when they were through the young man took the papers back to Manchester again.[3]

The net effect of these proceedings from the League point of view was not doubtful, but the result on the registers as a whole was a matter of some debate. Many of the conservatives, including some of the revising barristers, complained that the League objections on technicalities were injurious to the purity of the registers because leading to the striking-off of names of men who were well qualified but, for one reason or another, failed to appear to defend themselves. In several cases a post office was so swamped with notices of objection posted at the latest legal moment, that it was unable to deliver them in time for the receivers to appear to defend themselves before the revising barristers.[4] On the other hand Wilson, the

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, §§ 1105-1107.

[3] *Ibid.*, §§ 1702-1707.

[4] *Ibid.*, §§ 1397-1671.

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Chairman of the League, said that he had been often complimented by revising barristers for his agents' conduct in court and their energy in securing information, and told that the counties were indebted to the League for its industry in purifying the lists.[1] It was admitted that the League system, while "purifying" the protectionist side of the register, would leave great imperfections on its own side—though defective descriptions of free-traders' qualifications would be amended; the tacit assumption was that the voting lists would only be made perfect by the constant exertions of two national political associations.[2]

Although in this period there did not come to be two national organizations which supervised the lists, the protectionists nevertheless did not prove unteachable. Bright declared that in 1845 in the West Riding of Yorkshire protectionists made many more objections than the free-traders,[3] while in South Lancashire the League objections totaled 3316 and those of the protectionists only two hundred less. But the superior organization of the League told heavily even here, for the votes expunged as a consequence of its objections numbered 1722, while its opponents were successful in only 734 instances.[4] In North Cheshire the League objected to 1247 names and expunged 509, the protectionists to 976 with 106 successes.[5]

Materials for an arithmetical tabulation of the result of the League's attack on the register are not at hand, but a certain idea of its extent may be obtained. In 1844 it was reported that 160 boroughs had been visited, with certain improvement in 112 of them.[6] The October revision for 1845 resulted in gains for the League (on the total register) of 5½% for the county of Bucks, 3% for East Gloucester, 5% for East Somerset, 9% for East Surrey, 9½% for North Stafford, 11% for South Stafford, 14% for North Chester, 7½% for the West

[1] *Parliamentary Papers,* 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 3527.

[2] *Ibid.,* §§ 3612-3616.

[3] 3 *Hansard,* vol. LXXXIV, p. 519.

[4] *Parliamentary Papers,* 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 3449.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Prentice, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 279; *cf.* Mongredien, *History of the Free Trade Movement in England* (new ed., London, 1897), p. 113.

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Riding of York.[1] For eleven of the county divisions, with a total registration of 60,288, the League objections in one year numbered 10,034 or 16.6% of the register, of which 4865, or 8% of the total, were successful.[2] That is, in eleven county constituencies the net League gain by this means was nearly one-twelfth of the gross number of voters, and it should be remembered in addition that the incessant activity and propaganda of the repealers made it probable that in the event of an election their supporters would turn out in greater force than their opponents.

There was a second side to the electoral attack of the League, which consisted in the creation of county voting qualifications. Notwithstanding the new franchises provided for in 1832, the largest class of voters in the counties still consisted of the old forty-shilling freeholders. Some one of the League leaders, probably Cobden, seized on this qualification and its numberless variations[3] as providing for the middle classes an opportunity similar to that offered to the landowners by the famous Chandos clause. In the rhetoric of Bright this conception formed "a small weapon, which we have discovered hid in the Reform Act, and in the constitution of the country . . . [It is] the strong and irresistible weapon before which the domination of this hereditary peerage must at length be laid in the dust."[4]

About the time that the registration policy began to be pushed, this new method was also given publicity, and it proved of very considerable success. The gist of the matter was the persuasion of the more well-to-do who favored repeal of the corn laws and who were not otherwise qualified, to become voters by the purchase of forty-shilling freeholds or rent-charges in the counties; for the organizers of the League had become persuaded that without the 152 county members of

[1] Calculated from *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 3507.

[2] Calculated from the same, § 3327.

[3] Actually there were 576 freehold qualifications for the county franchise, *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[4] *Speeches by John Bright* (ed. J. E. T. Rogers, London, 1868), vol. II, p. 288.

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Parliament they could not win to their end.[1] The plan was taken up with enthusiasm. Cobden neatly turned the tables on the Conservatives with his cry of "Qualify, qualify, qualify!" The purchase of freeholds was represented in a moral light by such speakers as Bright and W. J. Fox:[2] it gave every man of moderate means an opportunity to acquire, in the old landlord phrase, a stake in the country; it would attach men to their nation, stimulate interest in agriculture, promote stability, and redound to the moral good of the individual. On the other hand the creation of votes was denounced in unmeasured terms by hostile speakers. Though the League courted investigation[3] and though Cobden tried to show that his design was free from the sinister quality of manufactured voting,[4] the Leaguers were denounced as executing a wholesale system of perjury and forgery. "If the League was permitted to pursue this course", said its most virulent opponent in Parliament, "in a few years they would swamp all the *bona fide* voters, and be able to return members who would not represent the honest electors, but would be returned by a minority . . ."[5] Lord Brougham said that the purchase of votes was legal but unconstitutional,[6] and it is curious to see how the protectionists were forced to appeal to the constitution to condemn a practice which merely extended the old system of non-resident voting to a point threatening the predominance of the old electors.[7] The Anti-Corn Law League, liberal and in general favoring simplification and broadening of the franchise, was using the ancient property restrictions for its own purposes. It is an enlightening example of the ingenuity of peaceful reform.

[1] Prentice, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 260.

[2] *Cf. ibid.*, vol. II, p. 276.

[3] 3 *Hansard*, vol. LXXXIII, p. 1150; vol. LXXXIV, p. 238; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, p. 197.

[4] Morley, vol. I, p. 305.

[5] 3 *Hansard*, vol. LXXXIV, p. 515.

[6] 3 *Hansard*, vol. LXXXIII, pp. 36-37. Cases of the creation of votes by the purchase of rent-charges were in fact taken to court, where the practice was declared to be legal. *Jurist* (London), vol. X, pp. 313-318.

[7] 3 *Hansard*, vol. LXXXIII, pp. 1147-1149.

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The manner in which the county freehold policy was carried out can be described in detail, though the extent of its effect is less certain. A "private and confidential" letter was sent to anyone who seemed a likely prospect, urging him to qualify for, say, East Surrey, and to encourage those over whom he had influence to do so; the League promised every assistance, and offered a forty-shilling freehold qualification in that county for £56 paid at the League offices.[1] In Huddersfield in 1845 a Mr. Thomas Robinson advertised West Riding qualifications for all parties favorable to free trade.[2] A particular case was that of Bright's Buildings in Honley; through the medium of Robinson they were purchased by fifty people for £1990 as tenants in common and promptly leased back to the vendor for just enough to give each purchaser forty shillings a year.[3] Similar instances were noted at Crosslands and Bradford.[4] In the South an agent of the League bought a house at Brighton for £900, had it divided into eighteen rent-charges purchased for 49*l.* 15s. apiece, and so secured eighteen new voters, only one of whom lived in Sussex.[5] The same agent stated that between 250 and 300 similar purchases had passed through his hands. Occasionally he even paid the rent in advance out of his own pocket, that the qualification might be early enough for legal voting in the same year.[6] Another of the League agents testified that in January, 1846, he handled about £20,000 for the purchase of votes; he believed that anyone going to a League agent with £60 could be supplied with a vote.[7]

The League is effectually clear of any charge of using its own funds in forwarding this procedure.[8] There was no conceal-

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 309-310. In this instance it was a protectionist member of Parliament to whom the circular was sent!

[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, § 4746.

[3] *Ibid.*, §§ 4750-4754.

[4] *Ibid.*, §§ 4774-4787.

[5] *Ibid.*, §§ 2949-2962.

[6] *Ibid.*, §§ 3007, 3011, 3023-3033.

[7] *Ibid.* §§ 3500, 3747.

[8] *Ibid.*, Report of Committee, p. iv; compare *ibid.*, §§ 3503, 3726-3780, 4768-4772, 4932-4941.

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ment at the time that the transactions were simply to secure voters,[1] nor was there any prevarication before the investigating committee of the House of Commons. The League's function was simply that of agent and accountant. It provided the purchaser with information and relieved him of all trouble especially in the case of unacquainted persons clubbing together for rent-charges. A ledger account was held with every buyer, though the sums paid by persons desiring qualifications in various counties were in some instances collected into bank accounts to the credit of League agents.[2]

The Conservatives were forced by this activity into pursuing the same courses. The Sussex Agricultural Protection Society decided that as an organization it would have nothing to do with the creation of votes,[3] but a member of its managing committee advertised that "friends of agriculture" might procure qualifications for East or West Sussex by applying to him. There was even an advertisement in a Sussex paper that votes could be purchased for £5 less than of the Anti-Corn Law League.[5] But it appears that not over twenty-four protectionist votes were created in the whole county.[6]

The extent to which the purchase of voting qualifications was carried is, as has been said, uncertain. George Wilson estimated that in 1845 about half a million pounds was spent in the purchase of property to get votes, but this was only a guess. The Conservative agent in Middlesex declared that the League had increased the register in that county by 500 votes, and admitted that its activities, if continued, would swamp the Tories. From the Conservative side, also, we get an estimate of 1483 created votes, in the main of exactly forty shillings a year, added to the register in the West Riding, a number more than sufficient to swing the county to free trade.[7] Less precise esti-

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, vol. VIII, No. 451, §§ 4790-4791, 4918.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. iv, § 4952.

[3] *Ibid.*, § 5612.

[4] *Ibid.*, §§ 5412-5421, 5591-5592.

[5] *Ibid.*, §§ 5465, 5469.

[6] *Ibid.*, § 5693.

[7] *Ibid.*, §§ 3491, 3811, 3827, 4792-4795, 4839-4844.

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mates are even more enthusiastic. Cobden in 1849 explained how Lord Morpeth, at first defeated by a protectionist, had later been able to "walk over the course" in the West Riding by reason of the 5000 qualifications which had been made.[1] Two of the repealers record that "within a few months" after the inception of the freehold policy, "it was believed that a sufficient number of persons had purchased freehold qualifications in North Cheshire, in South Lancashire, and in the West Riding of Yorkshire, to secure to those constituencies Free Trade majorities in the event of an election."[2] And Morley states as a contemporary belief that approximately 40,000 persons in the kingdom had followed Cobden's urging to qualify as county voters.

It is not possible to evaluate the influence of the different types of activity carried on by the League. Two generations of discussion subsequent to 1846 showed that England was indeed converted to free trade; yet it is very questionable whether the process was as complete in 1846 as it was in 1860 or in 1880. Nor is it possible to say precisely what weight political considerations had in determining Sir Robert Peel's final decision. Cobden, just before repeal, could merge public opinion and presumptive votes in Parliament[4] into one argument, at the same time that exuberant Leaguers and unreconciled Tories were attributing Peel's difficult act to fear of the League's electoral power.[5]

What is certain is that the League acted as a practical political force of national scope. While the cause of labor and of

[1] Cobden, *Speeches,* vol. II, p. 494.

[2] Ashworth, *Recollections of Cobden and the League,* p. 185; Prentice, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 280.

[3] Morley, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 306.

[4] *Ibid.,* vol. I, p. 356.

[5] *E. g.,* the *Quarterly Review,* vol. LXXVIII, p. 554 (September 1846): "The real 'eloquence of Richard Cobden' was as the representative and organ of a conspiracy which was permitted to agitate the public mind by incendiary meetings—to usurp the sovereign authority by levying half a million of money for illegal purposes—and to menace the Constitution itself and the independence of Parliament by the avowed fabrication of a hundred thousand fictitious votes."

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ultimate democracy was carried on until 1885 under conditions which greatly limited the forms in which pressure on Parliament could be applied, the Anti-Corn Law League, which drew its strength in large part from enfranchised or enfranchisable elements of the population, had studied the lesson of organized effort. Its work on the voting lists, its creation of qualifications, its meetings and bazaars and coinage of catch phrases, were all designed for very much the same end as that of the modern American party worker who tries to "get out the vote". In an important sense, therefore, the whole work of the League was but a part of the slow process of giving full effect to the great Reform Bill of 1832. Though the modern party system in England dates only from 1867, it was in the very earliest years of Queen Victoria's reign that modern large scale methods began to be foreshadowed.[1] A hundred years ago the ranks of parliamentary divisions were largely self-constituted; now they are determined in conclaves held far from Westminster. It seems not unfair to connect the beginning of this downfall of parliamentary supremacy with the political methods devised by the Anti-Corn Law League.

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[1] An interesting link is furnished by the fact that T. N. Roberts, who supervised the electoral registration department of the Anti-Corn Law League, became later the chief agent of the Liberal party. Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. lvii.

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MAZZINI AND DANTE[1]

> "At any rate, if not new in the sphere of thought, the idea of nationality, regarded as the sign of a mission to be fulfilled for the good of humanity, was quite new among the political associations of that day."—Mazzini, *Autobiographical Notes.*

I

IN these days when Italy presents the rare picture of two outstanding patriots so far apart in methods and ideals, one is led to wonder whether D'Annunzio and Mussolini will be as misunderstood by future generations as Mazzini and Dante have been by those who have come after them. It seems firmly imbedded in the general consciousness that Dante (if indeed considered other than a poet) was the first, perhaps the greatest, of the champions of Italian nationalism; and that Mazzini not unworthily relighted the torch which had lain blackened and neglected some five hundred years and more.[2]

There is, of course, somewhat to be said for views so persistent and so universally adopted as almost to become dogma. On the other hand, it is certainly arguable that both may be

[1] This paper was written before the masterly work of C. E. Vaughan: *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy* [Manchester Univ. Press 1925] appeared. Inasmuch as Mr. Vaughan was more concerned with Mazzini's views regarding the relation of the Individual to the State than in an exhaustive treatment of his concept of Nationality [vol. II, pp. 300-304 and *passim*]; and since the connexion between Mazzini and Dante was nowhere discussed, I do not feel that these volumes have detracted from whatever of worth this essay originally contained.

[2] From among a myriad references to this viewpoint I suggest the following:—Forcolo, *Essay on Petrarch;* W. Boyd Carpenter, in *Nineteenth Century,* vol. LXXX (1916), pp. 939 *et seq.; Contemp. Review,* vol. CIX (1916), pp. 394-398; M. L. Henry, in *Atlantic Monthly,* vol. LVIII, pp. 803 *et seq.; Nation,* vol. XLIII, pp. 421 *et seq.,* and vol. XV, pp. 61 *et seq.,* 135 *et. seq.; Review of Reviews,* vol. XLVI, pp. 113-116; *Democratic Review,* vol. XXX, pp. 41 *et seq.; Galaxy,* vol. III, pp. 484 *et seq.;* and for what appears to be an extremely erroneous view of Dante *vide* J. M. Robertson, *Patriotism and Empire,* pp. 63-64.

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read in an altogether different light, and that neither the Florentine nor the Genoese held an Italian nation as the τέλος of his politics. To be a patriot is one thing—to be a Nationalist is "other quite". Both Dante and Mazzini looked beyond Italy. Both were conditioned, in their thinking, by a Stoicism tempered with Christianity. In both, Epictetus becomes Augustine. To both, by the exigencies of actuality, does Italy seem to need freedom from oppression, whether of Guelphic feudality or of white-coated Austrians; but to neither is a liberated Italy the ultimate goal. "Do you ask whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could be greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not consulting the citizens of one city alone . . . but the citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery."[1]

It has therefore seemed not inadvisable nor inappropriate to restate the politics of Dante and Mazzini as I read them. It may be possible that we can have for them more than the detached sympathy deserved by those who loved their country. It may be that we should reverence in them men who held all mankind in their hearts.

Mazzini, during his impressionable years, had steeped himself in the philosophy and literature of the French Revolution; reading much and thinking more, probably brooding often on that entrancing subject during those long nocturnal walks which escaped the comprehension, and aroused the suspicions, of the Genoese government. As he turned the subject over in his mind, there came to him, almost as a revelation, the remarkably sane conviction that the French Revolution had failed because it was one-sided. He had been impressed by the insistence with which the Revolution had held fast to the doctrine of the Rights of Man. He was more impressed by its failure to insist on the equally essential doctrine of the Duties of Man. The Revolutionists, he felt, had not realized that rights cannot exist without duties—that rights, all-important and undeniably necessary though they may be, are, none the

[1] Epictetus, *Diss.* III.

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less, conditioned upon the carrying out of duties; that rights emanate from duties, which are antecedent and superior. To insist upon the Rights of Man was laudable; to insist upon such rights without proclaiming the existence of duties was futile.[1]

The French Revolution failed because it appealed to the weaker side of man's nature; it urged him to get rather than to give; it encouraged acquisitiveness rather than sacrifice. "A Declaration of Rights furnished no basis for idealism, provided no imperative, binding law for man; it established no guide for conduct, bestowed no definition for happiness. It neglected the strongest impulses to right action; enthusiasm, love, and a sense of Duty." "You cannot," declares Mazzini, "by any theory of Rights make men unselfish. You can at best drive them like Faust to seek happiness or life's Elixir in the Witches' Kitchen."[2]

> Right is the faith of the individual. Duty is the common collective faith. Right can but organize resistance; it may destroy, it cannot found. Duty builds up, associates, and unites; it is derived from a general law, whereas Right is derived only from human law. There is nothing to forbid a struggle against Right. Any Individual may rebel against the Right of any other Individual which is injurious to him; and the sole judge between the adversaries is Force. And such in fact has frequently been the answer which societies based upon Rights have given to their opponents. Societies based upon Duty would not be compelled to have recourse to force. Duty, once admitted as the rule, excludes the possibility of a struggle, and by rendering the individual subject to the general aim, it cuts at the very root of those evils which Right is unable to prevent. . . . The Doctrine of Rights puts an end to sacrifice and cancels martyrdom from the World.[3]

Here, one is inclined to agree with Professor Rose, is the bed-rock of Mazzinian doctrine. The French Revolution, run-

[1] Mazzini, *Autob. Notes*, p. 69.

[2] Cited in Bolton-King, *Mazzini*.

[3] Mazzini, *Foi et Avenir*.

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ning in this vicious circle, "having begun with a Declaration of the Rights of Man, could end only in a Man, Napoleon." Mazzini maintained that it merely marked the passing of an old era, the era of individualism, and did not initiate the new era, the era of collective energies. Here, then, lies the mission of Italy.[1]

Life, for Mazzini, was a mission:

> We must find an educative principle to guide men to better things, to teach them constancy in sacrifice, to bind them to their brothers without making them dependent upon any Man's theory or upon the brute force of the Community. This principle is Duty. We must convince men that they, sons of one God, have here on earth to carry out one law, that each must live, not to himself but others, that the end of life is not to have more or less of happiness, but to make ourselves and others better; that to fight injustice and error, *everywhere*, for our brothers' good, is not a Right only, but a *Duty*. Duty we may not without sin neglect, Duty that lasts as long as life. . . . Life was given you by God that you might use it for the profit of Humanity, that you might so develop your individual faculties that they will develop your brothers' faculties; that by your work you might add something to the collective work of bettering men and finding Truth. . . . Man's bounden Duty is everywhere and in all things to forward the progress of Humanity. . . . The Supreme Virtue is sacrifice,—to think, work, fight, suffer, where our lot lies, not for ourselves but others, for the victory of good over evil. God has placed you here on earth, He has set around you millions of beings like yourselves, whose march keeps pace with your march, whose life finds sustenance in your life. He willed to save you from the perils of solitary existence, and therefore gave you needs, which by yourselves you cannot satisfy.[2]

These quotations are enough to indicate that the all-important function of man is duty to himself, to be good, "to make

[1] For an elaboration of this theme, see J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*.

[2] These passages and many more of the like can be found in the *Essay on Duties of Man*.

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himself a temple to the Ideal, to God." "You must educate and perfect yourselves as well as educate and perfect others." Duty applies also to the family: "Before humanity and God, children are the most awful responsibility that a human being can have." Duty extends to *mankind:* "Life was given you that you might use it for the profit of Humanity."

How accomplish such a task? How canalize our puny efforts to consummate this sublime ideal? Man in view of such a gigantic prospect must pray with Mazzini's Breton fisherman: "Thy sea is so vast, O God; and my little bark so weak."

It is to enable man to fulfill his duty to mankind, to bridge over this wide gap, to provide him with a means for the fulfilment of this, the greatest function, the true end of his existence, that the nation is created. It is to provide him with an adequate means of association and cooperation, an environment in which he can develop his own individual talent to the full, and without hindrance, for man has but one Right only, "to fulfill his mission without impediment."[1] It is to furnish this, that the nation exists. "The Nation is the God-appointed instrument for the welfare of the race, and in this alone its moral essence lies. . . . A nation is a living task, her life is not her own, but a force and a function in the universal Providential scheme. . . . Countries are but workshops of humanity." Therefore the nation has two solid functions to perform, one the education and development of its members "in the light of the moral law"; one the proper arrangement of its activities in the furtherance of humanity.

The nation, then, is to provide the living tissue which transmits the genetic spirit of duty to the flesh of nationality, or, to escape from an embarrassing metaphor, the nation is the means or instrument by which the individual can fulfill his duty to Humanity. It is an essential element, a *sine qua non;* a means of multiplying infinitely the forces and powers of action. It is the answer to the Breton's prayer.

[1] Mazzini, *Nationalità: qualche idea sopra una costituzione nazional.* (Edizione National, vol. VI, pp. 125 *et seq.*).

[2] Mazzini, *Essay on Duties of Man.*

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Man is created for great destinies. The end for which he has been created is the development, full, ordered and free, of all his faculties. The means by which he may attain this goal is through association with his equals.[1]

Every people before occupying itself with Humanity, must constitute itself a Nation.[2]

The Nation is the fulcrum of the lever we have to wield for the common good. In abandoning that lever we run the risk of rendering ourselves useless to Humanity. Humanity is a vast army advancing to the conquest of lands unknown, against enemies both powerful and astute. The peoples, the nations, are the different corps, the divisions of that army. Each of them has its post assigned to it, its special mission to execute: and the common victory depends upon the exactitude with which those distinct operations shall be fulfilled. Disturb not the order of battle.[3]

Nationality is the part which God has prescribed to each people in the work of Humanity. That is its mission, the task which it is to accomplish upon earth; to the end that the thought of God may be realized in the world; it is that task which gives the Nation the right of Citizenship in Humanity, the sign and symbol of its personality, the status which it occupies among the peoples, its brothers. . . . Tied by an infinity of necessary relationships to all that lives and moves about them, they [the nations] can only extricate themselves by self-destruction. "*Un peuple qui s'isole est un peuple suicide.*" When God establishes a people in the world, saying to it, "Be a Nation!", He does not say: "Isolate yourself, enjoy your life as the miser does his hoard, covet your liberty as though it were a crime, cherish My Word as though it were a secret for no other ear to hear." He says: "March! With head erect, among the brothers I have given you, free and without constraint, as becomes one who carries My Work in his heart. Take your place among the nations according to the sign I have placed upon your brow, according to the word I breathed into your ear when you were an infant in the cradle. Fulfill worthily and courageously your mission upon earth, because thereby shall ye be

[1] Mazzini, *Dilucidazioni morali allo statuto della Giovane Italia.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Mazzini, *Essay on Duties of Man.*

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judged. Confess boldly before the world and the masters of the world the Faith of your fathers. Do not deny your brothers, but aid them in accordance with *their* needs and *your* force, because you are all made in My image and I will reunite you all,—one day,—in My bosom. Walk without fear along the way I have blazed for you, and when they question you about your acts and the thought you are developing in the world, raise your hand and point the sky to those who ask. There is your Right, there is your Law and your Guarantee."

Now this name, this guarantee, this sign upon the brow of each people is its Nationality, as is that thought which it is called upon to develop in the world. That is why it is sacred. That is why a Nation loses its character when it forgets whence it came; when it no longer attaches itself to its principle, its source, i. e. Humanity. For as the measure and the guarantee of the Rights of each citizen is in the law which rules the Duties of all; the measure and guarantee of the Rights of each people can only be in the "*Loi Humanitaire*" which rules the Duties of all. In a word: Taking its step with the march of Humanity; having for its *base* the people; for a *stepping-stone*, the consequences of its principle logically deduced and vigorously applied; for its *force*, the force of all; for *result*, the amelioration of all and the "greatest good for the greatest number"; and for its *goal*, the accomplishment of the task which God has assigned it in the world. There is its Nationality.[1]

The nation, then, is an all-important element in the Mazzinian scheme of things; it is the converter of the spiritual and psychic into the material and physical, canalizing elements which, though teeming with life and power, would, if left to themselves and undisciplined, dissipate their energies in a futile and pathetic effort to accomplish their proper and peculiar functions. "The nation collects and combines the elements of civilization already acquired, deduces from them the Formula of Duty, which constitutes the common aim; directs the life of the country in its general and collective manifestations toward that aim, and represents it among the peoples."[2] "A nation

[1] Mazzini, *Nationalità: qualche idea sopra una costituzione nazional.*

[2] Mazzini, *Essay on Duties of Man.*

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is the association of all the men who, grouped either by language, or by certain geographical conditions, or by the rôle which has been assigned them in History, recognize the same principle, and march, under the empire of a uniform law, to the conquest of a definite end." [1]

It is sufficiently obvious that individuals with the best will in the world, inflamed with the greatest of enthusiasms for the noblest of ideals, cannot function effectively as independent units. The sea is so vast, and the little bark so weak. "The Pact of Humanity cannot be signed by individuals; but only by free and equal peoples, possessing a name, a banner, and the consciousness of a distinct individual existence. If you desire that the people should become such, you must speak to them of country and Nationality, and impress in vivid characters upon the brow of each the sign of their existence and baptism as a Nation," [2]

But apparently it is the forces of reaction which have triumphed. Why? The answer is incisive. "It is in the narrow spirit of Nationalism substituted for the spirit of Nationality; in the stupid presumption on the part of each people that they are capable of solving the political, social and economic problems alone; in their forgetfulness of the great Truth that the cause of the people is *one;* that the cause of the fatherland must lean upon Humanity." [3] "I believe, therefore," he remarks in the same essay, "in the Holy Alliance of the Peoples, as being the vastest formula of association possible in our epoch; in the liberty and equality of the peoples, without which no true association can exist; in Nationality which is the *conscience* of the people, and which, by assigning to them their part in the work of association, their function in humanity, constitutes their mission upon earth, that is to say, their individuality, without which neither liberty nor equality is possible." [4] "There is that written above us which all decrees of Councils

[1] Mazzini, *Nationalità: qualche idea etc.*

[2] Mazzini, *Principles of Cosmopolitanism* (introductory preface to 1850 edition).

[3] Mazzini, *Foi et Avenir.*

[4] *Ibid.*

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and Diets, all the Ukases of Tsars, are as powerless to efface as are the storm clouds to efface the sun from the vault of Heaven, the *universal moral law;* the progress of all through all; and there is that on earth which no tyranny can long repress, the *people*, the *power* and the *future* of the *people*. . . . I regarded the question of Nationality as it ought to be regarded by all of us, not as a mere tribute to local pride or local rights, but as a question of a European 'division of labour', and I believed that this question of Nationality was to give its name to the Century."[1] To give all of this the crowning stamp of confidence, he initiates us for a moment into the secret of his vision in his glorious prophecy:

> From the Rome of the Caesars went forth that Unity of Civilization imposed upon Europe by *force*.
>
> From the Rome of the Popes was given that Unity of Civilization imposed upon the human race by *authority*.
>
> From the Rome of the People will proceed a Unity of Civilization freely accepted by the *common consent* of the Peoples.
>
> This was the faith for which the Bandieras and their fellow martyrs died; and for this faith, if my hopes do not deceive me, I, too, of little account in heart and mind, but second to none in earnestness of belief, shall die![2]

There is much to admire in this stimulating idealism. Some of the quotations strike with a weird familiarity upon the ear. There is much of the spirit of the Great Emancipator in Mazzini. But to the dogma of nationalism as such, Mazzini has contributed nothing. To him the very word nationalism was anathema: it meant for him little but chauvinism; an exaggerated importance of the nation, as such. He did not, on the other hand, belittle the nation. A stancher, truer, more sincere and more earnest patriot has probably never lived. Italy, a regenerated Italy, an Italy for the Italians (to corrupt a Western phrase), was ever before him. But the nation, Italy or any

[1] Mazzini, *Autob. Notes.*

[2] Mazzini, *Records of the Brothers Bandiera.*

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other, was not to be made an end. "I care not if the Italians are prosperous, if men are starving elsewhere." The nation was but a means, a necessary step in the great work of furthering humanity. In such a concept there could be no room for nationalism whose "*means* is the destruction of the Individual, whose *end* implies the negation of all 'society' among the nations."[1]

His system is after all, supremely simple and confessedly attractive. The individual is the starting point, the individual with duties to himself, to his family, to humanity, for the successful accomplishment of which the nation has been divinely appointed. The work of the world cannot be done effectively until each people shall have constituted itself into a true nation of free and equal men, bound together in association. Each nation, as each individual, has its own attributes and capacities, and even as liberty, equality, and association are essential that individual man may develop the best that is in him, so too must a free existence be granted to the nation. To enable man to perform his duties well and completely, on the one hand, and, on the other to contribute its peculiar excellences to humanity, is the *raison d'être* of each true nation. Such a task, such a contribution, is its nationality.

Regenerated Italy, an Italy freed from external domination, and reborn in a free association of equal men, is only a phase of the "grand design". Italy, the initiatrix of a new movement, Italy the leader and champion of the Duties of Man, as France before her had given Europe the doctrine of the Rights of Man, occupies a nobler position in his politics.

What is true of Italy, must be true of all. Marching in step with Italy, not subordinate but as equals, assisting likewise in the noble task, there is to be, indeed *must* be, a true England, a true France, a true Germany, a true Austria, a true Spain, regenerate and free. There is no exaggeration of Italy to the disparagement of other peoples. We do not find any exaltation of the Italian, as such, in contrast with his Teutonic, Gallic, or Slavic neighbor. Racial differences are recognized, but

[1] Udny, S: "Italian Ideals of *Jus Gentium*," *Contemp. Review*, Nov. 1919.

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are portrayed as complementary, each nation with its own indispensable element to contribute. Italy has no mission to force its civilization, its *Kultur*, its character upon less favored nations; but, by attaining an independent life, and so developing to the full her peculiar abilities, she must gladly bestow her perfected endowments as a free gift to humanity. Each nation doing likewise, a full complement shall be attained and mankind shall receive to the full the gift of God.

II

Nascetur pulchra Troianus origine Caesar
Imperium Oceano famam qui terminet astris.

Mazzini's nationalism, as I have tried to show, is built up around one cardinal principle, namely, the essential unity of humanity, each nation performing its peculiar function in the furtherance of the ultimate purpose, the development of the human race.

It is difficult to avoid the suggestion that Mazzini's doctrine of nationality is to be found compact and embryonic in the *De Monarchia* of Dante. It is true that Dante would subject the nations of the world to the dominion of one Prince, while Mazzini advocates independent republics. But although the forms may vary, and the means be flatly contradictory, the fundamental objective is the same. Both hold the same goal before their eyes.

Dante's system, in the main, is closely akin to that of Mazzini; and with regard to three distinct points it is virtually identical. To begin with, in Dante as in Mazzini, mankind has a definite object, the development of its faculties. Secondly, to attain that development, universal peace, achieved by means of order and association, is essential. Thirdly, the guiding impulse in the great work for the welfare of mankind is to come from Rome.

Turning to the *De Monarchia* itself, we may read:

> Again, in the case of anything that is done, it is the ultimate end which constitutes the first principle and cause of the whole thing, for it is that end, which, in the first instance sets the

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agent in motion; so that it follows that the whole theory of the means which make for the end must be derived from the end itself.[1]

. . . and to understand the point in question, we must note, that like as there is an end for which nature produces the thumb, and another than this for which she produces the whole hand, and again another than either for which the arm, and another than all of these for which the whole man, so there is one end for which she produces the individual man, another for which the domestic group, another for which the district, another for which the city-state, and another for which the Kingdom, and lastly there is an ultimate goal for which the eternal God by His Art, which is Nature, brings into being the human race in its universality.[2] . . . .

Wherefore be it known, in the first place, that God and Nature make naught superfluous, but all that comes into being is for some function. For no created being is a final goal in the intention of the Creator, as Creator; but rather is the proper function of that being, the goal. Wherefore it comes to pass that proper function does not come into existence for the sake of the *being*, but the latter for the sake of the former.[3]

There is then some function proper to Humanity as a whole for which that same totality of men is ordained in so great multitude, to which function, neither one man, nor one family, nor one district, nor one city-state, nor any individual Kingdom may attain. . . . The specific capacity, then, which differentiates man is not merely *Being* . . . but *Apprehension* by means of the potential intellect. . . . It is plain that the specific potentiality of Humanity is a potentiality of the intellect. And since that same potentiality cannot all be reduced to actuality at the same time by one man, or by any of the limited associations distinguished above, there must needs be multiplicity in the human race, in order for the whole of this potentiality to be actualized thereby.[4]

[1] *De Monarchia* (text edited by Dr. E. Moore, Oxford 1916), Lib. I, ch. ii, lines 42-47.

[2] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, ch. iii, lines 5-19.

[3] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, ch. iii, lines 19-29.

[4] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, ch. iii, *passim*.

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That Mazzini utilized as one of his cardinal doctrines this principle of the perfecting of the human race by perfecting the individual, developing to the full the attributes and capacities of each, is a point which needs no further laboring.

Advancing into the work, we would find that the specific function of mankind is to "Keep the whole capacity of the potential intellect constantly actualized, primarily for speculation, and secondarily (by extension, and for the sake of the other) for action."[1] Thus early did Dante hit upon that definition of politics which the French, with their *penchant* for aphorisms, sum up in the phrase: "*la politique est la science des choses possibles.*" But this is best accomplished when men are "most free." In Dante's words

> the human race when most free is best disposed . . . wherefore be it known that the first principle of our freedom is freedom of choice . . . and free choice is free judgment in matters of will. . . . And since Nature cannot attain this goal by means of a single man (since the operations needful thereto are many, requiring multiplicity in the operators), Nature must of necessity produce a multiplicity of men ordained for diverse operations; to which, in addition to the influence from above, the virtues and properties of places here below do much contribute.[2]

Almost word for word we find this doctrine in Mazzini: "Man has been created for lofty destinies. The end for which he has been created is the development of all his faculties in a manner complete, ordered, and free. The means whereby he may attain this objective is association with his like."[3]

Or to draw another parallel, let us compare another principle of the great Florentine, *viz.*, that an institution must arrange itself with reference to its own good as an institution and also with reference to the purpose for which it is instituted, and that the latter is the higher order, with the Mazzinian concept of the twofold duty of a nation—one the education and development

[1] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, ch. iv, lines 2-6.

[2] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, ch. vii.

[3] Mazzini, *Dilucidazione morali allo statuto della Giovane Italia.*

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of its members in the light of the moral law; the other the proper arrangement of its activities in the furtherance of humanity.[1]—"Since, then, we may discover a twofold order in things, to wit the order of the parts with reference to each other, and their order with reference to some unity which is not itself a part (for instance the order of the parts of an army with reference to each other, and their order with reference to the general),[2] the order of the parts with reference to that unity is the superior order, as being the end of the other, for the other exists for its sake, and not conversely."[3] The close correlation of these principles, in concept, in wording, even in metaphors cannot be purely accidental.

Coming to the third principle, to wit, that the guiding impulse for the regeneration of mankind was to come from Rome, we find a similar parallelism. That Mazzini glorified Rome there can be no doubt. For him the great unity had twice been elaborated within her walls, and from the Rome of the People was to proceed that unity of civilization freely accepted by the common consent of the peoples. So too in Dante. In the concept of that great poet, the world could only attain universal freedom and peace (without which the potential intellect could not be developed) by means of a universal empire. But that empire was to receive its impulse from Rome, and Rome was to be its capital. "God and Nature make naught superfluous" and Rome was destined as the prime agent of the divine purpose. Dante's writings are replete with glorifications of the "Eternal City," especially in the *De Monarchia* and the *Divina Commedia*. Sordello's famous apostrophe to Italy shows the need of imperial control and the *risorgimento* of Rome:—

[1] *Cf. supra*, p. 81.

[2] This metaphor which Dante borrowed from Aristotle, Mazzini has borrowed in turn.

[3] Dante, *De Mon.*, Lib. I, ch. vi.

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What good comes, if Justinian readjust
Thy bridle, and thy saddle be not filled?
Ah folk, whose duty is to be devout
And let the saddle be the seat of Caesar
If ye well know what God appoints for you.
O German Albert,[1] who abandonest
Her, who has now grown savage and untamed
And oughtest to bestride her saddle bows,
May righteous judgment, falling from the stars
Come on thy blood and be so new and plain
That thy successor [2] may have fear of it,
Because ye two, thy father and thyself
Have been held back by greed of yonder things,
Until the Empire's garden [3] is a waste.[4]

And again in that splendid apotheosis in the thirty-second Canto of the *Purgatorio* :—

A forest-dweller here a little while
Thou shalt with me for aye be citizen
Of that Rome, where a Roman too is Christ.[5]

But it is in the second book of the *De Monarchia* that the divine nature of Rome is most clearly set forth, with all the intricacies of Thomist scholasticism, so delightfully mediæval that a brief résumé of the more important syllogisms may not be amiss. Dante starts out with the ethically irrefutable statement that the noblest people should rule. The Romans are the noblest, for Aristotle has said that nobility consists in virtue and ancient riches, and Juvenal has ascribed these qualities to the Romans.[6] Again adopting the strict Thomist method and citing the historic cases of the shield, the geese, the thunderstorm, and Lars Porsena, Dante attempts to prove that the Romans had the direction and approval of God manifested by miracles.[7] The argument here is that whereas Christ performed

[1] Albert, son of Rudolph of Hapsburg, 1298-1308.
[2] Henry of Luxemburg.
[3] Italy to be the garden of Empire.
[4] *Purg.*, vi.
[5] *Ibid.*, xxxii, 100-102.
[6] *De Mon.*, Lib. II, ch. iii.
[7] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, ch. iv.

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miracles in support of the Gospels, God when *invisible* performed miracles in support of the Empire. He follows this up with a more appealing argument that whoever seeks the common weal seeks the goal of right, whoever seeks the goal of right must have right on his side. That the Romans sought the common weal is undeniably proved by the public spirit of the Romans.[1] The book then winds up with an argument so interesting that I succumb to the temptation of giving it in full.

> I say, then, that if the Roman Empire was not of Right, then Christ, by his birth, presupposed a Wrong. The consequence is false, therefore the contradictory of the antecedent is true, for contradictions may be deduced from each other in the counter-sense. The sequence I thus demonstrate: whosoever observes an edict by choice, urges its justice by so doing; and since deeds are more persuasive than words, he urges it more patently than if he approved it in word. But Christ, as Luke his scribe bears witness, chose to be born of a Virgin Mother under edict of the Roman authority, in order that the Son of God, made Man, might be enrolled as a man in that unique register of the human race. Now this was observing the edict. Christ, then, gave assurance by deed that the edict of Augustus, who exercised the authority of the Romans, was just; and since jurisdiction is implied in the just issuing of an edict, it follows that he who sanctioned the edict as just, also sanctioned the jurisdiction whence it emanated, which jurisdiction, however, was unjust, unless it was of right.[2]
>
> Again, if the Roman Empire was not of right, the sin of Adam was not punished in Christ. . . . Punishment does not simply mean penalty inflicted upon him who worked the wrong, but penalty so inflicted by one who has penal jurisdiction. . . . If then, Christ, had not suffered under a qualified judge, that suffering would not have been a punishment, and the judge could not have qualified had he not had jurisdiction over the whole human race; since it was the whole human race that was to be punished in the flesh of Christ—and Tiberius Caesar,

[1] *De Mon.*, Lib. II, chs, x-xi.

[2] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, ch. xii.

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whose vicar Pilate was, would not have had such jurisdiction unless the Roman Empire had been of right.[1]

Indirect evidence of Mazzini's heritage from Dante may be drawn from the fact that Mazzini succeeds in finding in Dante many, almost too many, of his own ideals, and ever, one fears, reads into the works of his great predecessor much of his own philosophy.[2] He interprets Dante in a way that does not always appear justifiable by the facts; ascribes to him a polity which if Dante felt, he has nowhere clearly defined. One is almost willing to harbor the uncharitable thought that Mazzini attempts to find authority for his political theory, his sublime faith, in the works of Dante. Not, perhaps, in that defensive way in which we are wont to credit after-dinner stories of doubtful acceptance to some famous wit or *causeur*, but rather in the spirit of the schoolmen who found their justification in the Patristic or Biblical literature, duly, if sincerely, interpreted. His two short essays on "Dante" (1841) and "The Minor Works of Dante" (1844) contain in the name, and under the ægis of Dante, the fundamentals of his own system. Attempting in the course of a few brief pages to summarize Dante's political views, he works up a case to prove Dante's intense patriotism and his ideal of national greatness.

He begins with the essential idea of unity. God is one, the universe is one thought of God, therefore the universe is one. "All things existing have order among themselves, and this is form which makes the universe like unto God."[3] All things come from God; they all participate, more or less, in the Divine Nature, according to the end for which they are created. Of these, man is the most excellent; upon him God has bestowed more of His own nature than upon any other creature. Coming from the bosom of God, the human soul incessantly aspires toward Him, and endeavors by holiness and knowledge to become reunited to Him. Now the life of the individual

[1] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, ch. xiii.

[2] J. Holland Rose, *op. cit.*, also suggests this possibility but has not developed it.

[3] *Paradiso*, I, 103-105.

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man is too short and too weak to enable him to satisfy that yearning in this world, but around him, before him, stands the whole human race to which he is allied by his social nature. Man never dies, but works through one generation after another, onward in the road to eternal truth. Mankind is one. God has made nothing in vain, and if there exists a multitude, a collectivity of men, it is because there is one aim for them all. It is only by harmony and consequently by association that this is possible. Mankind must be one, even as God is one. One in organization as in principles. Unity is taught by the manifest design of God in the external world, and by the necessity of an aim.

Now unity seeks for something by which it may be represented, and this is found in a unity of government. There must of necessity be some center to which the general inspiration of mankind ascends, thence to flow down again in the form of law; a power strong in unity and in the supporting advice of the higher intellects naturally destined to rule, providing with calm wisdom for all of the different functions which are to be fulfilled, performing the part of pilot, of the supreme chief, in order to bring to the highest perfection what Dante calls the "universal religion of human nature".[1] That is Empire, Imperium, of which Rome is to be the center. God chose Rome from among the rest of the nations. It is her bosom that has already given unity to the world; and it is in her bosom that the world will once more find it, and forever.[2]

Up to this point, there is no deserved criticism of Mazzini's interpretation, which, of course, he makes the foundation stone in the corner of his own edifice. But proceeding, he is forced to the difficult task of explaining Dante's Empire, which, it would appear from the *Epistolæ*, and *Purgatorio*, and *De Monarchia* (all written, I am convinced, about the year 1312), is little beyond the creation of a truly literal *Holy Roman Empire*. For the *De Monarchia* is not a prophecy, neither is it an epitaph, but most convincingly a battle-cry. That Mazzini

[1] Dante, *Convivio*, II, 4.

[2] Mazzini, *Opere Minore di Dante, passim*.

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cannot, will not, admit. For him the Empire holds a grander, nobler conception than an idealized Ghibellinism. Armed with a strange misunderstanding of fourteenth-century Italy, and fortified with a daring conception, Mazzini attempts to purge Dante of the taint of Ghibelline.

> Ghibellinism [he declares] was feudality, the noblesse, the defenders of the Empire; Guelphism was the community, the people [!] [1] When, after the Bianchi and Neri parties were formed, Boniface called in Charles of Valois, the Bianchi, who were plebeians, were persecuted, and the Neri (patricians) made themselves Guelphs, because they sympathized with Charles. The Bianchi then allied themselves with the Ghibellines who had formerly been put down, and whose ancient principles of feudalism had been irrevocably crushed. Dante, who in early life, had been a Guelph, was henceforth a Ghibelline, that is to say, he was always on the side of the people, the element of Italian futurity [!] [1] Beyond Guelph and Ghibelline he saw the national Italian unity; beyond Clement V and Henry VII he saw the unity of the world and the moral government of this unity in the hands of his own Italy.[2]

If this be true, as Mazzini declares, then Dante must stand convicted of downright hypocrisy in his *Epistolæ*, his *De Monarchia*, his *Commedia*.

It is true that Dante's Empire was to be Roman (not *Italian*), but the conception of a world empire with Rome as its head is not identical with Italian nationalism. "This doctrine of a World Empire is a flash of the old Roman Imperialism, focussed in a Christian lens" [3]—a truly literal Holy Roman Empire.

It is easy enough to say that Dante filled the *Inferno* with Ghibellines, and to deduce therefrom that he was not strongly imperialist; but it is always advisable to keep in mind that Dante's characters are placed in the *Inferno* for faults of character and not for political views, be they Guelph or Ghibelline.

[1] The indicated surprise is mine.

[2] Mazzini, *Dante, passim.*

[3] J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*, p. 9.

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Guido da Montrefeltro is in Hell not because he was a Ghibelline but because he gave treacherous advice to a deceitful pontiff. Throughout the poem, Guelph and Ghibelline, white and black, are treated with remarkable impartiality. Pisa and Arezzo are described in terms as full of scorn as Guelphic Florence. Pisa is the "*vitupero delle gente*"; Arezzo, "the den of snarling dogs." As long as Dante considers moral character and personal worth he is an impartial judge. It is not in his allocation of persons or in his apostrophes to Italian cities that one must look for his attitude toward the Ghibelline cause. For that we must rather look to his treatment of the Hohenstaufens, and for his imperialist ideas. It is unnecessary to repeat the already cited passages from the *Purgatorio*. The very word Italy, save as a reference to a geographical region, is not used in the *De Monarchia*; as an adjective in the form Italian, it is quite unknown in that unquestionably political work of Dante. To the Hohenstaufens he is particularly kind. Frederick II is placed in *Inferno* among those "who held that the soul died with the body," but elsewhere he speaks of him in softer vein, hinting that the virtuous and hospitable Lombardy had become more unworthy because of papal interference with Frederick's plans. The reproach is directed against the pontiff, not the emperor. In the *De Vulgarii Eloquentia*, he speaks of him in glowing terms.

> But those illustrious heroes Frederick Caesar and his happy-born son Manfred, displaying the nobility and righteousness of their character, as long as fortune remained favorable, followed what is human, disdaining what is bestial; wherefore those who were of noble heart, and endowed with grace, strove to attach themselves to the majesty of such great princes; so that in their time, whatsoever the best Italians attempted, first appeared at the courts of these sovereigns.[1]

Again Barbarossa is styled the "*buono*", Conraddin is the "victim of Angevin malevolence" and Manfred is removed from unworthy burial ground and placed in Purgatory capable

[1] Dante, *De Vulgarii Eloquentia*, Lib. I, ch. xii.

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of obtaining salvation. None of the Hohenstaufens is visited with the ingenious torments or biting satire which the poet knew so well how to inflict.

It is, however, in Dante's imperialism that his attitude towards Ghibellinism is most strongly evident. One is prone to put too much emphasis on the magic of a word. By the fourteenth century, the words Guelph and Ghibelline had lost much of their earlier significance, and had become mere party names around which rival factions might coalesce. Broadly speaking, Guelphism meant civic (not national) independence, naturally opposed to monarchical despotism; while the Ghibelline would as naturally be drawn to a hostile quarter. Yet Pisa and Genoa, Ghibelline though they were, were as jealous of their civic liberties as either Guelphic Milan or Florence, the difference lying in the fact that they hoped to obtain their civic liberties through imperial rather than French or papal favor. With them, Dante believes in the efficiency of imperial control. The horrors of civic turmoil which have beset Italy are due to the Emperor's absence. To him alone belongs the blame, in him alone is the hope of restoration.

Dante does not hope for a mere restoration of Italian unity, the construction of a distinct Italian nation. His letter[1] to Henry VII distinctly repudiates such a claim:

> . . . As though thou [Henry of Luxemburg] didst suppose the laws of the Empire thou hast to guard to be circumscribed by the boundaries of Liguria, not perceiving (as we suspect) that the power of the Romans is neither cramped within the limits of Italy, nor the margin of three-cornered Europe, . . . by inviolable law, it doth reach the flow of Amphitrite, and scarce deigneth to be bounded by the barren wave of ocean. For it it written for us:
>
> *"Nascetur pulchra Troianus origine Caesar*
> *Imperium Oceano, famam qui terminet astris!"*
> (*Æneid*, I, 286-7)

[1] Dante, *Epistolæ*, No. vii.

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Dante was not a nationalist, and those who herald the lover of Beatrice as the champion of Italian nationalism are as "utterly wrong in relation to politics, as they are utterly right in relation to literature."[1] He saw his politics through Roman eyes, to be sure, but always and unfailingly as an imperialist.

Yet Mazzini, carried away by his own enthusiasm, wrote of Dante:

"Dante carried undefiled to his grave the thought which dominated his life, and died comforted, five centuries ago, in the belief that Italy would, one day, be a Nation, and the directress of European civilization for the third time." "Dante felt stirring in his breast a pride in Italian life more potent than has been felt in the breast of any of his countrymen from his day to ours. The 'Patria' was for him a religion." "Another thought sustained him and was the end towards which he directed all the energies which it alone had aroused within him. This aim is the national aim, the same desire that vibrates instinctively in the bosoms of twenty-five millions of men, and which is the secret of Dante's immense popularity in Italy. This idea and the almost superhuman constancy with which he pursued it, render Dante the most complete incarnation of this aim that we know." "The collective life of the human race, the law of incessant development, its progressive movement by means of constantly extending associations, the prophetic view of social unity arising from the various functions, with a view to one common end, the theory of duty, all this we find clearly indicated in these books by an Italian of the thirteenth century."[2]

Nowhere could one find a more concise summary of Mazzini's political philosophy; no other than Mazzini could have ascribed it to Dante.

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[1] W. H. V. Reade, Introduction to *De Monarchia* (Clarendon Press, 1916).

[2] Mazzini, *Dante* and *Opere Minori di Dante, passim.*

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THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF FASCISM[1]

A FEW years ago, political scientists would hardly have ventured even to imagine the existence, among our civilized countries, of a government which would not hesitate to place limitations upon any of the liberties of the individual that had been regarded from the beginning of the last century as a sacred heritage of human individuality; a government which would concentrate the effective control of a great part of public power in the hands of few, or of a single person, so as to give almost the impression of a dictatorship; a government which would propose to reform the constitutional and administrative organization of the state, openly characterizing its action in doing so as revolutionary; a government, moreover, which would not shrink from proclaiming itself as representative of the minority of the nation and which would announce its intention to win the consent of the majority by the exercise of force. If the Fascist party, resting on such principles, has attained to power, and thereafter has succeeded not only in maintaining itself, but in strengthening its position and in acquiring the support of large elements even outside of Italy, is not this fact a demonstration that the premises which the scientific world adopts as the basis of political theory and political practice are at least incomplete, if not inexact, in so far as they fail to meet the exigencies of certain situations which can occur in the lives of nations?

The first, perhaps, of these premises, and the one which appears the most obvious, is that the government should rest

[1] Professor Gini was the author of the plan lately adopted by the Italian Government for the reorganization of the Senate. He visited the United States in 1925 as an expert attached to the Italian Debt Funding Commission and on that occasion he prepared this paper. Shortly afterwards he was called from the University of Padua to the Royal University at Rome, where he is now Professor of Economic Policy and Statistics and Director of the Royal Institute of Statistics and Economic Policy. He is the founder and editor of *Metron* and the author of noteworthy economic and statistical studies, including a report for the League of Nations on the subject of raw materials.

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upon the consent of the majority of the citizens and interpret the will of that majority. To-day it would be difficult to deny that the Fascist government enjoys the support of the great majority of the Italian population; but there certainly have been periods, or at least one period, in which that administration did not possess the support of such a majority.

On the other hand, at times when many could have believed that there was no basis for doubt on the subject, the head of the administration, and of the Fascist party, did not hesitate to declare that he was accumulating the necessary force in entire confidence of acquiring the consent of the majority little by little in the future. His expression of his confidence in such terms revealed his assumption that he did not possess it at the time. Again, at times when there was more foundation for doubt concerning the extent of the support of the majority, important spokesmen of the Fascist party proclaimed, amid the applause of the Black Shirts, that the Fascists were disposed to fight and die rather than relinquish power. The impression of objective persons was that those favorable to the Fascist régime constituted, at a given moment, a genuine minority, but a minority ready to die for their chosen cause, while the majority, composed of elements more or less openly opposed to the Fascist régime, did not manifest any comparable interest in the contest.

In this last statement there is, I believe, a basis for criticism of the postulate indicated as the first of those ordinarily set up. That postulate takes for granted—if you examine it carefully—that the majority and the minority which take shape in connection with various questions manifest in the solution of those questions an interest, if not identical with their own magnitude, at least in the same order of magnitude; this, I suggest, is taken for granted not with respect to particular individuals, but with regard to the average of the majority or minority. If we accept the foregoing interpretation as correct, the postulate which we may call that of the right of the majority may be generalized and transformed into the postulate of the paramountcy of interests, according to which the government is to be administered by the part of the population which represents the prevailing interests.

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In the ordinary political life of a people, the hypothesis of a corresponding order of magnitude of the interest which the majority and the minority, on the average, manifest in bringing particular questions to solution seems acceptable; and this justifies the adoption of the postulate of the majority as the basis of the ordinary political life of the nation. Even when this hypothesis is not realized, in certain cases there are not lacking correctives which permit the several interests to make themselves effective in proportion to their due weight, regardless of the number of persons who respectively represent them. This circumstance explains why, in practice, the postulate of the majority may serve without grave impairment as a basis for the normal political life of the nation. When, for example, material interests are at stake, the financial elements of importance in the parties at issue assume the leading rôles. Their rôles may well be decisive because of business relations and interwoven interests, even without any open purchase of votes in the determination of an electoral contest, inasmuch as people who from an abstract point of view would favor one solution, vote in practice against that solution when it might operate to the prejudice of the interests of persons or institutions to which they feel themselves intimately bound.

When, on the other hand, interests are at stake not of a material order, but such as to involve the fundamental principles of public and private life, the force of propaganda may be sufficient to draw the vote of the majority to the party which feels most keenly on the question. But when questions of an ideal character are under discussion, questions which most people regard as fundamental and upon which in any case there is a definite opinion hardly capable of being changed, then neither the force of persuasion nor the bonds of interest will suffice to attract the consent of a majority to a minority group. And this is true, no matter how vital may be the interest of the minority in the question, or how relatively indifferent the majority may be to it. When such is the case, it will be understood how it is that the minority feels itself authorized to impose its program upon the majority. Neither from the moral point of view nor from the political point of view is there

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anything, as a matter of fact, which can justify a state of affairs wherein one individual whose interests are prejudiced by reason of a given governmental measure or program to the extent, let us say, of ten monetary units, must give way to two individuals each of whom derives, in consequence of the particular program or measure, an advantage to the extent, let us say, of three monetary units.

The negation of the principle of the majority was bound sooner or later to alienate from Fascism the fraction of the Democratic party in Italy which at first had supported it because it saw therein salvation against the invading spirit of Bolshevism, as well as the majority of the Popular party, that is to say, the party of Catholic principles, which has been engaged in a contest with the Socialists for the leadership of the laboring classes in Italy. And in fact this alienation did take place. The conflict with the Liberal party also was certain to develop according as Fascism, which had at the outset presented a program essentially liberal in character, came to adopt, little by little, the program of the Nationalist party, which had supported Fascism in the struggle and had been fused with Fascism after the common victory.

The existence of a government in the hands of the minority is not, after all, when carefully analyzed, in antithesis to the liberal concept of political life, neither as a *means* in so far as the minority government represents the results of the free action of the citizenry, nor, on the other hand, as a *result*, in so far as the minority government satisfies the prevailing interests. But a more obvious gap existed between the liberal theory and the nationalistic theory which was gradually adopted by the Fascist party; and this irreconcilability was destined to show itself very early. The liberal theory assumes that society consists of an aggregate of individuals who must look after their own interests and it regards the state as an emanation of the individual wills intended to eliminate the conflicts between the interests of individuals. The nationalistic theory, on the contrary, views society as a true and distinct organism of a rank superior to that of the individuals who compose it, an organism endowed with a life of its own and with interests of its own.

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These interests result from the coordination of the desires for the time being of the current generation together with the interests of all the future generations which are to constitute the future life of the nation. Often enough these are in harmony one with the other, but occasionally the interests of future generations are opposed to those of the present generation, and in any case they may differ notably, if not in direction, at least in intensity. The agency destined to give effect to these higher interests of society is the state, sacrificing, wherever necessary, the interests of the individual and operating in opposition to the will of the present generation.

Hence the concept of the government as an agency to which is entrusted a mission of historical character, a mission which summarizes its very reason for existence. It is an agency, not for the changeable wishes of numerical majorities or of major interests, but rather for the effectuation of a program corresponding to the interests of the national organism. In consequence, therefore, there is the tendency to free the administration from the constant control of parliamentary majorities. Once the program of the administration is approved, the administration henceforth derives its authority directly from the program itself and cannot permit others to interfere with it in giving effect to the program. The justification of measures of restraint upon individual liberties follows from this point of view, although these measures may be opposed to the desire of the majority or, theoretically, of even the entire body of citizens, when such measures of restraint are thought to be necessary in order to give effect to a program identified with the interests of a nation.

The concept which I have outlined briefly seems to be in harmony with that of the Conservative party and especially that of the Conservative branch of the Popular party in so far as the latter sees in certain institutions—such as those of private property, the family, and the Church—cohesive social forces which must be maintained regardless of the individual wishes of particular citizens. It is not surprising that the supporters of these principles who had been identified with the Liberal and Popular parties in the political struggles of recent years

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should have abandoned the last-named parties in order to remain favorable to Fascism.

This concept has also points of contact with the Socialist concept in that both assume the ideal of a collectivity superior to the interests of the individuals composing it. On the other hand, Fascism in no sense whatever withholds due recognition of the social importance and individual rights of the laboring classes. On the contrary, Fascism sees in them the living forces of the nation destined to renew the upper classes of society in the course of the ceaseless shift which goes on among the constituent elements of the national organism.

The essential difference between Fascism and the Socialistic current of thought, which has drifted off from the original programs of Communism and Collectivism, consists to-day in the concept of organic unity to which the interest of the individual must be subordinated. The Fascists perceive this unity in the nation, while the Socialists recognize it, at least theoretically—even at the cost of sacrificing their native land—in the larger human society.

This contrast explains why a fairly large part, if not, indeed, the very nucleus, of the Fascist movement has been built up of ex-Socialists who abandoned their party because of, or in consequence of, the war. This observation is particularly true of the younger element in the Socialistic party, including young men of a practical turn, often restless in temperament, who had rallied to the Socialist party not so much because of its positive economic program, as because of its negative program of protest against the aimless individualism of the Liberal régime, and who found in Fascism the means for effectuating their desire to take a part and to reconstruct. It was this element of Socialist origin—to which, as is well known, the head of the party himself belonged—which gave tone to the Fascist program and distinguished it from the position of the former Nationalist party, a position more theoretical than practical in character.

And in a sense this explains the attitude of the Fascist party towards international or supra-national organisms such as the League of Nations, the International Labour Office, and the like.

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It is an attitude of natural aversion from organisms tending to place limits upon the free action of the national organism, and, consequently, in a certain sense actually to weaken that organism. On this basis is to be explained the effort not to extend one iota beyond what is necessary the function of such international organisms or the participation of the national government in their proceedings.

The nationalist theories had as their fundamental basis the organic concept of society. Naturally, the acceptance of these theories was destined to bring about the discussion of organic representation which, both before and shortly after the war, had many supporters in Italy and abroad and which had recently been given some effect in the national economic councils of certain countries. This problem was one of the principal matters assigned by the Italian government to a commission of eighteen members, men engaged in public affairs and professors of law and social sciences. The commission was appointed with instructions to prepare for the government a draft of the legislative reforms to be introduced into the organic structure of the state. The majority of the commission favored the introduction into the Parliament of organic representation based upon professional corporations or syndicates. The authorities of the administration accepted the proposal in the form which the writer had the honor of suggesting, to the effect that the organic representation should be provided for in the Senate, which thus would be intended to become elective in part. Without entering upon a discussion of the details which this reform is to embody, it is perhaps worth while to emphasize the fundamental reason for introducing into the country's legislative machinery organic representation supplementary to individual representation, which to-day rests upon a geographic basis in most countries. I may be permitted at this point to quote the opening paragraphs of the report wherein I had the honor to submit to the government my proposals in this connection.[1]

[1] This report has been published. See Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, *Relazioni e proposte della Commissione presidenziale per lo studio delle riforme costituzionali*, Rome, 1925, (Provveditorato generale dello Stato, No. 324). The organization of the state along corporate lines is under way in the winter of 1926-27 as the essential preliminary to the reform of the Senate which will be based thereon.

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The principle that all citizens, so far as they possess legal capacity to do so, may participate with equal suffrage rights in the political life of the state—the principle which is at the very basis of universal suffrage—fits in with the concept of the state as a means of satisfying the individual aims of citizens. If, indeed, the action of the state possesses an *absolute* importance which varies with the individuals belonging to the several categories of the population, particularly in proportion to their respective wealth, it cannot, on the other hand, be said that the action of the state assumes a *relative* importance systematically different in the lives of those individuals. The poor man's vital necessity for positive action on the part of the state is no less than that of the rich man and in this sense the action of the state cannot be regarded as less important for the poor than for the rich.

But, on the other hand, when the state is regarded as an entity, that is, as an organism standing apart with its own objects and its own requirements, and when individuals are regarded as means to satisfy such objects and such requirements, it is natural that individuals be called upon to participate in the political life of the nation in no other proportion than that of the importance which they assume in the life of the state.

The two points of view have in fact always made themselves effective in the political organization of the state, offsetting each other to some extent. It is easy to understand, however, why the second point of view should come little by little to be emphasized more definitely according as the organization of the state is buttressed in consequence of the extension of its functions, all the more since, in the exercise of the functions more recently assumed, it is easily possible that the objects of the state should differ from the simple sum of the aims and objects of the individuals which compose it. This last hypothesis is borne out with particular frequency in the field of political economy, which in recent years has come to absorb so large a part of the activity of the state; hence it is readily comprehensible why emphasis has been more and more placed upon the necessity for organic representation of the economic functions of the different categories of citizens supplementary to their individual political representation.

In the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation I have drawn attention to the intensification and expansion of the functions of the state. This is one of the manifestations, or rather a con-

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sequence, of the progressive organization of society. If, indeed, we may to-day speak appropriately of society as a true and distinct organism—that is to say a totality of elements mutually bound one to the others, existing in a state of equilibrium and possessing the qualities necessary for self-preservation and eventually for the restoration of equilibrium—this is something that probably could not be said with quite as much exactitude for past ages. With the increasing density of populations, the multiplication of all the means of communication, the further subdivision of labor, the increasing refinement of the economic feeling of individuals, the sharpening of the faculty of foresight, it is hardly to be denied that the bonds among regions, among various classes and among individuals have been multiplied, the reactions are more effective and more rapid, equilibrium is, consequently, more nearly stable, and the restoration or readjustment is more rapid and more complete after some abnormal disturbance.[1]

In this fact undoubtedly, as well as in the greater correspondence to the realities of life which is derived therefrom by the nationalist theory, is to be found one of the reasons for the increasing favor with which that theory is regarded not only in Italy—where it is accepted by the party now in power—but more or less in all countries, even apart from truly and exclusively legislative provisions.

The more effective organization of a nation naturally leads to a greater coordination of its functions through a central controlling power. The affirmation, for example, of the protectionist theory either in the field of commercial policy or in that of immigration, the submission to governmental control of international credits belonging to private citizens, the intervention of government in conflicts between capital and labor—these things more and more frequently and significantly give expres-

[1] This subject is discussed in the author's series of lectures at the Commercial University "Luigi Bocconi," Milan, during the academic years 1923-24 and 1924-25, published under the title *Patologia Economica,* 3d ed., G. Tenconi, via Stampa 11, Milan (6), 1925. See particularly Lecture IV, § 4, and Lecture XII, §§ 13 and 14. It was again taken up in the *Lezioni di Politica Economica* given during the academic year 1925-1926 to the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Rome. (Rome, Sampaolesi, 1926.)

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sion to the nationalist process of thought which demands the subordination of particular interests to those of the nation. However much reason may exist for questioning whether the interests of the nation have always been properly interpreted and whether the intervention of public authority in economic life during and after the war has assumed exaggerated proportions, with perhaps prejudicial consequences, nevertheless it is undeniable that this intervention finds a partial justification in the increasingly strong tendency of modern society toward organization.

But it is not only in regard to the relations existing between private individuals and public authority that the greater capacity for organization of a nation reveals its genuine consequences; these are also to be found in the relations which exist between the various branches of public authority and between their respective agencies, and also in the fashion in which these agencies operate.

One of the tendencies of Fascism to which most attention has been drawn is certainly that of concentrating power. This tendency has manifested itself by emphasizing the attributes of the state as contrasted with those of local authority, by the appointment, for example, of the chief administrator (*podestà*) in each municipality and the governor in the capital, by the limitation of the power of the local authorities to impose further taxation, and by control over the professional associations of employers and employees. It has also shown itself in the lessening of the functions of the legislative chambers as contrasted with those of the cabinet, and, within the cabinet itself, in the strengthening of the authority of the President of the Council, who, without losing legally the position given him in the national constitution, is, according to some observers, gradually coming to assume, practically speaking, the functions of dictatorship.

The head of the government and of the Fascist party, and his followers, have often insisted upon the term "Revolution" by way of describing the process represented by Fascism in the development of the nation. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to find in the development of Fascism the formal extremes of

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revolution. The march to Rome might conceivably have resulted in a revolution but in point of fact it was limited to an armed demonstration, the king having given his adhesion to the movement. Thus Mussolini arrived in power in an absolutely legal fashion; and thereafter, he took every precaution to keep within the bounds of formal legality all the measures of an exceptional character which his government adopted. Quite apart from the question of form, the action of the Fascist administration, once it had acquired power, was not shaped in the way in which, generally, revolutionary action is understood to go, namely, to substitute for a limited governing class the control of somewhat more extensive social groups; but rather was it directed to augmenting the power gathered in the hands of those who had managed to establish themselves in control. From this point of view, the development of the Fascist administration may be thought to resemble not so much a revolution in process as a succession of *coups d'état.*

There was no genuine and distinct reaction against the development of the Fascist Government on the part of the majority even though some measures of an unusual character produced at first an unfavorable impression in certain circles. The disorganization which had come to exist during the administrations which preceded Fascism made the great majority of the nation feel the necessity of a strong hand and a united will.

We have witnessed during these years in Italy one of those resumptions of power by a limited number of persons, which, historians tell us, occur from time to time in the life of nations; and it has been a resumption fortunately not requiring a civil war for its fulfilment. The exercise of sovereign and political authority, according to the observation of historians, appears to be concentrated at the outset in the hands of a single individual, and then, little by little, its privileges are expanded through a constantly larger group until it ends by being regarded as a right which theoretically belongs to all the individuals who constitute the nation. But after some time the democratic régime reveals symptoms of degeneration and a monarch, a tyrant or a dictator, or whatever name he may bear, steps in, and the cycle once more begins its course.

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As a student of economic problems, I may be permitted to observe that this law of political cycles can find its justification in the light of economic considerations when the classical field of political economy is properly enlarged.[1]

The hypothesis usually taken as the basis of economy theory is that labor constitutes a burdensome activity. The more this activity is intensified, the more arduous its consequences become, while the yield diminishes; so that a point is reached which represents the point of equilibrium at which any individual ceases to increase his own productive activity, and is content with such yield as it then produces. But the relation between the yield and the effort required to obtain it differs from individual to individual in the various productive activities which may be undertaken. Thus it is that each devotes himself to the form of productive activity which he prefers and exchanges the product thereof for commodities which others turn over to him. So there comes to be that division of labor the advantages of which were so beautifully set forth by the classical economic school.

But this concept, which is undoubtedly exact for quite a large proportion of human activities, does not hold true for all of them. There are, as a matter of fact, human activities which are not arduous in character. In order that individuals should abandon such activities with a view to devoting themselves exclusively to the activities of a burdensome nature, it would be necessary that the latter should yield a reward such as to compensate not only for the burdensome character of the labor, but also for the surrender of the pleasure derived from the non-burdensome activities. Yet it is only in exceptional circumstances that a reward of this character can be given.

It follows that so far as activities of an attractive character are concerned, the division of labor does not operate at all, and each individual regularly reserves for himself the right of engaging in them. Thus no one of us, although devoted to the exercise of some professional activity, will give up pleasant

[1] On this subject, see the author's *Patologia economica,* Lecture III, § 5; also his *Lezioni di Politica Economica,* pp. 245-248.

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activities of various sorts, such as going to the theatre, reading the newspapers, taking walks, making trips and the like, except for some extraordinary reward and under exceptional conditions.

The great majority of these activities of a pleasant nature, nevertheless, have no direct social utility, so that economic science may ignore them; but there are activities of an attractive character which may well be called productive like the arduous activities, inasmuch as they contribute to social organization. Among these pleasant activities is that of exercising authority, which in the present form of society takes the shape of the exercise of sovereignty and participation in public affairs. It follows that if we are to allow economic forces freely to operate, there will be a tendency of citizens each to exercise his own political activity and each to assume some portion of authority. This is the reason why in all periods of history the exercise of sovereignty and political activity has tended inevitably to be divided and subdivided. From this point of view there is something of an analogy with what happens in the physical world in the phenomenon that is known by the name of "degradation of energy". If, for example, two bodies of different temperature are placed side by side, energy tends to pass, as is well known, from the warmer to the colder, and their temperature tends to reach the same level. In society something similar takes place. But when this activity of the exercise of authority—which is essential in a social organization—has reached an advanced stage of subdivision, it loses a great part of its efficacy. It becomes necessary, in order to restore the equilibrium and efficiency of society, that the exercise of authority be restored to unified control by means of a *coup d'état* or a revolution. On the part of many people in many, if not all, countries, there is an impression that the subdivision of the exercise of authority in modern times has gone much too far. This is the reason why Fascism is regarded as an experiment which, if successfully carried out, may exercise a great influence upon the political development of other nations.

The uncertain point in connection with the system of Fas-

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cism, now effectuated, is the lack of an objective standard whereby to interpret the interests of the nation. We must not conceal from ourselves the danger that a minority, which has come into power through the exercise of force or in consequence of unexpected developments, will go on maintaining itself by force and yet retain the intention of serving in good faith the true interests of the nation and purporting to carry out the program inspired by those interests, but not in reality corresponding to them. The fact that such an error of foresight may be committed in good faith does not make it any the less dangerous for the nation. On the other hand, it is an error much more easily committed when the number of persons actually endowed with power is very limited.

Nor is it to be denied that a state of affairs in which the prevailing interests are indeed the interests of the majority and fit in well with the higher interests of the nation is clearly to be preferred. But it is when agreement is lacking and not when it exists that the problem presents itself; and in such a case there can be no doubt as to the choice between the desires of the majority on the one hand, and on the other, the paramount interests of a minority which are in harmony with those higher interests of the nation. The objectivity and practical character of the standard suggested by the principle of the majority clearly cannot be a sufficient reason for maintaining that principle in circumstances wherein, as we have observed, its very basic premises do not exist.

It is perhaps in order to add that a government administered by a minority can be regarded in no other fashion than as a transitional solution. Either such a minority government succeeds—because of the excellence of its administration—in winning the consent of the majority, or it embitters the latter and arouses on its part a reaction which ends by making the interests of the majority prevail, and sooner or later it brings about the fall of the minority government. When the President of Council declared that he was accumulating force in anticipation of the consent of the majority, he clearly indicated that he was tending toward a government based upon consent as the position of national stability. It is the general impression that the

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Fascist Government has succeeded in this program and to-day possesses a great majority behind it in Italy.[1]

In order that the danger to which I have alluded above may be less imminent and the winning of the consent of the majority easier, it is undoubtedly very desirable that the government should maintain the utmost contact with the people and take account of the impressions produced on them by governmental measures, not remaining deaf to suggestions emanating from the people. The Chamber of Deputies, the Provincial Councils, and the Councils of the Communes, as well as party organizations, which constitute the expression of the wills of individuals or of local institutions, should consequently be maintained, if for no other reason than to serve as consultative bodies when the larger problems are under consideration. It is significant in this connection that quite a number of proposals presented to the government by the Commission of Eighteen with the object of giving to the executive power a decisive preponderance over the legislative authority—proposals resisted in the proceedings of the Commission by the writer alone—have been rejected by the government. Indeed, the government, in accepting the idea of making the Senate elective in part, manifested a wish to achieve a larger representation of the nation as a whole in its legislative structure.

On the other hand, the success of a government in which the effective administration of authority is confined to one person or a few persons depends, in the last analysis, upon the quality of this person or of these few persons. The conviction is widely held in Italy that the Fascist régime could hardly have succeeded or persisted if it had not had at its head an individual of the exceptional qualities of Mussolini; and this explains the authority, almost unlimited in extent, which he possesses among the Fascists, and the respect which even those who are wholly opposed to his régime, or indifferent to it, have for him personally.

In conclusion, it seems to me that there can be no doubt

[1] This impression has been materially reinforced by the development of 1926, during which year the majority behind the Fascist régime was very greatly augmented and consolidated.

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that the Fascist experiment has had highly satisfactory results in Italy. Among those who have had an opportunity to compare the present situation of Italy with that which existed under the preceding administrations, there is no uncertainty whatever in this connection.[1] The concentration of power in the hands of few men has permitted the revaluation of national ideals, the reestablishment abroad of the prestige of Italy, and the restoration of domestic order. This last achievement has greatly facilitated the economic recovery of the country, dating from the early part of 1922, and that has hastened the financial adjustment in progress. Moreover, the rapid solution of many pending problems has been made possible by the concentration of political authority and many reforms great and small have been effected, some long matters of deep study and others new —reforms which in the aggregate deserve favorable judgment.

But all this does not signify, as I see it, that the success of the Fascist government makes it desirable to attempt analogous experiments in other countries or in other conditions. It is an experiment which exceptional conditions have made necessary and the success of which was realized by an exceptional man, rather than a system of government suitable for all times and all countries. This does not mean that from the experiment itself there may not be learned lessons from which all countries may profit, with regard, for example, to the mutual relations and operation of legislative and executive agencies, with regard also to the organization of parties for purposes of organic representation, with regard finally to the use and abuse of individual liberties.

One other conclusion may be drawn by many from the foregoing considerations to the effect that, in the last analysis, force is what determines a political party's tenure of power. This conclusion, of course, is in no sense novel. It would not be correct if by "force" we understood merely the physical force derived from muscular strength. But if, on the other hand, we understand "force" in the larger sense to represent the power

[1] The satisfactory character of the results of Fascist administration has been greatly emphasized by the economic and financial measures of the last twelve months.

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derived from the intellect no less than from the muscles, and, over and above that derived from the intellect, the force which is derived from the weight of interests and the intensity of feeling, the conclusion I have indicated is hardly to be doubted, I think. Originally electoral contests were assemblies of armed individuals generally aware of one another's equal power and consequently regarding themselves as equal, one to the other; they were willing, therefore, to refrain from struggling, and instead found it more practical to agree beforehand in allowing the victory to rest in the hands of the more numerous group, in the conviction that the latter would have won it in any event if the question were put to the decision of arms and not amicably settled. But where the reality of the situation has advanced far beyond the assumption of equal power, either because of diverse social qualities, for example, such as characterize the relations of white and colored races in the United States, or because of the difference in intensity of feeling and of interests such as characterizes the relations during recent years of the Nationalist and Social Democratic parties in Italy —in situations of this sort, there is no legal device or philosophical theory which can prevent the more powerful party from securing the upper hand and actually conquering the place of power, just as there is nothing except some external force which can prevent the body lighter than air from rising, and the body heavier than air from falling to the earth.

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REVIEWS

The Constitution at the Cross Roads. By EDWARD A. HARRIMAN. New York, George H. Doran Company, 1925.—xv, 274 pp. $3.00.

The title of this volume is somewhat misleading. For it suggests a study of the Constitution and a discussion of the alternative roads along one of which the Constitution must henceforth travel. Whereas in reality the volume does not deal with the Constitution primarily, and of the two cross roads of nationalism and internationalism before which the Constitution stands, the latter forms the subject matter of the entire study.

As is explained in the preface, the author finds the United States invited to become a member of the two new political organizations created by the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations and the Permanent Organization of Labor, as well as a member of "the judicial body of these two organizations," the Permanent Court of International Justice; and he sees in these possible memberships a diametrical departure from our traditional policy. "The Constitution is at the cross roads. In one direction leads the way of national tradition and absolute independence; in the other, the way of surrender of absolute independence of action in some degree, to a federation of the world." Two questions are before the American people: what are the legal consequences of membership in the new organizations and are those consequences desirable for the people of the United States? The second question is dismissed as outside the scope of the volume, which thereupon undertakes a detailed examination of what the author graphically describes as the "legal topography of the new road opened by the Treaty of Versailles."

The reviewer finds it difficult to see in the volume the "impartial" answer which the author undertakes to give to his question. The title itself and the phrasing of the preface indicate the author's bias, and this is confirmed on almost every page. Fairer is it, even to the author, to take his volume as a legal brief, written with skill and marshalling its arguments in formidable array, to prove that the organizations dealt with in the text are, from the very description

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of them, such as to call for an immediate negative answer as to the desirability of membership in them on the part of the United States.

Successive chapters of the volume deal with the objects of the League and the Labor Organization, membership in these bodies, the general schemes of organization, the executive, legislative, and judicial power (the latter including the Permanent Court as well as the judicial functions of the Council and of the Assembly of the League), the obligations of members, sanctions, and other lesser details. The method of treatment consists in a running commentary, longer or shorter according to the importance of the point at issue, upon the documents which form the constitutional bases upon which the several international institutions rest. An elaborate analytical table of contents serves in place of an index.

Taking the volume as a lawyer's brief, judgment as to the merits of the argument will depend in considerable measure upon the personal attitude of the reader. But here and there throughout the text are statements so extravagant and assumptions so unwarranted as to expose the author to easy counter-attack. "In one direction lies the way of national tradition and absolute independence." How can one speak of "absolute independence" of any nation in this modern world, to say nothing of the restrictions which are imposed upon the United States by the established rules of international law? How can the League of Nations be properly denounced as a "federation" when the author pauses later to comment upon the inability of the League to take action without the unanimous consent of its members? The argument (pp. 101-102) proving that the Permanent Court is the judicial branch of the League follows the vicious circle of asserting that a decision of the court must be an act of the League lest the court would not otherwise bear the same relation to the League which the Supreme Court bears to the United States, which would only be the case if the court were in fact the judicial branch of the League. Here and there the Constitution of the United States is held up for comparison. If the Covenant of the League approaches the Constitution too closely, it is dangerous; if it departs too far it is defective or futile. Barring these defects the student will find the volume a useful guide to the legal aspects of the League, against which he can check the numerous studies in which the League is approached more sympathetically.

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The Empire in Eclipse. By RICHARD JEBB. London, Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1926.—xxxi, 352 pp.

Having failed to heed the warnings of Mr. Lionel Curtis that salvation could be found only in Imperial Federation, the British Empire now shows little disposition to profit by the wisdom of Mr. Richard Jebb, stalwart opponent of Federation and champion of the cause of Britannic Alliance. In volumes published before the war (*Studies in Colonial Nationalism* and *The Britannic Question*) Mr. Jebb described with much insight the conditions that seemed favorable to the development of the self-governing Empire into a co-operative partnership of equal states united under a common Sovereign, and argued the case for Britannic unity through permanent voluntary alliance as against Federation. The history of the Empire during the War, when Federation was rejected and the Dominions stood forth as the free allies of the United Kingdom, in the councils of war and peace as well as on the field of battle, seemed to indicate that the conception of Britannic Alliance rested on solid foundations, though the land of Cobden and Gladstone had not yet been converted to the policy of fiscal protection, without which there could not be established within the Empire that system of reciprocal commercial preference which Mr. Jebb held to be essential to its perpetuation.

But the realization of the Alliance ideal appears to him to be more remote than it seemed at the close of the war. In the present volume the author surveys the history of the Empire during the post-war period in chapters on the Imperial Conference, Foreign Policy, Trade Policy and Defence Policy, and finds that in each case it is a record of retrogression. He concludes that there is something wrong with the Empire, "something which checks the recent promise of its development into an effective Britannic commonwealth, or association of states under the common Crown for mutual aid in all the purposes of national life; something which has depressed the flush of confidence at the close of the war in the future of our own league of nations." But Mr. Jebb is no pessimist; the Empire is in "eclipse", rather than in decline, and eclipse is defined as "a temporary obscurity, interrupting an effulgence which will presently return." The astronomical analogy is not perfect, of course, for it will require human effort to set the Empire in the right road.

In a final chapter the author indicates what ought to be done. He is convinced that the *sine qua non* of lasting imperial integration is the adoption by Great Britain of a policy of national protection

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modified by imperial preference, a policy which would have been adopted twenty years ago, one gathers from Mr. Jebb, if the politicians had not succeeded in deluding the people of Great Britain. Their refusal to discard the "outworn superstition" of free trade has not only thwarted effective imperial unity but is, in the author's opinion, the principal cause of the continued industrial depression in England. Without a common trade policy, the member states of the Empire will tend more and more to pursue separate policies in foreign affairs and in defence, as they have actually been doing during the last few years. Unfortunately, from Mr. Jebb's point of view, the Conservative Party in England, subordinating imperial strategy to party tactics, has for the time being abandoned the cause of protection.

The author's purpose, as he tells us, is "to put forward a particular view of the existing position in the light of certain facts which have been selected accordingly." That is to say, his work is essentially one of interpretation and propaganda. But even those who do not share the "particular view" may well be grateful to Mr. Jebb for his reliable presentation of "facts".

R. L. SCHUYLER

A History of England. By HILAIRE BELLOC. Volume I. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.—xiii, 421 pp. $3.75.

In writing the history of England Mr. Belloc has attempted, in his own words, "to combine considerable detail of narrative and data with the presence of general theses." This first volume, which is to be followed by three others bringing the story down to the close of the nineteenth century, begins with Caesar's invasions and ends with the Norman Conquest. In the remote past of Britain as partially revealed by the findings of archaeology Mr. Belloc takes no interest, for "real history," he tells us, "can only be based on written records helped by tradition" (p. 11). In his opinion the archaeologists have done nothing more useful than to lay a foundation for negligible conjecture, and he faithfully ignores what they have to say both of pre-Roman and of Roman Britain. To devote more than a hundred pages to the Roman Occupation without giving any evidence of acquaintance with the writings of Haverfield is a singular achievement in studied neglect, to say the least.

It would seem that the author's "general theses" are to be ex-

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plained by three capital influences in his life—religious faith, ancestry and war psychology. His Roman Catholicism, aided probably by his French descent, makes him an intense partisan not only of Catholicism but of Rome, pagan as well as Christian, and one of his theses is that English civilization is wholly Roman in origin (pp. 3-4, 25-26). The same influences, reinforced no doubt by war psychology, account for his vehement anti-Germanism. The historically well-informed reader will be astonished to learn that in the first century, B. C., a traveller, in passing from the "barbaric" North of Europe (*i. e.*, the land that is now Germany) to the "half-civilized" West (*i. e.*, the present France) "crossed a clean division and felt a sudden change of surroundings, like the change that is felt in coming out from forest into well tilled land" (p. 13). The authority for this extraordinary assertion is not vouchsafed. The Anglo-Saxon "pirates" are represented as contributing nothing to the making of England except a slight infusion of barbaric blood and a linguistic element. These savages, it seems, had nothing else to contribute, for our author light-heartedly invokes the authority of Tacitus to show that they had no "institutions" of their own! (p. 18). As to language, Mr. Belloc adopts with enthusiasm Professor Wiener's sensational philological theory that the Anglo-Saxon and other Teutonic dialects were made up in large part of debased Latin and Greek words. "We now know, since Wiener's research and reasoning have appeared," he assures us, "that no very early record of Germanic speech has survived, and that the Germanic dialects of our documents, very many Teutonic words in constant use, are largely Greek and Latin in origin" (p. 15). He must have heard of the dooms of Ethelbert of Kent, which were compiled about the year 610, but he has forgotten about them, for he says that our earliest certain fragments of Germanic speech are of the eighth century (p. 36).

Throughout the fifth and sixth centuries, according to Mr. Belloc, the essentials of Roman civilization endured in Britain. The Roman towns, the Roman agricultural and social system and the Roman tradition of monarchy all survived (pp. 177, 178, 181). He even ventures the amazing statement that only two of the cities of Roman Britain decayed (p. 223). We are thus called upon to dismiss from mind the teachings of Stubbs and Maitland, of Haverfield and Vinogradoff. The most accomplished students of legal history have pronounced the dooms of the Anglo-Saxon kings to be the purest specimens of Germanic law, yet Mr. Belloc does not hesitate to say

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of the laws of Ina that "they are based, of course, like all the codes of the Dark Ages, on the late Roman institution of the *Compositio* . . . " (p. 241).

Mr. Belloc professes great respect for tradition as historic evidence, and he denounces the "mania for attacking tradition" as one of the "plagues of the nineteenth century" (p. 123). But it turns out that he is a picker and chooser among traditions, rejecting those that do not support his preconceptions. Thus he accepts the tradition that St. Helena, the mother of Constantine, rediscovered the Cross. But there was a tradition, well established in Bede's day, that the nation of the Angles emigrated *en masse* from their continental homes to England, and to this our author does not refer. He was anxious to minimize the number of the "pirates" who settled in England.

Mr. Belloc has given a memorable exhibition of the will to believe, but he has none of the qualities which a historian must possess if his work is to be taken seriously.

R. L. SCHUYLER.

The Political Consequences of the Reformation: Studies in Sixteenth Century Political Thought. By the Rev. R. H. Murray. Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1926.—xxiv, 301 pp. $4.00.

This book is handsomely gotten up and attractively printed, with a good index, handy chronological table of sixteenth-century writings, and useful bibliographies and references in the footnotes introducing one to works in foreign languages on the subject. Its chapters, however, deal with well-worn topics on which it is difficult to say much that is novel: "The World of Machiavelli," "Luther and the State Church," "John Calvin and his *Institutes*" (*Institute,* by the bye, seems the more correct translation), "Bodin and the Theory of Sovereignty," "Calvin's Disciples," "Leaguers and Jesuits," and finally, "British Speculators." Thus the book covers again about the same ground as Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius,* not to mention other works. Mr. Murray tells us in the preface, however, that for over twenty years he has been reading the authors whose writings he now analyzes, and he generally accompanies his interpretation by specific citations of the texts. It may be further conceded that he has a gift for writing epigrammatic sentences, though at times it misleads him into paradox and inconsistency. To the average reader his literary style will probably prove clearer and more attractive than

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that of Figgis. Some words are overworked, however, particularly "seminal", an adjective that I do not think much of anyway, and which occurs on pages ix, 3, 126, 148, and 167 at least. We also hear a bit too often of "seething ideas", "ferments", and "mighty solvents".

Mr. Murray senses well the conditions and spirit of sixteenth-century political thought, but he sees them against an incorrect medieval background. Like so many writers on the sixteenth century, he insists on opening his book with a number of stock disparaging generalizations concerning the Middle Ages which writers have repeated over and over for the past two or three centuries without ever going any farther, whereas recent specialized research into the medieval period has contraverted and abandoned them. To give but one instance, how amazing the assertion that the Middle Ages "beyond question . . . were largely unpolitical," must sound to those who have investigated the variety and intricacy of medieval municipal institutions or the genesis of representative government in local and provincial estates then. The difficulty is that Mr. Murray has read little and thought less about the Middle Ages. He simply unquestioningly repeats stale generalizations hatched long ago. Let us hope that in the allusion on page xii to "the irruption of the Turks into Europe in 1453," the date is a misprint for 1353, since of course the Turks had begun to enter the Balkan peninsula a century before the tardy fall of Constantinople. Furthermore we think that for most of Mr. Murray's readers it should be unnecessary to rehearse as he has done the discovery of America, invention of printing, *Letters of Obscure Men, Enchiridion Militis Christiani,* and *Praise of Folly*. For such reasons we think that the Introduction on "The Background of the Reformation," might have better been omitted, and with it portions of the first chapter.

An example of seeming inconsistency of statement—in spirit, if not in letter—is the assertion on pages xii-xiii that the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* established in England in 1526 preceded the first *Index* on the Continent by twenty-five years, and that of Rome by thirty-three, whereas on pages xvii-xviii we read that the Fifth Lateran Council in 1512-1517 "had forbidden, under pain of excommunication and heavy fines, the printing of any books without the approval of the Bishop and the Inquisitor, and in Rome of the Cardinal-Vicar and the Master of the Palace." The distinction between the men of the North and the men of the South, for which Bodin is given credit on page 145, goes back to the *Oriental History* of Jacques de

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Vitry in the first half of the thirteenth century, and Bodin's whole theory of climatic influences is largely a repetition of medieval astrology. These are simply two instances of how unfamiliarity with medieval writings may vitiate at any moment the estimate of sixteenth-century writings. Surely it is time to give more heed to the influence of their reading in medieval books upon these sixteenth-century authors, instead of merely to the influence of their reading in the classics and that of contemporary conditions upon them.

But let us turn to a passage in this book which has especially pleased us, namely, the account of the patriotism, nationality, and nationalism of Hotman, author of the *Franco-Gallia*. Was he a native for many generations back of some walled and chartered Picard commune that used to collect its own taxes and pay no others, or of some province or former feudal state like Poitou or the Duchy of Burgundy, with its culture centering in its own provincial capital? No, he was not. His family "came originally from Breslau," which by no stretch of the imagination (until the Napoleonic era) could be called French soil. Note in the second place that his father became one of the magistracy or official class. He "had been 'Master of the Waters and Forests' and counsellor or judge of the *Parlement* of Paris," to which position Hotman would have in due course succeeded, had he not become a Huguenot. In the third place let us note that Hotman "dedicates his book to Frederick, Count Palatine of the Rhine, and his dedication breathes the spirit of patriotism, anticipating the work of Richelieu, who was the first to make every Frenchman realise that he belonged to *la patrie*." Mr. Murray goes on to say, "He has a fine definition of the French," but I prefer this implied definition of patriotism. Yet when Hotman sought to illustrate it from classical literature, he selected Ulysses who preferred to all the delights and even to the kingdom offered by Calypso, not Greece or Hellas, but Ithaca, a small local feudal state, "an eagle's nest, hung on the sides of steep cliffs." (*Cet amour, Homère le montre réalisé dans Ulysse, qui préfère à toutes les délices, et même au royaume offert par Calypso, Ithaque, sa patrie, un pauvre nid d'aigles, suspendu aux flancs des rochers escarpes.*) It was such fatherlands that Richelieu battered down. Nevertheless Mr. Murray may be right in saying, "There is possibly no better source than the letters of Hotman for discerning the beginnings of the new nationalism to which the *tres magi* of Bacon, Henry VII of England, Louis XI of France, and Ferdinand the Catholic, had given the form of each kingdom that made it possible." But what a start! Here again

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it should be noted that Hotman regarded Louis XI as "a tyrant, and that his tyranny redounded not only to his own infamy but also to the ruin of his people as well" (page 198).

Two slips in proof-reading that may be noted are on page 209, *Monarchomacos* for *Monarchomachos*, and on page 230 "Loyasa" for Loyola, as the reference in the index shows.

LYNN THORNDIKE

Some Problems of Wages and their Regulation in Great Britain Since 1910. By ALLAN G. B. FISHER. London, P. S. King & Son, 1926.—xvii, 281 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*

This volume has one main object and two subsidiary objects. It presents some of the more important wage problems that have arisen since the war, and it endeavors to do this with special attention to the various opinions of the various parties involved in the wage negotiations and the principles that had been applied in each case. Some of the more important problems are discussed under the heads, "Wage Negotiation in 1919", "International Labor Legislation", "Arbitration and the Industrial Courts Act", "The Trade Boards and the Minimum Wage", "Railway Wage Negotiations 1918-1924", and "The Mining Agreement of 1921."

One of the most interesting chapters is that entitled "Trade Boards and a Minimum Wage." As is well known, the minimum wage legislation of Great Britain began with the Trade Boards Act of 1909 and the legislation has been applied under the direction of the Trade Boards. In this chapter the principle of a living wage is clearly stated and adequately defended both on economic and social grounds. One gathers from these pages that the task of ascertaining the minimum of decent living has not been as thoroughly or as accurately performed in Great Britain as in the United States. Nevertheless, the Trade Boards have since 1921 fixed minimum rates which are slightly above what Mr. Rowntree calls "the poverty line standard." This is a considerable gain for the exploited workers. The author is in favor of the family allowance system, according to which the wages of the head of a family vary with the number of children dependent upon him.

While the work covers a very wide field and presents a great variety of facts, methods, and opinions, the author admits that the conclusions in his study are "negative and disappointing." Even where wage settlements have been considered in the light of general

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principles, there has been very little agreement concerning wage rates. Nor have the regulations, adjustments, and institutions which the author has investigated yielded or suggested any new scheme for insuring industrial peace or for regulating general movements of wages. Nevertheless, the author does derive from his study certain generalizations in which he seems to have a measure of confidence. Compulsory arbitration he rejects, particularly in the absence of a set of principles or industrial code for the guidance of the arbitration tribunal. The principle of a minimum living wage is accepted as well established both deductively and by experience. Wage rates above the minimum can safely be left to the interaction of the forces of supply and demand. Mr. Hobson's theory of underconsumption has had no perceptible influence on wage settlements. In wage negotiations there is much beating of the air and an astonishing amount of failure on the part of each side to meet the argument of the other. In its present form the science of economics seems capable of providing only slight and uncertain guidance for the task of regulating and determining wages.

JOHN A. RYAN

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

Family Allowances in Practice. By HUGH J. R. VIBART, London, P. S. King and Son, 1926.—x, 237 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*

In the preface to this work the author tells us that his intention has been to examine the subject impartially and to obtain a true view of the actual facts concerning the operation of the family allowance system. The historical sketch describes the system as applied in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany. Some of the particular topics presented are the amount of the allowance, the method of payment, the administration of the fund and the basis of assessment, the attitude of labor, the bachelor; also the effect of the system on the general level of wages, on population and on agriculture. The last two chapters deal respectively with the question of state compulsion as a method of establishing family allowances and the general value of the system.

The astonishingly rapid spread of the arrangement in the four Continental countries studied is attributed by the author to the general humanizing tendency of the century, the fear of a declining birth rate, the difficulties of inflated prices and the social tenets of

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Catholicism, not only in opposing birth control but in the direction of social justice and the improvement of family conditions. At the conclusion of his chapter entitled the "Principles of the Family Wage," the author lays down three basic principles for the right determination of wages: first, the output of the worker; second, industry's capacity to pay; third, the needs of life for the individual. In his opinion an ideal wage system would suitably blend these three elements. No fault can be found with this generalization; the great difficulty in practice is to effect the combination in such a way as to safeguard human needs without injuring the industrial machinery by which these needs are supplied.

He points out that the system has been in operation too short a time to yield any reliable information as regards its effect on the birth rate and population. In his opinion we are not justified in anticipating that there will be any considerable direct effect, in as much as wages constitute only one of the factors of the problem. In the meantime what is certain is that the system tends to improve greatly the quality of the population.

As regards the question whether family allowances should be enforced by the state, possibly with state subsidies, it is noted that there has been considerable demand for this provision in France, Belgium and Holland. The author seems well warranted in the judgment that state compulsion should not be introduced until the system has obtained a greater measure of favorable public opinion than exists at present. When that time comes, the burden which now rests too heavily upon conscientious employers, who have put the system into effect voluntarily, can be effectively distributed, through state action, over the whole industrial field.

It is somewhat remarkable that the family allowance system has not yet been introduced into Great Britain, for the same conditions of adult male wage rates inadequate to maintain a family are quite as general in that country as in those countries on the Continent that have adopted the arrangement so rapidly. Possibly the failure to adopt it in England is due in part to the prevalence of unemployment insurance and in part to the opposition of the trade unions. Why are the trade unions antagonistic? Because they think that the allowances will tend to lower standard wages, will give the employer too much opportunity of interfering in the private affairs of employees and will weaken their powers of resistance. Thus far practical experience seems to deprive these fears of any adequate basis in fact.

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In the author's opinion the family allowance system introduces no new principle, but merely extends the influence of needs as a factor in the determination of wages. He thinks that the system suggests a means whereby it can be possible, without unduly straining the resources of industry, to enable that section of wage-earners in whose hands lies the up-bringing of the coming generation to live at a higher and, from a national point of view, a more desirable standard. "This," he declares, "would appear to be the true mission of the family allowance and it is in accordance with its capacity for attaining that that it should be judged."

JOHN A. RYAN

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The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals. By JACKSON H. RALSTON. Revised Edition. Stanford University Press, 1926.—xl, 512 pp. $5.00.

Mr. Ralston has revised and brought strictly up to date his 1910 volume entitled *International Arbitral Law and Procedure*. There have been many arbitrations since that time; and he has also used sources and cases of earlier date not included in the first volume. He now refers to La Fontaine's *Pasicrisie*, to the Lapradelle-Politis *Recueil*, to the *Recueil des Traités* of Descamps and Renault, to the decisions of the *Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes*, and to the published opinions of the American-British, German-American, and Mexican-American tribunals, as well as to the opinions of the Permanent Court. It is now a complete and up-to-date presentation of arbitral cases—approximately a thousand of them. In spite of some reservations which may be made as to the author's plan, the volume is a quite invaluable guide for anyone interested in international arbitration, and for lawyers who have international claims to prepare.

An address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco in 1925 serves as an introduction. After a brief survey of the use of arbitration, the author discusses its present value. Refusing to concede that differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal systems make the operation of an international court impossible, he points to the past success of international arbitrations as proof to the contrary. He shows—and proves later—how widely international law has been built up through arbitral decisions. While the reviewer

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agrees thoroughly with Mr. Ralston's attack upon sovereignty, it must be admitted that that theory has been of essential importance in the past history of international law; and it therefore seems dangerous to base the law between states upon the same principles as those underlying the law between individuals. Not one of the many arbitral decisions has ever been rejected, the author affirms, though there is only moral force to back them up. He thinks that arbitral tribunals, no matter how constituted, have always followed international law in their decisions. In international affairs the judicial method of settling disputes has made in a very brief period the progress which has required thousands of years as between individuals.

The author's plan is to quote opinions, and leave the reader to take his choice. With such a plan, the most convenient method of revealing the wide range and value of the book, as well as of arbitral cases in general, is to summarize briefly though incompletely the subjects covered. Chapter i quotes a few definitions of international law; and the author speaks of the "changing conception," away from natural law. Chapter ii takes up treaties, their operative date, validity, relation to local law, and interpretation. Chapter iii deals with commissions—method of selection, jurisdiction, the Calvo Clause (concerning which the opinion of the author as to the recent decision of the Mexican Claims Commission in the case of the N. A. Dredging Co. would have been of value), contracts and bonds, the rule of local redress, denial of justice, relation of international to domestic law, effect of decisions, and interest. Chapter iv considers the parties to cases, and chapter v with their citizenship. Chapter vi is devoted to procedure, including that of the Permanent Court—memorials, language, authority of umpire, form of award, pleadings, etc. Chapter vii is concerned with evidence, chapter viii with claims, and chapter ix with damages—indirect, punitive, for torts, contracts, imprisonment, etc. In chapter x the rights and privileges of aliens are considered in respect of equal treatment, unneutral conduct, expulsion, etc. The principal change of structure from the old volume is in the division of the former chapter on government into two chapters. The first (chapter xi) now includes attributes and limitations of sovereignty—its meaning, continuity of states, equality, territorial jurisdiction, recognition, *de jure* and *de facto* governments, servitudes, and acquisition of title. Chapter xii takes up the important topic, only recently given separate treatment by legal writers, of the respon-

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sibility of governments, for acts of officials, of member states, of individuals, and for revolutions, mobs, customs duties, etc. Chapter xiii deals with prescription, chapter xiv with war, chapter xv with maritime war, chapter xvi with prize law, and chapter xvii with commissions of inquiry. Appendices contain the Rules Governing American Claims against Foreign Governments, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and the Statute and Rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

From this survey it is evident that Mr. Ralston has given us a valuable summary and guide not only for methods of arbitration but for rules of international law. The quotations and references make of it almost a first-hand source. The reviewer, however, is firmly convinced that it would have been much more valuable if Mr. Ralston had included his own interpretation and criticism of the cases. Brief quotations are often misleading. The doctrinal notes in the *Recueil* of Lapradelle and Politis are of the greatest assistance to students. Mr. Ralston confines himself to the "case method," and this, to the reviewer, is insufficient. He does not even give credit to himself for his own opinions in the Venezuelan cases, though we would readily have forgiven him if he had said "Umpire Ralston" as he said "Umpire Plumley" and others. This method doubtless accounts for a severe monotony of style. Paragraph after paragraph begins "The same question arose in the case of . . ." Footnotes are strictly limited to references and these often occur in too abbreviated a form. Unless strict uniformity is adhered to, with an explanation of abbreviations, full citations should be given. Thus no knowledge is granted as to where the Ottoman Annuities case is to be found. Again, the *Reports of the Central American Court of Justice* are cited on p. 9, and on p. 39 the *Anales de Corte de Justicia*. The former are not listed in the bibliography.

Although the reviewer regrets that Mr. Ralston could not have given us more by way of interpretation and criticism of cases, he knows of no other book of this sort which approaches it in value. It should not be omitted from any library of international law or relations. The Stanford Press has done an admirable job of printing and binding.

CLYDE EAGLETON

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World Developments in the Cotton Industry. By LOUIS BADER. New York University Press, 1925.—xvii, 187 pp. $3.00.

This volume consists essentially of three sections, the first dealing with tendencies in the cotton manufacturing industry, the second, more briefly, with raw cotton, and the third with methods of marketing cotton goods. The first section contains many statistical data regarding the expansion of cotton manufacture into countries where it was formerly undeveloped, the decline in British exports of cotton goods, the growth of the cotton factories in our own South, and the stationary position of the industry in New England. Some discussion of causal factors in the situation is scattered through it, but there is no adequate analysis of them. The author may understand, but he fails to bring forcibly to the attention of the reader, the fundamental fact that the world requirement for cotton textiles is incapable of rapid expansion, and that since the manufacturing industry is relatively simple, and since low wages pretty generally mean low costs of production of cotton goods, it is but natural that cotton factories should spread into more backward countries which formerly depended on England and New England for cloth. Mr. Bader rightly points out that the difficulties of these two centers of textile production can be minimized only by turning to finer and finer goods, but offers no sufficient discussion as to the possible measure of expansion in demand for such goods.

The treatment of the raw cotton situation is not very illuminating. Writing in 1925 the writer could perhaps hardly be expected to foresee fully the sharp recent changes in production and prices. However, the grounds on which he based his forecast, since shown quite inaccurate, that no material reduction in price was likely to take place, were far from convincing in the light of the facts then known. The statement in support of this opinion that "the only authoritative figures available indicate that more cotton was consumed than produced during the last twenty-five years," is presumably based on failure to recognize the inevitable disparities of statistics compiled from different sources; broadly speaking, of course, consumption over a long period of time cannot exceed production. Equally unconvincing is the suggestion (page 94) that because the number of spindles in the world has increased twenty-one per cent. since the beginning of the century, the consumption of cotton ought to increase correspondingly. As a matter of fact, as is expressly stated by Mr. Bader in another place, the increase in cotton spindles

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since the beginning of the century has been more than fifty per cent (page 49), but under the conditions prevailing the installation of new spindles by no means constitutes demand for more cotton.

The author scarcely makes reference to the diminished buying power of the world resulting from the war, and touches only in a dozen words on the effect of the boll weevil in holding down production in the immediate post-war years. Still less does he call attention to those differences in cost of production as between eastern and western regions of the South which are having such a profound effect upon acreage and on the whole price situation. The suggestions that the South should expand its acreage in order to prevent other countries from gradually taking away its market and that lower prices would so stimulate consumption as to benefit the cotton farmer seem rather beside the point.

In both of these sections the author at times relies upon unofficial sources for data concerning which authoritative statistics are readily available. This is, for example, the apparent explanation of his startling statement that the quantity of silk used in the United States has multiplied fifteen times in five years, and that of artificial silk 2,275 times since 1916. Between 1918 and 1924 (disregarding the abnormally high figure of 1919 and the abnormally low one of 1920) silk consumption as measured by imports increased about twenty-five per cent, and between 1916 and 1924 rayon consumption multiplied sixfold.

The present reviewer is scarcely competent to form an opinion of Mr. Bader's chapters dealing with the marketing of cotton goods. He considers the possibility of increasing sales, especially of the finer grades, by careful market analysis and by advertising.

E. Dana Durand

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Washington, D. C.

The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré. Translated and Adapted by Sir George Arthur. New York, Doubleday Page and Company, 1926.—xii, 371 pp. $5.00.

The most serious charge that has been levelled against the reminiscences of Raymond Poincaré (*Au Service de la France. Neuf Années de Souvenirs*) is that the author has attempted to obscure the essential questions at issue by burying them under a mass of detail. Certainly the volumes that have appeared thus far leave

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with the reader a distinct sense of disappointment. They are hard reading and in spots are positively wearisome. Many pages are devoted to details of slight significance. The author spends much time in pointing out errors on the part of his critics, though these are frequently of minor importance. Moreover, he enlarges unduly upon certain incidents concerning which he feels able to justify himself.

Much of this material has at least some value to the student of pre-war diplomacy, but it can hardly be of interest to the general reader. The publishers were well-advised, therefore, in attempting to make the English edition more digestible. The first volume covers the year 1912 and combines the first volume and the first half of the second volume of the French original. The translator has been rather successful in making the adaptation. There are some places where the omissions seem somewhat arbitrary, but on the whole the chief line of the argument comes out clearly enough. The author attempts to prove that even the closest scrutiny "would fail to detect any particle of malevolence or mischief-making" in the French policy pursued during the Balkan Wars. It was the object of the French Yellow Book on this critical period to demonstrate this same thesis, and M. Poincaré's account is hardly more than a summary of the material already printed, at least as far as the French policy is concerned. He throws somewhat more light upon the policy of Russia, which he regards as mistaken but not ill-intentioned or belligerent. He admits that the Serbo-Bulgar Treaty "contained the germs not only of a war against Turkey but a war against Austria" and makes much of his own opposition to Russia's connection with the Balkan states. The careful reader will come away strengthened in the conviction that the Russians meant to utilize the Balkan League for their own purposes, and that their eyes were steadfastly fixed upon the Straits, even though to Russia's allies such a policy may have seemed foolhardy and dangerous. What stands out particularly from M. Poincaré's rather confused account of the Balkan crisis is that the Russians were satisfied to leave Constantinople to the Turks but that it would mean war within twenty-four hours if anyone else should lay a finger upon it, as Louis reported, and that Russia would probably not go to war even if Austria attacked Serbia, as the French military attaché expressed it.

Though Sir George Arthur has been successful in making the adaptation one can hardly join the Duke of Northumberland who,

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in the preface, congratulates M. Poincaré upon having found so able a translator. The translation is sometimes loose and at times inaccurate. It is bad enough when M. Poincaré himself speaks of the agreement of 1904 as having been signed by the Conservative Cabinet of Lord Salisbury, but it is worse yet to have an Englishman translate this to read "signed by the Conservative leader, Lord Salisbury" who died in 1903. Not only that. The volume is marred by the frequent use of bad grammar or faulty construction, or by abuse of idiom. The French narrative present can hardly be rendered by the English present tense. One is rather surprised to see the Dardanelles and Bosporus referred to as the "narrows" and to find "septentrional" and "meridianal" (*sic*) used instead of northern and southern. The use of "de" for *von* in German titles is scarcely excusable in an English book, but it is not as bad as the careless rendering of proper names themselves ("Feld Marschall Hötzendorff" for Conrad von Hötzendorff; "Bieberstein" for Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, for example). Worst of all are the misspellings, with which the book fairly bristles—"Comte de Mum" for de Mun, "Fallière" for Fallières, "de Stummer" for von Stumm, "Herr Vangenheim" for Baron von Wangenheim, "Tzechs" for Czechs, "Tiza" for Tisza, "Frezcinet" for Freycinet, "interpolations" for interpellations, to mention only a few. Taken all in all, this English translation and adaptation has the advantage of greater brevity, but otherwise is not a very creditable piece of work. Students will be well-advised to rely upon the French original.

WILLIAM L. LANGER

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The Geneva Opium Conferences, Statements of the Chinese Delegation. By SAO-KE ALFRED SZE. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.—vii, 163 pp. $1.50.

The bitterness and mutual recriminations which resulted from the action of the Chinese and American delegations to the International Opium Conferences, held in Geneva in the winter of 1924-25, make it especially important to have in available form the statements made by the Chinese, together with their explanations. Both delegations withdrew from the Conference because their proposals were not adopted by the delegates of the other nations represented, and some of the latter have intimated that this impeded greatly the progressive suppression of the traffic in narcotics.

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It is somewhat difficult to extract the really salient facts from these documents, which are couched in diplomatic language and necessarily contain many repetitions and omissions. The Americans and Chinese insisted that all the nations represented should "enact effective laws or regulations for the production and distribution of raw opium and coca leaves so that there will be no surplus available for purposes not strictly medical or scientific". The other countries said that this was impractical until the Chinese enforced their own laws and treaty obligations for the prohibition of the cultivation and use of opium for smoking purposes, as it had proved impossible to prevent smuggling opium from China into other Oriental territories. The Chinese admitted that the Peking Government was unable to prevent the growth and use of opium, but demanded that the other powers should agree to enact and to enforce laws which the Chinese were unable to administer efficiently. This seemed unfair to the others, and they offered to abolish the use of opium in their possessions within fifteen years after "the effective execution of the measures taken by China has reached such a stage as to remove the danger of opium smuggling from China into those territories".

The Chinese accused the other Powers of subordinating moral issues to financial considerations and threatened them with organized boycotts, if the Chinese plan was not approved. Turkey, Persia and other opium-growing countries stated that they were not in a position to enforce such laws, and finally it became evident that the real issue was an attack upon the administration of British India, which was reluctant to take further measures to please the Chinese, while the latter were so notoriously violating their treaties of 1907, which provided for the cessation of the export of opium from India to China, in consideration of the abolition of the growth of the poppy in China. All authorities seem to agree that the military dictators of China encourage the production of opium as the easiest method of securing large revenues, and that China produces the greater part of the world's supply. The Chinese asserted that the estimate of 15,000 tons raisied annually by China, made by the International Anti-Opium Association of Peking, is excessive, while it is believed that 2,000 tons would be adequate for the legitimate use of all countries.

The other nations were confident that control of the manufacture of opium derivatives, which is carried on in less than twenty factories in all lands, would be the best method of preventing the abuse of

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narcotics, except by Chinese opium smokers, while the Americans and Chinese felt that the only efficient way was control of production, which the others said was impossible at present. The latter also held that it was unjust that the Americans and Chinese, while not proposing to take any efficient action themselves, should insist that other countries should make large financial sacrifices and attempt the enforcement of prohibitory laws, which the rest deemed unwise, in face of the failure of the American laws against alcohol.

The Chinese position cannot be understood without reading the statements of the other delegates, but it is evident from this book that the question is one of methods and not principles and that it should be possible to make progress through compromises and concessions. Some of the delegates evidently thought that the uncompromising attitude of the Americans was the chief obstacle to the success of the conferences, while the imputations of bad faith and the attacks on other countries made by the Chinese were deeply resented.

It is gratifying to note that the Government of India has taken steps recently leading toward the execution of the American plan, largely in deference to American public opinion, and that the League of Nations has been active in various ways made possible by the decisions of the conferences, including the sending of a commission, with American members, to investigate the possibilities of assisting opium-growing countries to overcome the difficulties which prevent the limitation of the drug to medical use.

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Income in the Various States. Its Sources and Distribution, 1919, 1920 and 1921. By MAURICE LEVEN. Based upon Estimates of The National Totals by Willford Isbell King. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1925.—306 pp. $5.00.

With every additional publication issued by the National Bureau of Economic Research, it becomes increasingly apparent that the establishment of that agency in 1920 "for the purpose of conducting exact and impartial investigations in the field of economic, social and industrial science" was an event of major importance in social science. The organization itself is noteworthy in two ways: first, for the high standing and brilliance of its personnel—if indeed the term "brilliance" can be applied to men whose *forte* is the capacity for

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infinitely careful and painstaking research. Second, for the unique method of eliminating partiality or bias in its findings. No report may be issued without the approval of a Board of Directors which includes representatives of organizations so diverse as the American Bankers Association and the American Federation of Labor, the American Statistical Association and the American Farm Bureau Federation. Moreover, any director is entitled to present his exceptions to the findings or conclusions of an inquiry upon the pages of the report itself. The result has been the entire elimination of any suspicion of a propaganda motive back of its published data such as, unfortunately, attaches to the work of some other research bodies. The endeavor is to publish facts and statistical conclusions only, and this purpose is adhered to with unusual success.

As its first and a continuing task, the Bureau set to work upon a thoroughgoing and comprehensive study of *Income in the United States*. The two volumes appearing under that title in 1922 contained the most careful estimates that had ever been made in this field on a national basis. The nearest previous approaches to them in thoroughness had been the work of investigators on the Staff, like Willford I. King (with his *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*) who participated in the Bureau's study. In the same year and as a byproduct of the main study, appeared a brief monograph by Dr. Oswald W. Knauth summarizing the available data on *The Distribution of Income by States in 1919*.

The present volume, which is No. 7 in the Bureau's publications, is a further outgrowth of the work represented by the three initial volumes to which reference has just been made. As one point of origin, Dr. Leven has employed revised national totals of income as estimated by Dr. King and summarized by him in the present volume in the form of a "Preliminary Statement." The pioneer monograph by Dr. Knauth has provided another point of departure. As compared with the latter, the present study covers the three years 1919, 1920 and 1921 instead of the first of these alone. Moreover the present estimates for 1919 as compared with the earlier estimates are based upon a greater mass of material and refinements of method which secure a closer approximation to the fact. In addition to the presentation of data, the volume has as an object the development of a technique for the computation of estimates of income by states for succeeding years on a uniform basis. It is the hope of the Bureau that successive refinements may render its estimates in the future more and more accurate.

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The original estimates of national income (upon which the distributions by states have been based) covered the years 1909 to 1918 inclusive. These have now been extended to cover 1921, with certain alterations in method applying to the entire period. National or state "income" in the sense used by the Bureau stands for the sum of "those kinds of individual book incomes commonly accounted for in terms of money. If every individual kept an accurate set of private accounts and thereby arrived at his net money income for the year, and if all these net incomes were added together, the resulting totals would be those which this report attempts to approximate." The modifications of method employed in arriving at this income, as compared with the 1922 figures, are discussed by Dr. King under seven heads: (1) Reclassification of the gainfully employed. (2) Separation of salaried employees from wage workers and of salaries from wages. (3) Segregation of the mercantile industry from the unclassified group. (4) Merging of the miscellaneous hand trades with the unclassified group. (5) Inclusion of income received from foreign sources and deduction of income paid to foreigners. (6) Adoption of a uniform practice of using as divisors index numbers of the prices of consumption goods. (7) Substitution for business savings of changes in the command over consumption goods given to individuals by variations in their wealth. The last of these is regarded as the most important, and is the only change which involves anything like a fundamental alteration in the conception of income *per se*.

The state estimates, as has been said, proceed from the national estimates rather than from an attempt to follow out for each state individually "the detailed and exhaustive process employed in the preparation of the national totals." The various component parts of the national income are first apportioned separately to the various states in accordance with carefully computed indices. The estimates for the individual items in each state are then combined into a state total. It thus occurs that income in some states will show tendencies of increase or decline (during the three years in question) of an opposite character to those appearing in other states, or in the nation as a whole. This is due to varying tendencies in the separate types of income that are totaled, and the varying importance of different kinds of income in different states.

An illustration will make this clear, and at the same time present one of the more interesting findings of the report: The national total income for 1921 is much in excess of that for 1919 and 1920. This

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pertains also to most of the individual states. It is due to "the great advances between the beginning and the end of the year in the values of inventories as measured in terms of consumption goods." But an opposite tendency was at work in the case of agriculture. In Iowa, South Dakota, Nebraska, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Idaho the 1921 income was lower than that of 1919. For the nation at large, the 1921 income was to the 1919 income as 1.33 : 1.00. In New York the ratio was 1.62 : 1.00. But in South Dakota it was 0.39 : 1.00. It is apparent to the reader (no inferences of this character are permitted in the text) that the agrarian radicalism which manifested itself at about this time in the activities of the Farm blocs at Washington was not wholly attributable to the farmers' perversity!

In converting the estimated incomes of the various states into terms of the 1913 dollar, the total dollars of current purchasing power were divided by yearly indices separately calculated for each state in the following manner: The "cost of living" index computed by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics was assumed to be an adequate index of prices of goods consumed by urban employees. Similar indices were calculated by the National Bureau of Economic Research to represent the prices of goods consumed by farmers, by families spending $5,000 annually on consumption goods, and by families spending $25,000 annually on consumption goods. These four indices were combined by weighting each in accordance with "estimated total income in each State of the classes of consumers indicated." The simplicity and soundness of the method is appealing although it is not made clear what income classes of consumers are "indicated" by the $5,000 consumption index and the $25,000 consumption index, respectively.

Space will forbid more detailed attention to the data presented. Their utility will be widespread among business executives with national markets, among those concerned with the distribution of tax burdens and among students of economic, social and political phenomena in America during the period dealt with. Professors Edwin F. Gay and Wesley C. Mitchell, under whose general direction the two years' investigation was carried on, share with Dr. King, Dr. Leven and their assistants in the credit for this important study.

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The Unreformed Senate of Canada. By ROBERT A. MACKAY. New York, Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1926.—xvi, 284 pp. $5.00.

Among second chambers the Canadian Senate has a peculiar interest for political science. It is more than an ultra-respectable home for aged politicians. It embodies an interesting attempt to create an upper house which would meet the dual requisite of a parliamentary system in a federal state, which should have sufficient vigor to realize the "great compromise" essential to federalism, yet should not be strong enough to dissipate cabinet responsibility. It marks the judgment of the nearest neighbor, whose problems of public life are the most similar, upon three generations of American experience. At the same time, it now ranks among those older second chambers from whose history we are warranted in drawing conclusions. Despite the value of this Canadian experiment in government, it has evoked almost no formal discussions which are not essentially legal in their approach. Hence the present study with its suggestive title is especially timely.

Beginning with a brief survey of the origins of bicameralism in British America, Professor Mackay considers the problems which faced the Fathers of Confederation and their intention in this regard. He appraises the Senate as a working organ of the Canadian constitution, and examines the validity of popular criticisms of the institution—that it is merely a refuge for political deadwood, a purely partisan body, either supine or maliciously obstructive (depending on which party rules the lower house) and that as the citadel of wealth and senile conservatism it presents an irrational obstacle to reform. He concludes this careful analysis with an appraisal of the Senate's record, and a survey of reform proposals. The book is well written and entertaining. There is ample factual data to support the author's analyses, yet it is introduced so smoothly that the amount of meticulous research involved is not obvious. There are statistical tables relating to each major topic, supplemented by four appendices, including pertinent sections of the Bryce report on second chambers and tabulations of Senate action on legislation (1867-1924). There is a serviceable bibliography and index.

The analytical and negative part of the book is the more satisfying. Professor Mackay finds most of the popular strictures on the Canadian upper house unjustified. It was intended to enjoy neither the historical and social setting of the House of Lords, nor the special

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privileges of the American Senate, yet has suffered from inevitable comparison with both of them. The Fathers intended it to be distinctly a secondary chamber. They foresaw that provincial rights would depend more on the political power of strategically placed sectional groups than on legal safeguards, hence they stressed the parliamentary rather than the federal requisites. They did not, however, anticipate Cabinet dominance over the House, and the complete passivity of the latter in the system of life appointments to the Senate. Far from being fatuous, proceedings in general maintain a high level, affording promise of the Senate's continued usefulness as a revising and investigating, rather than a governing chamber. The author also concludes that its debates are freer from partisanship than those in the Commons, but fails to emphasize that this very freedom is an index of political weakness. He decides that partisanship is not noticeable in amendments offered to legislation passed by the lower House, but that it is discernible in the case of measures vetoed. He ventures on the conclusion (dangerous, because subjective) that such obstruction has in general been in the national interest and vindicated by public opinion. Professor Mackay believes that the Senate is ill adapted to the rôle of protector of provincial rights because of the frequent failure of appointments to represent local opinion, but that it constitutes a valuable check upon Commons (or rather Cabinet) sovereignty. He concludes, also, that it has rarely opposed reforms which were clearly necessary or advantageous—which, of course, is a matter of personal opinion. The working of the appointive system is frankly partisan, and practically dependent on the Prime Minister's discretion. This, however, can be utilized to correct misrepresentation of sectional and group interests in the lower house which result from the vagaries of popular nomination and election. Finally, the personnel of the Senate is probably at least as good as that of the House. Though many of its members are inactive, it does include a minority of ripe experience and unusual talent.

It seems to be *de rigeur* that those who discuss political problems must have solutions to offer, and Professor Mackay conforms to custom in this respect. On the necessity of reforming the Canadian Senate, there seems to be general agreement. Abolition he considers undesirable and politically impossible; Quebec and the Maritime Provinces would never consent to so drastic a step. Reform proposals are conditioned by the fact that federation is considered as a moral compact among the provinces. Few of the reform pro-

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posals, in his opinion, approach the heart of the difficulty—reduction in size of the Senate, participation of Cabinet Ministers in its debates, adoption of the British system of undersecretaries, transferring the main responsibility for private-bill legislation to the upper house, or curbing its veto power. Reform must be focused on the appointive system and embody the following requisites: reorganization of the Senate upon a basis sufficiently popular to secure public confidence without endangering the supremacy of the Commons; conservation in its membership of legislative and administrative experience and enlistment of eminence in non-political walks of life; retention of equality among the four sections into which Canada has been divided as regards representation in the Senate. The scheme which the author believes would best fulfil these conditions is a combination of appointment by the Government and election by the House, for a nine-year term (one-third renewable each triennium), nominations in either case to be made from certain defined categories. In view of the political exigencies which demand the retention of an upper chamber in Canada, such a proposal is worthy of very serious consideration.

The vexed problem of bicameralism is always with us, and would probably be better served by numerous special studies such as the one now under consideration, than by the more superficial comparative surveys to which we are accustomed. It is to be hoped that more contributions as fair and painstaking as that of Professor Mackay will be forthcoming in the near future.

A. Gordon Dewey

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The Chinese Abroad, Their Position and Protection. By Harley Farnsworth MacNair, with an Introduction by The Hon. V. K. Wellington Koo, and a Foreword by Fong F. Sec. Shanghai, The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925.—xxii, 340 pp.

It has probably been suspected that, by and large, the lot of the Chinese in foreign lands is "not a happy one." Dr. MacNair confirms this suspicion. In this "not exhaustive survey" of the problem, which admittedly, is "expository and not critical in its nature", the author, after accounting for the early laxity of the Chinese government in the protection of its subjects in foreign lands on grounds of, (1) its hostility to emigration, and (2) the later development there of the idea of modern public law concerning the legal

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relation between the state and the individual, undertakes to present the salient facts regarding the legal and economic position of the Chinese abroad—of whom, we are told, there are some 8,000,000. Somewhat more than 50% of these, however, dwell in territories, once Chinese, which have been annexed by other nations.

The above figures suggest, what is said to be a fact, that the Chinese are not, as a race, a migrating people. This fact is attributed to their family system and ancestor worship; hence presumably, with the gradual breakdown of these institutions under modern conditions, their migratory proclivities may increase. It is significant, in this connection, that the Chinese emigrant is no respecter of climates—the temperate and torrid zones being equally congenial to him. Dr. Koo assures us, however, in the Introduction, that the expansion of Chinese industrial enterprise will take care of all of China's surplus population for at least another half-century.

It is perhaps not surprising that, in general, the Chinese immigrant is a greater success, politically and economically, in tropical regions, than in the newer temperate areas which the white man has staked off for white colonization. In the tropics "the Chinese does not supplant the Englishman, he supplements him. . . . In the Malay States, for example, the Chinese are described as "hard-working, capable, law-abiding aliens," and in Borneo, Sir Charles Brooke is said to have remarked, "without the Chinaman we could do nothing." In these parts the Chinese become prominent members of the communities, and are even elected, at times, to local government councils. With this situation should be contrasted the riots and disorders which have characterized the contracts of the Chinese and whites throughout the temperate zone.

It is a natural corollary of the above that the legal restrictions upon the Chinese, as immigrants or residents, should be more rigorous in the "white man's home" than in those localities comprising the "white man's burden." Head taxes—as high as $500 in Canada and New Zealand; tonnage restrictions, as for instance, one Chinese for each 500 tons of ship capacity, in some Australian States; language tests—requiring, for example, the reading of any European language that the official might suggest, as in South Africa; and total exclusion, as in the United States, represent the restrictive measures employed against Chinese immigrants. Australia and the United States rank as the prime offenders against Chinese susceptibilities, especially in their denial of naturalization to Chinese, and in their discriminatory land laws and failure to protect adequately

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Chinese nationals. On this latter point the author marshals a damning array of evidence, relating particularly to the United States, and Fong F. Sec, in the Foreword to the book, testifies to its validity, "for", he says, "was I not spat upon, kicked, stoned, and forced to run for my life time and again just because I was a Chinese?" The author adds his plea to those of American statesmen from the time of President Cleveland, for the passage of legislation conferring on the federal executive and judicial agencies powers to protect aliens against the violation of their treaty rights.

Dr. MacNair does not delve into the larger social implications of racial contacts of the Chinese. Intermarriage is touched upon only once—that reference being to Siam, from which no generalizations are drawn. No evidence is adduced to suggest conclusions regarding Chinese assimilability in white territories, though Dr. Koo, in the Introduction, seems to take general issue with those who claim that Chinese are incapable of assimilation.

The author has not, apparently, allowed his Chinese environment to destroy reasonable objectivity in his use of materials. It is a useful survey, based upon the use of a wide range of documentary materials and general works, all of which are listed in an adequate bibliography.

G. Bernard Noble

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Niagara in Politics: A Critical Account of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission. By James Mavor. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1925.—vi, 255 pp. $2.00.

As is well known, the Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario is a publicly owned and operated corporation for supplying electricity to the Province of Ontario. It is financed by the Province with the expectation that the carrying charges and the principal of the debt will ultimately be repaid from the receipts for the service, and that the public will thus, in a relatively short time, own the whole property free of debt. The municipalities served are cooperatively organized for distributing the electricity generated and transmitted by the Commission. With the exception of the Canadian railways, this is by far the most important publicly operated industrial enterprise on this continent. Hence it is the chief target for all opponents of public ownership and operation.

Although the author is a distinguished economist, this is wholly

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a political study. It contains only incidental references to the economics of the subject. The author starts out with certain fundamental assumptions, and reaches conclusions derived from these assumptions. His assumption is that all public operation of public utilities is incapable, inefficient, corrupt and vicious. He even assumes that the motives of the advocates of such enterprise are consciously based on the desire to overturn and destroy the present order of society.

The character and temper of the work are shown by the language used. The Commission is "a menace to the financial credit and to the liberties of the people" (p. 8), "an intolerable incubus", "against common sense"; it has forced the legislature "to pass confiscatory legislation" (p. 9), has "violated contracts" and "entered into illegal contracts" (p. 116), is "hostile to private interests" and "discordant with common sense"; it has established "a reign of terror" (p. 10), has caused the newspapers "to suppress information", has "a strangle hold" (p. 10), has caused "a misappropriation of public funds", is "guilty of a breach of trust", "handles funds with incredible looseness" (p. 122), has "diverted trust funds" (p. 122), has played "dog in the manger" (p. 132), is "inexpertly managed" (p. 224); and "the promoters of it from the beginning had confiscation in their minds". Such language as this may be found on almost every page. The Commission has become a political party, and "swallowed the other two" parties, and "in point of fact the Hydro cannot be controlled, it controls both its own officers and the government."

The particular grievances of the author are that the Canadian constitution does not permit the courts to declare legislation unconstitutional; that the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council has declared this Commission not subject to the Dominion Industrial Disputes Act; that the Commission in the early days entered into competition with private companies (to-day it has almost a monopoly). The author apparently holds the Commission responsible for all these things. It is asserted more than once that the Commission has, through competition, intentionally depressed the value of private companies in order to buy them cheaply. It appears from the work, however, that although the companies cut prices to meet the competition they continued to pay good dividends. From this some inference might be drawn as to previous prices.

There is much wailing about the debt created on account of the Commission without any consideration of the benefits created thereby.

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The wicked Commission has with the authority of the government suspended temporarily payments into the sinking fund. Has anybody ever heard of national governments or even private corporations doing such a thing? The chief grievance of the author seems to be that the government in nominally providing for public ownership did not so restrict the territory and the size of the enterprise, and did not so restrict the borrowing and taxing powers, as to cause the enterprise to fail, as is so often done in the United States. The author uses all the familiar arguments about how much taxes the industry would pay in private hands and how much labor it would employ. He predicts that the Hydro will have to raise prices but does not tell us how much its price could be raised and still be lower than the charges of the private companies. He harps much upon the debt, but does not state how much property would be left if the Hydro were liquidated, after all debts were paid, and even after all the charges that the opponents claim should be ascribed to it were met. Nor does he predict what the private companies would be charging had there been no Hydro. The author fully endorses the discredited Wyer report.

In view of the prominence of the author this is probably the most useful document extant for propaganda purposes against public ownership.

JOHN H. GRAY

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

History of Ireland, 1798-1924. By the RT. HON. SIR JAMES O'CONNOR. New York, George H. Doran Company, 1926.—2 vols., viii, 304, 396 pp. $5.00.

Since the history of Ireland is, perhaps more than that of any other country, a subject of controversy in present-day politics, any work on the subject almost necessarily reflects the author's own political views. It is fortunate, indeed, when the views are stated frankly, as in this book, instead of unavowedly influencing the whole treatment.

Sir James O'Connor's political opinions apparently put him in a middle position with regard to the Irish question. Ireland, he holds, must of necessity be closely connected with Great Britain, principally for strategic, but also for economic reasons (vol. II, pp. 253-257). On the other hand, he asserts with equal emphasis that the

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Irish people, for reasons mainly religious, are so essentially different from the English as to make an actual union impossible (vol. I, pp. 141-153). Among the chief disadvantages of the union he puts the era of illusion inaugurated in Irish politics—the illusion of expecting impossible good things for Ireland as soon as the hand of Great Britain should be removed. "What an amount of wrong thinking the denial of self government is responsible for!" (vol. II, p. 241). The treatment throughout makes us clearly aware that right and wrong were mixed on both sides and reminds us frequently that Ireland was not the only country with grievances; thus a description of bad conditions in Ireland is usually balanced by a quotation showing that things were just as bad somewhere else.

The general arrangement of the work is rather strictly chronological; the material included, as well in the social, economic, intellectual, and religious spheres as in the political, is almost entirely limited to matters having some bearing on the Anglo-Irish dispute between 1798 and 1924, and is all treated from that standpoint. Much space is devoted to interpretative discussions and reflections; for instance the passage of the Act of Union is narrated in one page and commented on in three chapters.

The greatest interest of the work is probably in its comments on the men of the period. Sir James states his opinion frankly upon the characters as they pass across the scene; the Irish leaders, from Daniel O'Connell, who "injured rather than served the country" (vol. I, p. 254), to Michael Collins, who "had but a muddled mind", (vol. II, p. 249), probably come off the worst as a group. The character sketches are struck off neatly and skillfully; perhaps the best is that of T. M. Healy (vol. II, pp. 78-82).

The general critical point of view is scarcely mitigated by being frequently humorously expressed. Such remarks as "the Dublin Corporation turned from its more uncongenial and laborious task of mismanaging the City to prate about this entrancing rule of international ethics" (Wilsonian self-determination, vol. II, p. 252) and "the Irish Irelanders ignored most of the facts and all the possibilities of the situation" (vol. II, p. 239) suggest seriousness of opinion as well as satiric vigor. Neither does the ironical suggestion that Michael Collins's enthusiasm for the old Brehon laws was connected with the fact that they punished murder only by fine (vol. II, p. 249) detract from the moral earnestness of his condemnation of the state of mind in Ireland during the so-called "Anglo-Irish war", for which only the prophet Isaiah can provide him with words sufficiently

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strong (vol. II, p. 322). Yet it is quite evident that he enjoys for their own sake the more humorous aspects of the history, such as the "rebellion of 1848" (vol. I, pp. 294-298).

The refutation of patriotic legends occupies a large place in the book; a list is given of eight principal false allegations (vol. II, p. 379) and a number of others are taken up as well; he seems at times to be leaning over backwards in his endeavor to moderate and tone down the Irish nationalist view. This element of refutation is especially prominent in the chapters dealing with the close of the eighteenth century; he almost spends more time in refuting such legends as that the government stirred up the rebellion of 1798 (vol. I, pp. 93-100), and that Ireland was cheated in the Act of Union (vol. I, pp. 121-137) than in narrating what actually did happen.

One cannot help feeling that the main purpose of this book is to promulgate Sir James O'Connor's opinions, and, in spite of his constant "on the one hand this, but on the other hand that" attitude, he puts them forward very definitely. Nevertheless, the book is by no means negligible from a purely historical point of view. We would perhaps be grateful if he indicated more frequently the sources on which he relied; it is, for instance, a bit mystifying to have two different sets of figures given, without any statement of the sources of either, for the number of "pay schools" and pupils in them in 1824 (vol. I, p. 218); but there can be no doubt that he has produced a work which deserves a place among the few good books on Irish political history.

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BOOK NOTES

American civilization is far older than its critics will allow. Mr. Douglas Woodruff's *Plato's American Republic* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1926; 122 pp.; $1.00) is a witness to at least a century of its permanence. Mr. Woodruff, who as a member of the debating team of the Oxford Union Society travelled extensively in this country, has contrived in a deliberately clever parody of a Socratic dialogue to say again what Mrs. Trollope and Dickens once said. He sees in America megalomania, overproduction, the tyranny of mediocrity, disregard for individual liberty, gynecocracy in art and morals, and spiritual discomfort. His unsparing wit is evidently underlain with deep convictions — the Oxford movement piercing through the Oxford Union. And therefore the little book is not without significance. For Mr. Woodruff is honest enough to see that most of what he dislikes is common to the modern world. Scotland, the industrial north of England and London are successively rejected as unfit for the good life according to Plato. Rural England and Oxford emerge as the only possible refuges of civilization. This puts the matter very clearly. If, however, a classical education makes life in the modern world impossible, a decently skeptical mind must ask whether the values acquired from such an education are adequate in themselves. That would imply a method perhaps nearer Socrates's own than Mr. Woodruff's.— CRANE BRINTON.

Proportional Representation, by Messrs. Clarence Gilbert Hoag and George Hervey Hallet (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926; xx, 546 pp.; $5.00), is a compendium that will be of great value to students of electoral methods. The authors, who are the secretaries of the Proportional Representation League, have attempted "a complete treatment of Proportional Representation and its bearing on the solution of the practical problems of a democracy." Chief attention is devoted to the United States, although there is much material on European systems. Messrs. Hoag and Hallett, however, nowhere set forth the essentials of the representative system which they desire to achieve. Their book, in other words, discusses complicated methods of securing mathematically exact minority representation without reference to other problems of govern-

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mental structure. There are dangers in lumping together city councils, state legislatures, Congress, and European parliaments with cabinets responsible to them, and arguing for the same system of proportional representation. Methods of counting heads must take some account of general governmental adjustments. If, in Great Britain, for example, proportional representation would make impossible government by a cabinet backed by a single party, the price may or may not be too high; but the price is in different currency from that paid (or received) by Cleveland. Preaching the proportional gospel without reference to the peculiar political problems of the areas to be saved is the chief defect of the book. Appendices which in length are almost equal to the text contain valuable lists of the communities and organizations which now have proportional representation, quotations from writers for or against the proposal, rules for setting up systems, discussions of such technical matters as the transfer of surpluses, a history of the proportional representation movement, a memorandum on constitutionality under American state constitutions, and bibliographical notes. These latter curiously enough omit Dr. Herman Finer's pamphlet, published by the Fabian Society three years ago. A consideration of its argument might have changed the orientation of Messrs. Hoag and Hallett's book.

On the opposite side of the question (and also not mentioned by the preceding book) is George Horwill's *Proportional Representation* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1925; 153 pp.). The chief merit of this work is the collation of figures on the number of parliamentary groups in various countries before and since the adoption of proportional representation. Whether the increase is due to the change in the electoral system is not clearly demonstrated. Mr. Horwill is inclined to argue *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. The author seems to have started with a dislike of minority representation, and to have "crammed" on European political history and electoral methods to support his arguments. His few remarks on France indicate that he completely misapprehends the nature of the problem in respect of the controversy between *scrutin de liste* and *scrutin d'arrondissement*. He transfers a well known French politician to the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, and when he deals with electoral statistics he ventures comparisons and conclusions which the prophets of proportional representation will have little difficulty in refuting. Appendices give extensive quotations from speeches of parliamentary leaders against proportional representa-

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tion (Bright, Disraeli, Gladstone, MacDonald, Austen Chamberlain) and include the summary of the arguments against proportional representation made in the valuable report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1910.

Such minor problems of electoral machinery do not concern Mr. H. L. Mencken. His *Notes on Democracy* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926; vi, 212 pp.; $2.50) are a raucous and Rabelaisian blast against universal suffrage. Yet it is Mencken, the man of "prejudices", rather than the subject or the method of attack that is interesting. No other modern writer could have written such a book; and had a pale imitation been attempted by anyone else, it would have been largely ignored. Mr. Mencken does not reason; he swears. His volume is a sustained but never monotonous burst of dislike, disdain, satire and abuse, directed against the *booboisie*, the Babbitts, the lowbrow masses, the evangelical churches—in short, the unintelligent four-fifths, and the nitwits they put in office to govern the quintessential élite. This outpouring is not bitter. Mr. Mencken enjoys himself hugely. He treats his audience as the politicians whom he abhors treat their electorates. He appeals not to reason, but to prejudices. He seeks agreement through attempting to annihilate reverence. He argues by ridicule. Yet, if one admits the absurdities, the intolerances, the buffooneries of modern democracy, what is the alternative? Mr. Mencken suggests "a true aristocracy; a clean tradition, culture, public spirit, honesty, honour, courage". Mr. Mencken, however, never seems to realize that such a régime could maintain itself only in an atmosphere of extreme intolerance and by completely destroying that very liberty of thought and speech which he himself prizes so highly and so genuinely.

A frank and realistic account of the conduct of a British election is to be found in Frank Gray's *The Confessions of a Candidate* (London, Martin Hopkinson, 1925; x, 175 pp.). In 1918 Mr. Gray (as a Liberal) unsuccessfully contested the Watford Division of Herts; in 1922 he forced an astonishing change of votes in the city of Oxford, and defeated Sir John Marriott. In 1923 he was reelected by a reduced majority, but was unseated on a petition, and in 1924 he was badly beaten in a three-cornered fight at Central Portsmouth. His experiences in nursing constituencies, before and after the polling, and his frank account of electioneering methods are worth attention as a realistic political exhibit. This will give scant support to the nineteenth-century democratic theory, or to the few remaining believers that *vox populi* is *vox dei*.

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Nearly every writer who discusses the political situation in Cuba has something to say about election evils. Vicente Pardo Suárez devotes the larger part of his volume entitled *Funerales y Responso* (Havana, Imprenta y Papelería de Rambla, Bouza y Ca., 1926; 382 pp.) which deals with political, social and economic conditions in his country to corrupt election practices and suggested remedies. The author is well qualified to conduct an inquiry into the political evils which have distraught his land, because of his long experience (twenty years) as Jefe del Despacho de la Cámara de Representantes, and his intensive study of political problems. He is the author of *La Elección Presidencial en Cuba* and *Prácticas Parlamentarias* (4 vols.). In 1905, as a delegate of Santa Clara, he assisted at the birth of the Liberal Party. By way of introduction, Señor Pardo Suárez has pictured a national infirmary. There he takes the reader and shows him suffrage on its death-bed; the Constitution a corpse, but unburied these many days; and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry dangerously ill. When Suffrage dies (December 15, 1925, date of President Machado's electoral reform law), funeral services are conducted over the remains. This occasions the unique title of the volume. The introduction reflects the atmosphere of the whole book, for the author is emphatically pessimistic. From the birth of the Republic elections have been notoriously corrupt. A first period of bad conditions reached a crisis in the election of 1905, which was followed by revolution, and United States intervention. Then in 1908 an election law was enacted which contained many excellent features. The fraudulent elections of 1916 and 1918, however, created such a storm of bitter criticism that President Menocal bowed to public demand and invited General Crowder to assist in the drafting of a new election law. The Crowder Suffrage Code contained provisions designed not only to insure honest elections, but also to break the control of the corrupt political machines. But within six months after the passage of the law, the first steps were taken to modify it. Thereafter "those capital points which prevented the professional politicians from controlling electoral legislation and moulding it to suit their convenience" were amended, with the result that by December 15, 1925, when President Machado enacted the last "modification," the value of the code was destroyed. Another political evil which Señor Pardo Suárez discusses at length is the "presidential reelection." The presidents who look for reelection are tempted to use their power and the power of all governmental officials to attain their ambition. There is no instance in Cuban history of a president's

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failing to be reelected; a president in control of the army and the political machinery must have a veritable national uprising against him to lose an election. "Reelection means revolution," says Señor Pardo Suárez, and therefore he advocates as "the only remedy for the election malady" a constitutional amendment allowing but a single six-year term for president and vice-president. It is interesting to note that this suggested amendment is in line with tendencies in other Latin-American countries. Only three, Santo Domingo, Peru, and Nicaragua, allow presidential reelection. Although it is conceded that the single term might make for fewer revolutions, the example of the recent transference of power from Zayas to Machado is eloquent testimony of the fact that administrations will continue to dominate elections. In a few pages the author discusses the "economic crisis," for which he suggests, by way of remedy, that Cuba break away from her present absolute dependence on sugar and tobacco. His self-assurance in prescribing remedies is refreshing. The book was designed obviously for Cuban consumption, and specifically to provoke discussion. By that token numerous exaggerated statements regarding Cuba's degradation can be readily explained. The book is sufficiently sensational to accomplish its purpose.—J. LLOYD MECHAM.

The recent *Report on the Resumption of Gold Payments by the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, The Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1925; xlvii, 598 pp.), by Professor E. W. Kemmerer and Dr. Gerard Vissering, marks the virtual close of another chapter in the world's struggle to regain the gold standard. During and immediately after the war, South Africa went through a period of inflation much like that experienced in the other belligerent countries, followed by a similar period of painful deflation. By the end of 1924, however, the country found itself in a peculiar position. Its currency pound had long been tied to the English pound sterling, but was now distinctly above the value of the latter — was, indeed, slightly above par. Moreover, the act making bank notes inconvertible was to lapse in June, 1924. These conditions led the South African government to appoint Messrs. Kemmerer and Vissering as an advisory commission. Three alternatives presented themselves. South Africa could unequivocally tie its currency to the pound sterling, thus deliberately accepting all the vicissitudes to which the latter might be exposed; it could follow sterling only to a stipulated degree of depreciation, as 10%; or it could return independently to the gold standard, thus severing all necessary connection with the

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British monetary unit. The last alternative is the one the commissioners urgently advised, and the thirty-odd pages in which they defend their conclusion is a masterpiece of terse, realistic argument. The report was submitted in January, 1925, and its recommendations were to be given effect at the end of June, but the return of Great Britain itself to the gold standard in April put an end to the whole problem: it provided a dramatic solution *ex machina.* In the following month all restrictions on the export of gold were removed. Certain other parts of the report, however, have a more permanent value. These are the sections dealing with the South African Reserve Bank, and with the general financial practice. In essence, the report recommends an increase in the sphere of activity and the degree of control of the Reserve Bank, to give it in actuality the important rôle it was originally designed to play. It is regrettable (see the *Economic Journal* for December, 1925, pp. 565-567) that these latter recommendations do not seem as yet to have received serious attention in governmental and financial circles.

The educational activities of the University of North Carolina and the work of the group of students of society, the record of whose activity is written in the *Journal of Social Forces,* have excited much interest and received much praise. An example of this enterprise is found in *Southern Pioneers* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1925; 221 pp.; $2.00) edited by Howard W. Odum. This stimulating book consists of an introductory essay by the editor and a group of character sketches by a number of collaborators. The editor's thesis is to point out the promise of southern leadership. To a great degree the South has been unproductive of leaders since the Civil War—its post-bellum generations lacked experience, were sensitive and self-righteous, there was no adequate university equipment of teachers and disciples, the environment was not sympathetic spiritually or economically to preachers of new ideas. But in spite of this the South has produced its pioneers in the new leadership, in the leadership that will contribute to the much needed national "renaissance of intellectual conviction, spiritual rejuvenation and stable morality." It is of these pioneers that this book tells: Woodrow Wilson fighting for an ideal; Walter Hines Page propagandizing for a wider and more national social viewpoint; Aycock, Graham and Booker T. Washington laboring to spread education; Madeline M. Breckinridge, effective worker for social betterment and women's equality; Seaman A. Knapp, promoter of agricultural knowledge and foresight; Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, restless and versatile planter of

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the seed of culture; and Joel Chandler Harris, literary realist attempting to strike the scales from the eyes of the socially blind. It is a group which makes the reader grow more optimistic. Is the "lost cause" forgotten? Has the South found another?—R. F. NICHOLS.

The student of comparative banking and finance will find much to interest him in H. E. Teare's *Australian Banking, Currency and Finance* (Sydney, N. S. W., Alexander Hamilton Institute of Australia, Ltd., 1926; xx, 316 pp.). This is a study of present-day monetary and banking procedure in Australia and New Zealand. The treatment is primarily descriptive and expository. Some space is given to historical development but not a great deal. In a separate booklet accompanying the main volume Mr. Teare also presents a *Digest of Australian and New Zealand Banking and Currency Legislation.* As the digest is chronologically arranged it affords something like an historical background for the text of the main volume.

Another contribution to economic knowledge has come from the productive pen of Dr. Radhakamal Mukerjee, entitled *Ground Work of Economics* (New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1925; viii, 217 pp.; $1.80). The author has already made important contributions to economics, and this volume, a simple and clear statement by one well-grounded in economic theory who knows well the economic situation in India, will not detract from the reputation he has already acquired. Professor Mukerjee works in the borderland of economics, for he is interested in sociology, geography, psychology and biology. This volume is not intended to contribute greatly to the stock of knowledge which the thorough-going student of Indian economics has, but rather to stimulate those who have not interested themselves greatly in the economics of Hindustan. The author also aims to provide assistance to the Indian students of economics who are preparing for their baccalaureate examinations. Some of the chapter titles will show the breadth of the author's interest: Incentives to Work, Basis of Prosperity, Welfare, Problem of Food, The Rise of "Big Business", Distribution of Population, Rural Reconstruction, Lines of Economic Development. While the material in the book relates specifically to India, Professor Mukerjee frequently compares this country's economic institutions with those of other countries. The treatment, however, is much more concrete than that contained in his larger work, *Principles of Comparative Economics.* —W. E. WELD.

Although, because of the speed with which events have moved during the past year, some of his hopeful expectations have been

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blasted and some of his material seems oddly out of date, yet every student interested in the French fiscal crisis will profit by reading the Hon. George Peel's *The Financial Crisis of France* (London, Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1925; ix, 323 pp.; $4.25). The sympathetic viewpoint consistently maintained by the author in his study of the French situation is shown in the following quotation: "From age to age during two thousand years, a people of marvelous industry and intelligence have seen the profits of their labor intermittently swept away. Their earnings have been claimed in turn by irresistible Imperial Rome, by the feudal barons, by mediæval and Hanoverian England, by the gay and greedy princes of Versailles, by the Germany of blood and iron, by the Russia of the Bolsheviks" (page 9). Peel shows that from the beginning the French people have been the victims of bad public finance. The Great War merely intensified difficulties that had long been operative, and the colossal demands which the war generated simply overwhelmed a basically weak fiscal structure. Peel thought that the main crisis had developed—and he hoped that with Caillaux's return it had also been met—in September, 1925. He was wrong there, but that does not in the least alter the fact that his book is a great help to a sympathetic understanding of the French fiscal problem.

In his little book, *A Groundwork of Economics* (Dublin, The Educational Company of Ireland, Ltd., 1925; 112 pp.), Joseph Johnston undertakes to treat the entire body of general economic theory. Merely to put so much substance between two narrowly separated covers is a feat which requires ingenuity and skill. The language employed is as non-technical as the subject will permit—it apparently is leveled down for the lay reader. Yet its very terseness causes the book to bristle with implications and unheralded assumptions which probably could be clear and understandable only to a student of economics. Mr. Johnston, an Irishman, must have a program of economic reform for Ireland. Such a program is hinted at, but not put forward in any comprehensive manner in his book. At random intervals in the text there are injected admonitions to the Irish people to develop their potential electrical power, to organize their farmers into cooperative buying and selling organizations, to foster business enterprise, and to establish cooperative agricultural credit banks. These bits of advice are not very well fitted to the context, and are not backed by argument or justified by data.—HORACE TAYLOR.

Common Wealth, A Study in Social Philosophy (New York, The Century Company, 1925, xii, 472 pp.; $3.00) boldly and searchingly

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appraises our contemporary economic system and the postulates and assumptions of our orthodox economic theory, with special emphasis on our contemporary economic system. The author, C. G. Campbell, essays to present his material in such a fashion that it may be grasped by a reader of "average intelligence". Yet it is not a book for persons unacquainted with economic technique: neither is it a book for lip-readers. The entire work is divided into three books. The first is dialectical; it controverts the generally accepted nomenclature and significances of economic theory, sets up a specialized terminology, and classifies economic phenomena into new categories. Natural laws are expounded, "the compelling conditions in the Nature of Things to which men must conform in order to create and attain wealth". Wealth is not an inventory of things possessing value; it is held to be a "plenitude of worldly goods." And the concept of plenitude is "crystallized in the idea of a surplus". Therefore wealth includes only such goods as are over and above the needs of consumption. All wealth is Common Wealth because it is "indissolubly coupled to collective action in its production and to common benefit in its subsequent utile application." The author casts aside the conventional categories of productive elements as irrational and makes his own classification of factors: matter, energy, and volition. In Book Two the cultural characteristics of economic society are exposed and analyzed. In our artificial economy motivation is essentially bilateral —toward exploitation and acquisition. This latter movement is responsible for the powerful influence of "exchangeable value" and money price in directing cultural and economic conduct. The author adopts the position that price has no essential conformity to "true economic value". The rules of the acquisitive game are metaphysical rather than natural: hence the convention of private property. The author holds that the exaction of economic tolls is only made possible by the sequestration convention, which is a human establishment and not a natural condition. The only justification for such tolls is an appropriate contribution to Common Wealth. In Book Three the wastes and losses, material and psychic, which inhere in the processes of the artificial economy are set forth. The author looks into the future and promises greater happiness on one hand, dire disaster on the other. "Common Wealth, rightly utilized, is both the physical basis of and the great means to racial spiritual progress." But misused individual wealth and abused individual power can lead only to racial sterility and social death. So the author leaves us at the crossroads.—HORACE TAYLOR.

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Among the requisites of clear thinking enjoined by the science of statistics is that of appropriate classification. Following this injunction, there appears to be need of classifying the ever-enlarging number of statistical text books now available for the American college. We might divide these into those which are mathematical and those which are non-mathematical in presentation. In the case of the latter, we might again separate those which deal with the logic of statistical method *as such* from those which are designed for some special type of student. Chaddock's *Principles and Methods of Statistics,* would be an example of the first. As to the second we have books on "business" statistics, "educational" statistics, "vital" statistics, and so on. Accepting the essential validity of this kind of departmentalization of statistical application, there would seem to be room for a logical filling-out of the remaining social disciplines with an appropriate statistical treatise specially devised for the needs of each. In other words, we need books on sociological statistics, political statistics, anthropological statistics, and possibly historical statistics and religious and moral statistics as well. The first of these gaps has been almost simultaneously preempted by two capable American sociologists, Professor Clarence G. Dittmer of the University of Wisconsin with his *Introduction to Social Statistics* (Chicago and New York: A. W. Shaw Company, 1926; x, 167 pp.; $2.50) and Professor Manuel C. Elmer, head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, with *Social Statistics* (Los Angeles: Jesse Ray Miller, 1926; 306 pp.; $2.50). These are closely similar in aim and within the elementary and introductory scope of each, both are creditable pieces of work. Both exhibit the prevailing *tabloid* tendency among elementary texts in this field. Dittmer, for example, devotes the first two-thirds of his book to topics, preliminary to statistical analysis, which may be treated without reference to formulae. These are presented in an interesting and unambiguous style and may be trusted to dissipate as far as they carry him (as the author hopes) any anti-statistical "complex" that the student may possess. But this "introduction" would surely have to be followed by a less elementary discussion of statistical analysis, as is evidently intended, before the student would be very well equipped to do any statistical work on his own account. One is reminded by the whole attempt to simplify statistics of similar efforts to deprive tobacco and coffee of their narcotic elements. According to devotees of these drugs, the efforts to purify them are not wholly satisfactory. An undergraduate associate of the

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present writer once gained campus fame by his proposal to rewrite the Bible from an atheistic standpoint; but his subsequent reputation as a professor of economics has been more substantial. May it not be similar with the endeavor to remove its quantitative aspects from statistics? The reviewer is not certain that a positive answer should be forthcoming, and in any event the query is not intended as a criticism of the two books under attention, both of which are distinctly more successful than any other books of the tabloid type which have hitherto come to his attention. Elmer's book, when used in connection with the problems and references at the end of each chapter, would probably prove to be a very satisfactory text for "students of sociology and social work" of the type which the author has in mind. But this raises another question, conceded at the outset of this note for the sake of the argument. Just what are "social" as distinct from "educational" or "economic" or "vital" statistics? At this point it will be wise to stop, for the reviewer confesses that he does not know, and he hesitates to start his brethren once more to quarreling.—STUART A. RICE.

For a number of years *An Introduction to Statistical Methods* by Horace Secrist, first published in 1917, was one of the two standard text-books on the subject generally employed in American colleges. In the revised edition (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925; xxxiii, 584 pp.; $2.00) the earlier book has been "entirely rewritten, enlarged, simplified, rearranged, more fully illustrated, and, it is hoped, the principles more accurately stated" (Preface). The result is substantially a new treatise, about a hundred pages greater in length, although the same general arrangement of subject matter is followed. A comparison of the two editions provides something of a measure of the amount and the direction of the progress that has occurred during the eight years intervening, for both present a résumé of the prevailing practices, at the time of writing, in a comprehensive and thorough manner. The most striking developments have undoubtedly been those of Warren M. Persons and others in the analysis of time series and their utilization for prediction in the realm of business. There was very little to be said on this subject in 1917. An entire new chapter is devoted to it by the author in 1925. To a lesser degree the same may be said of the chapters dealing with index numbers, which have been extensively revised in the light of outstanding contributions by Wesley C. Mitchell and Irving Fisher. Another wholly new chapter is that on "The Theory of Probability and some Properties of the Normal Law of Error Distribution."

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The revision will undoubtedly restore the book to a favored position among the small number of preferred texts for college use.—STUART A. RICE.

A text on "elementary methods" of "statistical control," prepared "without resort to the use of higher mathematics" and making "no claim to originality in the types of analyses given," is far from being a present-day novelty. This statement of aim by William G. Sutcliffe in his *Elementary Statistical Methods* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1925; xvii, 338 pp.; $3.00) might serve equally well in introducing half a dozen other books now available in the same field. This being the case, the author's work must be judged in large part upon style and clarity of presentation. In these respects he leaves much to be desired. Figures of speech tend to be overdrawn, and he may be accused of using platitudes. "Every concern has its own particular problems and they should be dealt with in a scientific manner" (p. 13). "Statistics, however, like the lighthouse, merely *indicate* the channel to follow, society may take its bearings or it may be so blinded by sentiment and passion as to ignore the light and eventually pile society up on the rocks of financial ruin" (p. 12). Again, it is not clear whether in his introductory effort to "sell" his subject to the reader, the author means by "statistics" the figures which result from analysis or the analytical methods by means of which they are obtained (chap. ii). The arrangement of the volume is based upon a separation of the treatment of frequency series and time series. An impression of immaturity and lack of balance is conveyed by the volume as a whole. For example, only half a page is devoted to the subject of correlating time series. On pages 75, 83, 145, 164 and elsewhere there are charts or tables without captions.—STUART A. RICE.

Le Problème de la Colonisation Franque et du Régime Agraire dans la Basse-Belgique (Brussels, Hayem, Imprimeur de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1926; 191 pp., with maps and diagrams), by G. Des Marez, is really an extract from the *Mémoires* of the Royal Academy of Belgium. The importance of the subject for medieval history and the distinction of the author in legal and economic history, however, justify separate publication. The first part of the work controverts the claim Wauters made in 1885 that maritime Flanders was not colonized by Saxons. Using law as a guide, Des Marez goes back to the position of Vanderkindere that the Saxons did settle along the coast (as well as in Brabant), while in between these two, occupying the valleys

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of the Lys and the Scheldt, were the Salian Franks. The longer part of the treatise has to do with the type of agrarian organization in the three parts of southwestern Belgium mentioned above. Meitzen had assigned the district to the *Hofsystem*, or scattered farm type, associated with the Celts. Des Marez combats this view, arguing that, while in the Salian district of the Lys and the Scheldt and in the coast district of Flanders the *Hofsystem* did prevail, nevertheless in the Saxon settlement of Brabant the village system had been established. This was not the nucleated village but the street or river type. Of course, this distinction does not appear to involve so much of a difference, when we remember that by the author's own showing, the village homesteads were spread out in a line and that the homesteads were in neither case very near the fields. According to the author, Meitzen's theory of ethnical influence in the determination of the form of settlement is incorrect. In its place should be put, as far as the district under consideration is concerned, a water theory. If drinking water is scarce or deep, as in Brabant, the homesteads have to be nearer together, while if, as in the Lys-Scheldt district, it lies near the surface, they may be quite dispersed. In the former case, the homesteads have to be near to the available supply wherever it can be found; in the latter they can be placed here or there at will. This argument might have more plausibility if the nucleated type of village (in Brabant) were in question. The author himself explains the scattered homesteads of maritime Flanders rather on grounds of later colonization by the Saxons who wrung from desert sands an isolated farm here and there amid irregular dykes and roads. The two parts, ethnical and agrarian, have not been carefully integrated. The evidence for the colonization which took place from the fourth to the ninth century comes from records that are centuries and in some cases a thousand years removed from the events. The suggestion of a *hydraulic interpretation* is interesting, but it can hardly be regarded as established by the author.—N. S. B. GRAS.

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